An assemblage of discrimination and social preferences by Gagnon, Nickolas
 
 
 
An assemblage of discrimination and social
preferences
Citation for published version (APA):
Gagnon, N. (2020). An assemblage of discrimination and social preferences. Maastricht University.
https://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20200909ng
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2020
DOI:
10.26481/dis.20200909ng
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 06 Jan. 2021


c© Nickolas Gagnon, Maastricht 2020
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in an
automated data system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of
the author.
The author acknowledges financial support from Maastricht University and the
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and Sylvain.

Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Effect of Unfair Chances and Gender Discrimination on Labor
Supply 5
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
II. Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II.A Unequal Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II.B Unfair Chances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II.C Gender Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
III. Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
IV. Study Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV.A Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
IV.B Online Labor Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV.C Procedures and Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
V. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
VI. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
VI.A Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
VI.B Test of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
VI.C Exploratory Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
VII. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VII.A Unequal Wages and Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
VII.B Fairness of Chances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
VII.C Discrimination, Labor Supply, and the Gender Gap in Earn-
ings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
VII.D Possible Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
VIII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.A. Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.B. Additional Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.C. Instructions of the Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.C.A Invitation Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.C.B Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3 On Your Own Side of the Fence 55
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
II. Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
II.A Wage and Ethnicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II.B Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II.C Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
II.D Redistribution Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
II.E Choosing Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Income Interactions . . . 63
II.F Friendships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
II.G Additional Procedural Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
III. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IV. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IV.A Overview Redistribution Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IV.B Testing the Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
IV.C Exploratory Analyses—Interaction Decisions . . . . . . . . 71
V. Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.A. Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.B. Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.C. Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 Reciprocity under Brief and Long Time Delays 91
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
II. Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
II.A Procedures Common to all Experiments . . . . . . . . . . 96
II.B Procedures Specific to Each Experiment . . . . . . . . . . 98
III. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
IV. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
IV.A Summary of the Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
IV.B Evaluation of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
V. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.A. Supplemental Information Regarding Wage and Effort . . . . . . 113
4.B. Analysis of the Relationship between Wages, Emotions, and Ef-
fort, using FaceReader Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.C. Analysis of Employers’ Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.D. Instructions (for Tucson-H) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.E. Email Reminders for Long-term Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5 Unequal Chances: Ex Ante Fairness and Individual Control 131
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
II. Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
III. Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
IV. Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
V. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.A. Instructions Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.B. Instructions Individual Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.C. Additional Information Concerning the Reverse Block . . . . . . . 151
List of Figures
2.1 Presentation of the Procedure Determining the Wages and Pre-
sentation of Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Mean Labor Supply per Payment Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Mean Labor Supply per Gender and Payment Scheme . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1 Scatter Plots of Short- and Long-term Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
List of Tables
2.1 Wages and Chances of Two Workers in a Pair for each Payment
Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 Demographic Characteristics of Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Predicted Labor Supply in Each Payment Scheme . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Labor Supply per Payment Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Tobit Regressions of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes . . . . . 25
2.6 P-values of Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Pay-
ment Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.7 Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes with Both
Types of Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.8 P-values of Predicted Differences in Labor Supply Effect of Pay-
ment Schemes between Low-Wage Workers and High-Wage Work-
ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.9 Labor Supply of Low-Wage Men and Women in UNEQUNFAIR and
UNEQDISCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.10 Tobit Regression of Labor Supply in UNEQUNFAIR and UNEQDISCR,
for Low-Wage Men and Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.11 Labor Supply per Gender and Payment Scheme . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.12 Tests of Inequalities in Labor Supply between Payment Schemes,
for Men and Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.13 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between
Payment Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.14 Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Men
and Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.15 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between
Payment Schemes, for Men and Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.16 P-Value of Test that Positive Discrimination of Women does not
Affect their Labor Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.17 Hurdle Model (Labor Supply on Payment Schemes), for Low-
Wage Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.18 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between
Payment Schemes, Hurdle Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.19 Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Young
(age ≤ 36) and Old (age > 36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.20 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between
Payment Schemes, for Young (age ≤ 36) and Old (age > 36) . . . 45
2.21 Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Em-
ployed Full Time and Not Employed Full Time . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.22 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between
Payment Schemes, for Employed Full Time and Not Employed
Full Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.23 Tobit Regression of Time Spent in the Experiment on Payment
Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.24 P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Time Spent in the Exper-
iment between Payment Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.25 Labor Supply per Payment Scheme, for Workers not Beating the
Odds and Workers Beating the Odds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.26 P-Values of Tests on Difference in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes, for Workers Beating the Odds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1 Treatments—Types of Contact with the Poor by the Rich . . . . . 62
3.2 Redistribution Rates and Resulting Distributions of Earnings . . . 64
3.3 Summary of Redistribution Rates Chosen by the Rich . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with
the Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution . . . . . . . . . 70
3.5 Percentage of Participants Choosing to be paired with a Cau-
casian in Each Rank, for Caucasians and Minorities . . . . . . . . 72
3.6 OLS Regression Estimates—Difference in Number of Caucasians
in First and Last Four Ranks, for Caucasians and Minorities . . . . 73
3.7 Choices of Contact with the Poor, and Tests of Equality of Choices,
for the Poor and the Rich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.8 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with
the Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including All
Participants with a Friend in the Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.9 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the
Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including Partici-
pants with a Friend who Interact with their Friend in their Con-
tact with the Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.10 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the
Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including Partici-
pants with a Friend who do not Interact with their Friend in their
Contact with the Poor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.11 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the
Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Subgroup of the
Caucasian Rich who Choose more often to Interact with Caucasians 81
3.12 Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with
the Poor on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Subgroup of
the Rich who Choose to Avoid Contact with the Poor . . . . . . . 82
4.1 Procedural Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2 Summary of Participants’ Average Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3 Average Effort by Wage Range, for Short- and Long-Term Workers 104
4.4 Estimates of Tobit Regression (4.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.5 Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.6 Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort as well as be-
tween the Unfairness Indicator I and Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.7 Estimates of Tobit Regressions (4.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8 Average Effort by Wage Range, for Short- and Long-Term Work-
ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.9 Estimates of Tobit Regression of Effort on Wage and Delay . . . . 115
4.10 Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort for Both Types
of Worker in Each Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.11 Estimates of Tobit Regressions of Effort on Emotions (4.1) . . . . 118
4.12 Effect of Wage on Emotional Changes in Workers . . . . . . . . . 120
4.13 Tobit Regression of Employers’ Effort Predictions on Short- and
Long-term Wage Offered, and OLS Regression of Employers’ Dif-
ference in Effort Predictions on the Wage Offered . . . . . . . . . 120
5.1 Criteria for receiving higher chances in the Regular and Reverse
Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.2 Mean Fairness and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons . . . 140
5.3 Asymmetries and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons . . . . 142
5.4 Mean Control and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons . . . 142
5.5 Mean Fairness and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons—
Reverse Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.6 Mean Control and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons—
Reverse Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152


Chapter 1
Introduction
The topics that bind this thesis, apart from the methodology and conceptual
framework—experimental and behavioral economics—are discrimination and
social preferences. They also represent my main research interests for the fore-
seeable future.
The Nature of Prejudice is social psychologist Gordon Allport’s 1954 master-
piece. It complements the large body of work that economists have accumu-
lated on discrimination (e.g., from taste-based (Becker, 1957) and statistical
(Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973) reasons, to more recent work, based on language
(Lang, 1986), implicit discrimination (Bertrand et al., 2005), attention (Bartoš
et al., 2016) or stereotypes (Bordalo et al., 2016)). Aside from its dissection of
prejudice, the book considers the behavior of individuals facing discrimination,
a fascinating topic that the reader will recognize in chapter 2. It sheds light
upon several ageless issues rarely scrutinized by economists. Furthermore, two
influential articles form the starting point of chapter 3: Luttmer (2001) and
Dahlberg et al. (2012). They both provide empirical evidence from economics,
correlational for the first and quasi-causal for the second, that living close to
the poor of another ethnicity decreases support for redistributive policies in a
society.
Social preferences stand at the forefront of each chapter that I present here.
The most successful models of those preferences are arguably inequality or
inequity aversion (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000)
and reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Chap-
ter 2 does explore workplace consequences of inequality aversion, but focuses
more on its less-studied cousin, the preference for a fair chance (e.g., Diamond,
1967), and also examines the specific dislike for gender discrimination. Chap-
ter 3 delves into the interplay of inequality aversion and ethnic discrimination
for redistribution decisions. Chapter 4 is about whether the passing of time
1
perturbs reciprocal behavior, once more in the context of labor markets.
Experiments are my methodology of choice; two chapters make use of the
laboratory and one recruits workers on an online labor platform. I find that
the most attractive part of experiments is the opportunity (and challenge) of
designing the “perfect” environment for what one aims to study. The tight con-
trol of the experimental environment, including random assignment to treat-
ments, offers the ability to draw clean causal conclusions, often an arduous or
impossible task with observational data. A natural question that arises for an
experimentalist is the one of external validity, i.e., how related are behavior
inside and outside of the experiment, especially when using the laboratory? On
this account, a number of articles (e.g., Karlan 2005; Benz and Meier 2008;
Baran et al. 2010; Dohmen et al. 2011; Franzen and Pointner 2013; Cohn et al.
2015; Buser et al. 2014; Herbst and Mas 2015; Potters and Stoop 2016; Riedl
and Smeets 2017; Fisman et al. 2017; Falk et al. 2018) provide evidence that
simple experiments do offer very useful information for understanding behav-
ior across diverse domains, from donations, lying behavior, loan repayment,
work behavior and career choices, to political votes and socially-responsible
investments. Moreover, Snowberg and Yariv (2018) show that, for a range of
common experimental measures, behavior is qualitatively similar in the lab-
oratory with undergraduate students, on online labor platforms, and using a
sample representative of the population.
The Effect of Unfair Chances and Gender Discrimination on Labor Supply is
the straightforward title of chapter 2, co-authored with Kristof Bosmans and
Arno Riedl, and the most recent work collected for this thesis. Using an ex-
periment on an online labor platform, we present the first investigation of the
causal effects of unfair chances in receiving a high or low wage and of gender
discrimination (through gender-discriminatory unfair chances) on labor supply
decisions of workers. Interestingly, its results provide a new mechanism for the
lower labor supply of women, which is a prominent explanation for the gender
earnings gap.
On Your Own Side of the Fence is the single-authored chapter 3. Its conno-
tative title comes from Flannery O’Connor’s 1965 short story Everything That
Rises Must Converge, staged in the American South during the Civil Rights pe-
riod. Using a laboratory experiment, this study explores the causal mechanism
behind the existing literature’s finding that living close to poor individuals of
another ethnicity decreases support for income redistribution. It also examines
whether those inter-ethnic and inter-income interactions actually occur when
2
individuals are given the choice. This additional feature allows me to provide
a distinct interpretation of the effect of inter-ethnic proximity with the poor on
redistribution. The chapter is a much-reshaped version of a design I created
several years ago, and the sessions were conducted during my Arizona visits.
Reciprocity under Brief and Long Delays is my first research project, which re-
sulted in chapter 4, co-authored with Charles N. Noussair and appearing in the
July 2020 issue of Economic Inquiry. With a laboratory experiment, we study
whether time erodes the positive wage-effort relationship commonly found in
the short term in incomplete contract settings. This work starts with a question
I had in Charles’ course during my research master’s degree, concerning one of
experimental economics’ most influential articles: Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl
(1993).
A supplementary contribution to this thesis appears in chapter 5. It is a
short work co-authored with Let́ıcia Micheli and served as a stepping stone
for chapter 2. Using a survey, we investigate empirically the role of different
sources of unequal chances in shaping fairness perceptions of those chances.
Without further ado, the research.
3
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Unfair Chances
and Gender Discrimination on
Labor Supply
Abstract
Labor market opportunities and wages may be unfair for various reasons, and
how workers respond to different types of unfairness can have major economic
consequences. Using an online labor platform, where workers engage in an
individual task for a piece-rate wage, we investigate the causal effect of neu-
tral and gender-discriminatory unfair chances on labor supply. We randomize
workers into treatments where we control relative pay and chances to receive a
low or a high wage. Chances can be fair, unfair based on an unspecified source,
or unfair based on gender discrimination. Unequal pay reduces labor supply
of low-wage workers, irrespective of whether the low wage is the result of fair
or unfair chances. Importantly, the source of unfair chances matters. When
a low wage is the result of gender-discriminatory chances, workers matched
with a high-wage worker substantially reduce their labor supply compared to
the case of equal low wages (−22%). This decrease is twice as large as those
induced by low wages due to fair chances or unfair chances coming from an
unspecified source. In addition, exploratory analysis suggests that in response
to unequal pay, low-wage male workers reduce labor supply irrespective of the
source of inequality, whereas low-wage female workers reduce labor supply
only if unequal pay is due to gender-discriminatory chances. Our results con-
cerning gender discrimination indicate a new reason for the lower labor supply
of women, which is a prominent explanation for the gender gap in earnings.
This chapter is co-authored with Kristof Bosmans and Arno Riedl.
5
I. Introduction
Chances are a pervasive feature of labor market activities and outcomes. Work-
ers are confronted with them when they face hiring, bonus payment, promo-
tion, and dismissal decisions. Those chances might be fair, but can also be
unfair for many reasons, ranging from favoritism and nepotism to discrimina-
tion. For instance, recent work suggests that women evaluated for tenure in
economics departments face lower chances than men of equal ability (Sarsons
et al., 2019). In this paper, using an experiment, we present the first investiga-
tion of the causal impact of unfair chances in receiving a high or low wage on
labor supply decisions of workers. Moreover, we provide the first examination
of the causal effect of gender discrimination (through gender-discriminatory
unfair chances) on labor supply decisions.
Recent work has shown that unequal pay can have major effects on workers’
behavior, such as reduced labor supply and productivity as well as increased
job separations (Bracha et al., 2015; Breza et al., 2018; Dube et al., 2019).
At the same time, a lasting idea in economics is that unfair chances influence
equity judgments (e.g., Diamond, 1967), and empirical studies have provided
support for this claim (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen
et al., 2013).1 Combining the results of those two strands of literature suggests
that unequal chances on labor markets may also affect workers’ behavior sig-
nificantly, although this has yet to be studied. Moreover, that inequality comes
from a specific source such as gender discrimination may generate especially
strong responses. In spite of this, whether gender-discriminatory inequality
does provoke reactions that are distinct from more neutral inequality has thus
far not been examined.
To investigate the causal effect of unfair chances and gender discrimination
on labor supply, we conduct a controlled experiment. We use an online labor
platform, where we hire workers who individually engage in a task at a fixed
piece-rate wage. We can draw causal conclusions by fully controlling both the
chances leading to pay inequality between workers and the source of these
chances. Workers first learn the procedure that will determine their wage as
well as the wage of another worker, which can be high or low. Then, workers
are informed of their own and the other worker’s resulting wage, after which
they decide individually how much to work.
1Psychologists have suggested that procedures regarded as unfair can engender undesirable
work behavior, such as decreased productivity and retaliation (e.g., Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry
1980, Skarlicki and Folger 1997).
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To cleanly isolate the effect of chances and their source on labor supply,
we implement a design that rules out peer interactions, risk, and reciprocity
considerations. Providing less labor is costly to workers because it reduces
their own earnings, but has no other effects. An important feature of our design
is that we implement an explicit gender-discriminatory policy, which has been
approved by the local ethical review committee.2 Moreover, the use of an online
labor platform provides us with a relatively large number of participants who
are arguably more representative than student participants. The anonymity of
the online platform also helps in avoiding peer effects from observing other
workers quitting the task.3
In our experiment we measure labor supply in the real effort task and im-
plement five different payment schemes (treatments) where we create wage
inequality through fair or unfair chances and also vary the source of unfair
chances. We randomize each worker into one of the five schemes. In each
scheme, a worker is anonymously matched with another worker engaged in
the same individual task. In two baseline schemes, called EQLOW and EQHIGH,
both workers receive the low wage or receive the high wage, respectively. In
these schemes, we do not mention the procedure that determines the wages. In
the other three schemes workers in a pair receive unequal wages: one receives
the high wage and one receives the low wage. In the payment scheme UNEQ-
FAIR, both workers have a fair chance (50%) of receiving the high wage. By
contrast, in the schemes called UNEQUNFAIR and UNEQDISCR one worker has
a 25% chance of receiving the high wage and the other has a 75% chance. In
the former scheme no specific source for the unfair chances is mentioned. In
the latter scheme, pairs of workers consist of a man and a woman, and they
are informed that their chances depend on their gender. One worker has a 25%
chance of receiving the high wage explicitly because she is woman or he is a
man, whereas the other worker has a 75% chance because he is man or she is
a woman.
To derive our hypotheses regarding labor supply in the different schemes,
we provide a theoretical framework which extends the framework on inequality
aversion and work morale by Card, Mas, Moretti, and Saez (2012) and Breza,
Kaur, and Shamdasani (2018) with the model of social preferences incorporat-
ing chances by Saito (2013). The model assumes that workers engaged in the
same work dislike wage inequality, and more so if this wage inequality is the
2Ethical Review Committee Inner City of Maastricht University (ID: ERCIC-054-15-11-2017).
3In Section IV.B we discuss potential drawbacks of online experiments and how we minimize
them.
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result of unfair chances. Both unfair chances and wage inequality increase the
marginal disutility of working, thus reducing labor supply. In addition, we posit
that gender discrimination as the source of unfair chances creates an extra psy-
chological cost that further increases workers’ marginal disutility from unequal
treatment.
We compare the labor supply of workers at a given wage across payment
schemes, and test four pre-registered hypotheses. Our first and second hypoth-
esis states that for both low-wage workers and high-wage workers, unequal
wages, unfair chances, and gender discrimination each incrementally decrease
labor supply. Our third hypothesis says that these effects are stronger for low-
wage workers than for high-wage workers. Finally, our fourth hypothesis con-
jectures that men and women may not react equally to gender-discriminatory
chances compared to the same unfair chances coming from an unspecified
source.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In line with the first hy-
pothesis, low-wage workers in worker pairs with unequal pay who receive their
low wage through fair chances work significantly less (−13%) than low-wage
workers who are matched with another low-wage worker. This effect of wage
inequality is consistent with results reported in the three previous studies on
the topic (Bracha et al., 2015; Breza et al., 2018; Dube et al., 2019). Inter-
estingly, the fact that in our case fair chances determine the unequal pay does
not remove this negative effect. Further, in contrast to the first hypothesis, low
wages resulting from unfair chances based on an unspecified source produce a
similar labor supply as low wages based on fair chances. However, low-wage
workers do significantly decrease their labor supply if they face unfair gender-
discriminatory chances. The average impact of gender discrimination on labor
supply is significant and large in economic terms. Low wages resulting from
unfair gender-discriminatory chances reduce labor supply by 15% relative to
low wages coming from unfair chances based on an unspecified source, and by
22% relative to equal low wages.
In contrast, high-wage workers appear to be immune to the different types of
inequality that we employ. In no case is their labor supply significantly different
in one payment scheme than in another. Thus, the second hypothesis is not
supported.
The third hypothesis, that the adverse effects on labor supply are stronger
for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers, holds when comparing the
payment scheme with gender-discriminatory chances to the other schemes. In
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all other comparisons, low-wage workers and high-wage workers do not signif-
icantly differ in their responses.
Finally, we obtain evidence that low-wage women respond more strongly to
gender-discriminatory unfair chances than low-wage men do, supporting our
fourth hypothesis. Moreover, an exploratory comparison across all five pay-
ment schemes reveals a distinct gender difference among low-wage workers.
Men decrease their labor supply in response to any type of disadvantageous
inequality, whereas disadvantaged women reduce their labor supply only if the
low-wage is due to gender-discriminatory chances.
Our study provides three main contributions to the literature. First, it is the
first to investigate the causal effect of unfair chances on labor supply decisions
of workers. Our finding that the fairness of chances from an unspecified source
does not affect labor supply stands in contrast to the empirical literature on un-
fair chances and income redistribution (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Krawczyk and
Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; Cappelen et al., 2013). Specifically, whereas
the distribution of initial chances has been shown to influence redistribution
decisions, we find that it has no impact on workers’ labor supply decisions.
This suggests that the response to unfair chances depends on the context.
Second, our study also provides the first evidence of the causal impact
of gender discrimination on labor supply decisions. Our finding that unfair
chances based on gender have a large negative impact on labor supply is consis-
tent with literature in medicine and psychology, suggesting that discrimination
imposes a specific psychological cost (e.g., Pascoe and Smart Richman, 2009).
This adds to the few economic studies showing that (ethnic minority) workers
modify their behavior when discriminated (Parsons et al., 2011; Glover et al.,
2017), making them appear less productive for employers. Our study is the only
one that identifies the effect of discrimination while controlling for changes in
monetary incentives resulting from the presence of discrimination.
A third contribution of our study is to the research on gender differences in
labor markets more generally (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Niederle, 2016). Our
result that men reduce their labor supply in reaction to unequal wages from
fair and unfair chances coming from an unspecified source, whereas women do
not, is consistent with the findings of Bracha et al. (2015). They, however, do
not study the effect of unfair chances. In addition, we show that also women
decrease their labor supply if they face lower wages that are the result of gender
discrimination.
Finally, an important implication of our study is that it suggests a novel
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and complementary explanation for the gender gap in earnings. Goldin (2014)
and Blau and Kahn (2017) review the literature on the earnings gender gap
and conclude that the modern gender gap is mostly explained by the lower
labor supply of women. The standard explanation for this lower labor supply is
that women value temporal flexibility more than men, plausibly because they
have to bear greater household responsibilities (e.g., Goldin, 2014; Wiswall
and Zafar, 2017). Importantly, we provide evidence that the experience of
gender discrimination itself can reduce labor supply. Not accounting for this
channel might lead to misjudgment of the impact of discrimination and ill-
advised policies. The identified channel may also affect the gender earnings
gap in the manner of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since the labor market offers
high returns to long work hours, a lower labor supply can be both a reaction to
discrimination and a rationale for employers to pay women less than men.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II situates our research
in the literature, Section III presents the theoretical framework, Section IV de-
scribes the study design, Section V advances the hypotheses, Section VI details
the results, Section VII discusses our findings and their implications, and Sec-
tion VIII briefly concludes.
II. Related Literature
II.A. Unequal Wages
A stream of literature suggests that wage differentials perceived as unfair ham-
per the work morale of workers (Adams, 1965; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Pfef-
fer and Langton, 1993; Bewley, 1999). Empirical evidence shows that unequal
wages for similar work indeed negatively affect several labor outcomes. For in-
stance, wage inequality decreases work satisfaction and increases job searches
among disadvantaged workers (Card et al., 2012) and hurts their productivity
(Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Cohn et al., 2014; Ockenfels et al., 2014).4
We discuss here in more detail those studies that investigate the effect of
unequal wages on labor supply, which is our variable of interest. Bracha et al.
(2015) report a laboratory experiment where workers are paid piece-rate wages
in an individual task and have to decide for how long to work. If no justi-
fication is provided, unequal wages decrease labor supply of male but not of
female low-pay workers. High-pay workers’ labor supply does not respond to
4However, individuals might accept or demand inequality on the grounds of equity (Konow,
2000). For example, wage differentials could be viewed as equitable if they reflect observable
productivity differentials (Abeler et al., 2010; Breza et al., 2018). This could even be the case if
differences in productivity are possible, but unobserved (Charness and Kuhn, 2007).
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wage inequality, irrespective of gender. Breza et al. (2018) conduct a field
experiment with male workers in an Indian firm. Workers work individually in
small teams in which wage inequality is manipulated. If workers do not observe
other workers’ productivity, then inequality decreases labor supply of low-pay
and high-pay workers as well as the productivity of low-pay workers. However,
wage inequality has no effect if it reflects observable productivity differences.
Dube et al. (2019) exploit a natural experiment caused by changes in the wage
structure of a large American firm. They find that workers arbitrarily receiving
a low relative pay after the change were more likely to quit, whereas work-
ers with a higher relative pay did not change their behavior. Those important
studies are informative about the effect of wage inequality on labor supply de-
cisions. However, they do not examine the role of chances or discrimination as
a reason for wage differences and how it may affect labor supply.
II.B. Unfair Chances
Economists have long considered the welfare implications of assessing inequal-
ity in terms of ex ante chances and ex post outcomes (Harsanyi, 1955; Di-
amond, 1967; Hammond, 1981; Epstein and Segal, 1992; Fleurbaey, 2010).
Models of social preferences have also recently incorporated a dislike for un-
equal chances, usually referred to as a concern for ex ante or procedural fair-
ness (Karni and Safra, 2002; Bolton et al., 2005; Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk,
2011; Saito, 2013). A number of laboratory experiments have lent empirical
support to the notion that individuals take into consideration the fairness of
chances when making distributive decisions (Bolton et al., 2005; Karni et al.,
2008; Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Krawczyk, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; Cappe-
len et al., 2013; Andreoni et al., 2016; Grimalda et al., 2016; Trautmann and
van de Kuilen, 2016; Cettolin and Riedl, 2016; Miao and Zhong, 2018). How-
ever, how ex ante chances influence the labor decisions of workers has not been
investigated.5
II.C. Gender Discrimination
Women face a gender gap in earnings, have lower promotion chances, are less
present in high-paid jobs, work less hours, work more part time, and have a
5Organizational psychologists have studied a related concept referred to as procedural justice.
According to one prominent form of procedural justice, procedures are fair to the extent that
decisions are “consistent” and without “bias” (see, e.g., Leventhal et al., 1980; Skarlicki and
Folger, 1997).
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lower labor participation (for overviews, see, Altonji and Blank, 1999; Riach
and Rich, 2002; Goldin, 2014; Blau and Kahn, 2017). A number of studies
suggest that demand-side gender discrimination plays an important role in ex-
plaining women’s disadvantaged labor market position (see, e.g., Bertrand and
Duflo, 2017; Neumark et al., 1996; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Sarsons et al.,
2019).6
Interestingly, potential supply-side effects of discrimination are much less
studied. Parsons et al. (2011) present evidence from American baseball show-
ing that minority players change their behavior in response to discrimination by
officials. Glover et al. (2017) show that ethnically-biased managers in a large
French grocery chain decrease minority workers’ productivity and labor sup-
ply. A field experiment of Ibañez and Riener (2018) examines some aspects of
gender discrimination (Affirmative Action for women) on job applications. In
those studies, discrimination changes the monetary incentives for workers who
are discriminated, so that the response to discrimination is entangled with the
change in incentives.
Studies in medicine and psychology show that discrimination is correlated
with serious negative consequences for physical and mental well-being. In a
meta-analytic review, Pascoe and Smart Richman (2009) link discrimination to
a range of psychological issues, such as anger, stress, anxiety, distress, and low
general wellbeing, all of which we can reasonably expect to considerably lower
one’s work satisfaction. However, the reviewed studies do not investigate the
impact on workers’ labor decisions.
III. Theoretical Framework
We adapt the framework of Card et al. (2012) and Breza et al. (2018) to model
how workers may react to unequal wages, unfair chances, and gender discrimi-
nation. In the original model, wage inequality between workers engaged in the
same work decreases work satisfaction or morale, which translates into lower
marginal utility from work and thus into lower labor supply. Our model is
an extension that also accounts for chances in the process leading to unequal
wages. That is, unfair chances are also assumed to decrease marginal utility
from work. To explore the role of gender discrimination, we assume that in-
dividuals are more averse to unfair chances caused by gender discrimination
6In this literature, taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination
(Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973) are the two most discussed forms of discrimination. Other forms
include language discrimination (Lang, 1986), implicit discrimination (Bertrand et al., 2005),
attention discrimination (Bartoš et al., 2016), and stereotypes (Bordalo et al., 2016).
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than to unfair chances coming from an unspecified source.7 We use this model
to derive most of our hypotheses, which are formulated in Section V.
Consider two workers, i and j, engaged in the same work receiving piece-
rate wages wi and wj , which are known to both workers. There is no interaction
between the two workers. A worker, say i, chooses labor supply li by taking into
account his or her own wage, the wage of the other worker j, the chances that
lead to their respective wages, and the cost of providing labor.
The modeling of marginal disutility created by ex post wage inequality is
inspired by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and is also used in Breza et al. (2018). It
is denoted Pi and given by
Pi(wi, wj) = αimax{wj − wi, 0} + βimax{wi − wj , 0}, (2.1)
where the first term on the right-hand side measures the marginal disutility
from disadvantageous wage inequality and the second term the marginal disu-
tility from advantageous wage inequality, with αi > βi > 0.8 That is, wage
inequality produces a marginal disutility, and this marginal disutility is greater
for disadvantageous inequality than for advantageous inequality.
The marginal disutility created by unfair chances, denoted by Ai for ex ante
inequality, is inspired by Saito (2013)9 and takes the form
Ai(Ewi, Ewj) = α
′
imax{Ewj − Ewi, 0} + β′imax{Ewi − Ewj , 0}, (2.2)
where Ewi and Ewj denote expected wages. Similar to equation (2.1), here the
first term on the right-hand side reflects the marginal disutility from disadvan-
tageous expected wage inequality, and the second term that from advantageous
expected wage inequality. As above we assume that α′i > β
′
i > 0 but we allow
for αi 6= α′i and βi 6= β′i. That is, the disutility weights placed on wage inequality
and unfair chances may differ.
We embed the aversion to unequal wages and the aversion to unfair chances
described in equations (2.1) and (2.2) in the labor supply decision in the fol-
lowing way. A worker i chooses labor supply li in order to maximize the utility
7Unlike Breza et al. (2018) and in line with our experimental implementation, we rule out
moral hazard and assume that work effort is fully contractible.
8This assumption is based on the empirical evidence reported in Bracha et al. (2015), Breza
et al. (2018) and Dube et al. (2019) which suggests that, on average, αi > βi = 0 or αi > βi > 0.
The literature on social preferences often makes the weaker assumption αi ≥ βi ≥ 0 (e.g., Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). In our model, if αi = βi > 0, then the effect of unequal wages on marginal
disutility is the same for advantaged and disadvantaged workers. If αi = βi = 0, then the
problem collapses to standard selfish preferences and unequal wages do not affect the morale of
workers.
9For earlier theoretical work combining social preferences and the effect of (un)fair chances,
see Bolton et al. (2005) and Trautmann (2009).
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function
Ui(wi, wj , li) = wili − Pi(wi, wj)li − Ai(Ewi, Ewj)li −
l2i
2
. (2.3)
In equation (2.3), the first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the utility
of monetary earnings derived from working, the second term is the disutility
created by wage inequality, and the third term reflects the disutility created by
unfair chances. The final term is the utility cost of providing labor.10
Assuming an interior solution, the optimal labor supply is given by
l∗i = wi − Pi(wi, wj) − Ai(Ewi, Ewj). (2.4)
Given our assumptions about αi, βi, α′i and β
′
i, the term Pi(wi, wj) is strictly
positive when wages are unequal and the term Ai(Ewi, Ewj) is strictly positive
when chances are unfair. Thus, unequal wages and unfair chances both reduce
the optimal labor supply.11 Disadvantageous inequality reduces the optimal
labor supply more than advantageous inequality does because of αi > βi and
α′i > β
′
i.
Regarding gender discrimination, we posit that it translates into further
marginal disutility from unequal wages or unfair chances. As before, we as-
sume that the marginal disutility caused by discrimination is greater for dis-
advantaged than for advantaged workers. That is, gender discrimination in
chances would increase α′i and β
′
i, and would increase α
′
i more than β
′
i. There-
fore, unfair chances based on gender discrimination reduce the optimal labor
supply more than unfair chances based on an unspecified source and the labor
supply reduction is greater for disadvantaged than for advantaged workers.
Before translating these theoretical considerations into testable hypotheses
in Section V, we first present our study design and experiment.
IV. Study Design
IV.A. Experiment
We hired workers on an online labor platform for performing a real effort task,
which consisted of entering lines of random characters.12 Each worker was
10For simplicity, we assume a quadratic cost function. The hypotheses derived from the model
stay qualitatively the same when assuming any other strictly increasing and strictly convex cost
function.
11Equation (2.4) assumes an interior solution. If the optimal labor supply is a corner solution—
zero or maximum labor supply—altering the inequality of wages or the unfairness of chances
may not affect the optimal labor supply.
12Here we describe the design of the experiment. The online labor market and the pros and
cons of using it for research purposes are described and discussed in more detail in Section IV.B
below.
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assigned the same task and carried it out individually, entering one line at a
time. The payment was on a piece-rate basis, that is, a worker received a fixed
payment per correctly entered line. If a mistake was made when entering a
line, the worker was informed and had to correct it before proceeding to the
next line. The length of the lines increased with the number of lines completed,
which made the task increasingly harder over time.13 Each worker decided
individually how many lines to enter. A worker could stop working at any time
by leaving the experiment. Workers were informed about this and that they
could not reenter the experiment once they had left. They were also instructed
that they could work for at most 65 minutes. The number of lines entered is
our measure of labor supply.
Each worker was randomly assigned to one payment scheme and anony-
mously paired with another worker in the same scheme who was engaged in
the exact same task on the platform. Each worker in a pair was first informed
about the procedure that would lead to his or her own wage and the wage
of the other worker. Thereafter, each of the two workers was informed about
his or her own resulting wage and the wage of the other worker. Thus, work-
ers only started working after any uncertainty about their own and the other
worker’s wage was resolved. Figure 2.1(a) provides a screenshot example of
what workers saw when they were informed about the procedure leading to
the wages, and Figure 2.1(b) shows a screenshot example of what they saw
when informed about the resulting wages. To emphasize the piece-rate nature
of the wage, it was described as a “payment per line.”
Table 2.1: Wages and Chances of Two Workers in a Pair for each Payment Scheme
Payment Scheme
Wage of Worker,
Wage of Other Worker
Chance of Worker,
Chance of Other Worker
Source of
Chances
EQLOW £0.03, £0.03 - -
EQHIGH £0.06, £0.06 - -
UNEQFAIR £0.03, £0.06 50%, 50% Unspecified
UNEQUNFAIR £0.03, £0.06 25%, 75% Unspecified
UNEQDISCR £0.03, £0.06 25%, 75% Gender Discrimination
Note: Chances are to receive the high wage (£0.06).
Table 2.1 summarizes the five payment schemes (treatments) we employ.
The schemes determine, within a worker pair, the wages and the procedure
creating these wages. In the schemes EQLOW and EQHIGH, no chances are
13The number of characters contained in a line ranged from 10 at the start to 26 at the end. We
implemented this to mimic an increasing and convex cost of labor supply. There was a maximum
of 85 lines and workers were not informed about this beforehand (see Figure 2.4 in Section 2.B
of the Appendix for two screenshots of the task). Further details on the task can be found in the
instructions of the experiment, which are provided in Section 2.C of the Appendix.
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(a) Presentation of the Procedure Determining the Wages (Payment Scheme UNEQDISCR)
(b) Presentation of the Wages (Payment Scheme UNEQDISCR)
Figure 2.1: Presentation of the Procedure Determining the Wages and Presentation of
Wages
involved and both workers receive either the low piece-rate wage of £0.03 or
the high piece-rate wage of £0.06. These treatments serve as controls for the
labor supply effect of receiving a low or a high wage when inequality in wages
and procedures is absent. In the three other schemes, the two workers in a
pair face chances to obtain the high or the low wage in a lottery. The lottery
draw is dependent such that one worker receives the high wage and the other
worker receives the low wage. In UNEQFAIR both workers have a fair chance
of 50% to receive the high wage, whereas in UNEQUNFAIR one worker faces a
low chance of 25% and the other worker faces a high chance of 75% to receive
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the high wage. In both of these schemes we do not inform workers about
the reason why the chances are allocated in this manner. In contrast, in the
scheme UNEQDISCR the unfair chances explicitly discriminate one gender over
the other. That is, one worker in the pair is informed that she (he) faces a 25%
chance of receiving the high wage because she (he) is a woman (man), and
that the other worker faces a 75% chance of receiving the high wage because
he (she) is a man (woman). In this treatment, in half of the cases men face
higher chances and in the other half women face higher chances.14
At the start of the experiment, a worker electronically signed an informed
consent form and then read the instructions. Each worker had to correctly an-
swer nine comprehension questions and go through a practice phase to become
familiar with the task. Only thereafter was the worker assigned to a payment
scheme and informed about the procedure leading to the wages in his or her
worker pair. After having learned his or her own wage and the wage of the
other worker in the pair, a worker could start working on the task.
IV.B. Online Labor Markets
We recruit workers on the UK-based online platform Prolific (www.prolific.ac).
The use of such online labor markets for experiments has gained in popular-
ity among economists in recent years.15 For our research the use of an online
platform provides important advantages over a laboratory experiment or a field
experiment inside a firm, but it also has some potential shortcomings. In what
follows we discuss these advantages and how we deal with potential disadvan-
tages.
The first advantage is that the online platform greatly reduces the possibility
of peer effects, because workers on the platform do not interact with each other
in any way during the task and can quit working without other workers noticing
it. On the platform there is no channel through which workers could commu-
14Workers were not informed about this balance.
15Examples include Pallais (2014) on inexperienced workers, Kuziemko, Norton, Saez, and
Stantcheva (2015) on redistribution preferences, Gilchrist, Luca, and Malhotra (2016) on
employer-employees relationships, Pallais and Sands (2016) and Horton (2017a) on labor mar-
ket referrals and recommendations, Bordalo et al. (2016) on stereotypes, Horton (2017b) on
minimum wages and employment, Lyons (2017) on diversity and production in teams, Coffman,
Coffman, and Ericson (2016) on anti-gay sentiments, Coffman et al. (2017) and Sarsons et al.
(2019) on gender discrimination, and De Quidt, Haushofer, and Roth (2018) on experimenter
demand effects. Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (2011), Arechar, Gächter, and Molleman (2018),
and Snowberg and Yariv (2018) report that common economic games and elicited behavior in
online and laboratory experiments provide qualitatively similar results. Bohren et al. (2018)
also use an online scientific platform to study gender discrimination, where individuals are not
paid but volunteer. Furthermore, several studies use existing labor data from online platforms,
e.g., Ghani, Kerr, and Stanton (2014), Stanton and Thomas (2015), and Dube, Jacobs, Naidu,
and Suri (2018). Finally, see Chen and Konstan (2015) for a survey of several experiments on
different platforms.
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nicate with each other and to our knowledge also no informal website exists
through which this happened. There are also restrictions on accounts and on
participation per IP address, which we discuss below. Moreover, only a subset
of registered potential workers meeting our criteria are invited to participate,
which limits the probability that registered participants who know each other
are invited.16 In a post-experiment questionnaire, 95.4% of workers reported
that they did not discuss the task with someone else when deciding whether or
not to participate, and a similar number (97.4%) declared that they completed
the task without the help of someone else. In a field experiment inside a firm,
in contrast, workers might communicate with others, observe how much others
work, and news might spread that there exist different payment schemes. Also,
in the laboratory it is likely that participants receive cues about the behavior of
others because the typical experiment has multiple participants inside the same
room.17
The second advantage is that it enables us to recruit a relatively large num-
ber of workers at reasonable costs, which increases the statistical power to
detect differences in labor supply across payment schemes. Moreover, the on-
line platform provides access to a pool of workers with diverse demographic
backgrounds, which arguably increases external validity relative to a sample of
undergraduate students. The third advantage is that, with approval from an
ethical committee, we were allowed to engage in gender discrimination on the
platform. This would have been difficult to implement in a field experiment
inside a firm for legal and other reasons.
We took precautions to minimize potential problems that are associated with
conducting experiments using online platforms. As participants have to read
and understand the instructions of the experiment without support, it might be
16Our criteria were: UK is the country of residence, registration as a man or woman, and an
approval rate of at least 80% for previous participation in other studies. The number of registered
individuals meeting our criteria was greater than 6,000. Workers meeting the selection criteria
could register for our experiment without receiving an invitation email if they logged in on
the website and selected our experiment, provided that our required number of workers had
not been attained. The fact that our experiment was almost fully conducted within 24 hours
limits this possibility. Importantly, there is no gain for workers from discussing or working with
someone else during our experiment due to the nature of the task.
17We have considered to run the experiment in the laboratory, but decided against it because it
would have been very difficult and expensive to avoid peer effects. For instance, any worker who
stops working and leaves the laboratory is likely to be noticed by other workers. An alternative
would have been to have only one worker at a time in the laboratory, but this causes at least three
problems: (1) it is extremely time consuming to collect a large enough number of observations,
(2) it may open the door to session effects (Fréchette, 2012), and (3) information regarding the
experiment can spread among potential participants, because the experiment would take place
over a long time period.
18
that they do not read them carefully enough or do not fully understand them.
To ensure proper reading and understanding, we required participants to cor-
rectly answer nine exhaustive comprehension questions about the instructions.
Participants who failed a question three times were automatically excluded and
did not participate in the experiment. Another issue might be that participants
do not fully trust that the instructions are truthful because online platforms
do not necessarily have the reputation to be deception-free. To minimize this
possibility, we made clear in the invitation to the experiment and again in the
instructions that we do not use deception and that this is the standard in eco-
nomic experiments. In a post-experiment questionnaire, participants report
that they understood the instructions well and that they largely trusted that the
instructions were truthful.18
Another concern might be that workers participate more than once, because
it is not possible to directly verify the identity of participants. To minimize this
possibility, the platform employs a number of measures to prevent duplicate ac-
counts. These measures include limiting participation in an experiment to once
per account, limiting the number of accounts per IP address, limiting partici-
pation in an experiment to once per IP address, requiring a unique non-voice
over IP phone number per account, and limiting accounts to one per Paypal or
Circle account for payment.19 The platform also forbids the use of VPNs and
tracks changes in the country of connection and other suspicious participation
patterns.
IV.C. Procedures and Demographics
Workers on the online platform were invited via email in January 2018 and
freely decided whether or not to participate.20 In total 1,271 workers success-
18The comprehension questions also prevented automatic programs (robots) from entering
our experiment by passing as human workers. Importantly, exclusion of subjects who failed was
independent of the payment schemes, because they were excluded from the experiment before
they were allocated to a scheme. Participants reported how well they understood the instructions
on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Very Well) with a mean answer of 6.27 (SD = 1.04, N
= 1,254) and reported how much they trusted the instructions on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at
All) to 7 (Completely) with a mean answer of 5.94 (SD = 1.42, N = 1,254).
19Our study was registered using two separate experiments on the platform, one only accessi-
ble to men and one only accessible to women. This is a feature of the platform, which requests
that filtering by gender be done in this manner. This means that participation in the study was
limited to one man and one woman per IP address (using gender reported on the platform). A
total of 6% of participants had the same IP address at the time of their participation as another
participant of the other gender. The address can be the same for different reasons, e.g., workers
participate from the same house, public space or workplace. Note that Paypal and Circle also
take steps to prevent duplication of accounts.
20The invitation email can be found in Section 2.C of the Appendix.
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fully completed the comprehension questions and participated in the experi-
ment. On average, those workers spent 26.35 (SD = 15.56) minutes in the
experiment, and were paid 2.64 (SD = 1.53) pounds. Table 2.2 summarizes
their demographic characteristics.
Table 2.2: Demographic Characteristics of Workers
Demographic Characteristic Mean (SD) or Percentage
Age 38 (12)
Task Experience on Platform 141 (176)
Woman 50%
Student 16%
UK National 93%
Caucasian/White 88%
Employed Full-Time 50%
Employed Part-Time 20%
Job Seeker 18%
Not in Paid Work 6%
Other Work Situation 5%
Note: N varies between 1,263 and 1,271 by characteristic because we could not obtain some
characteristics from the platform for a few workers.
Not everyone who logged into the experiment actually participated. Specifi-
cally, the sample does not include the following individuals. First, the software
automatically prevented 281 individuals who did not complete the comprehen-
sion questions from being assigned to a payment scheme and starting the task.
Second, eight individuals quit at the end of the comprehension questions or
during the practice phase. Third, 48 individuals were excluded because they
exceeded the time limit.21 Fourth, seven individuals where removed because
the reported gender in the experiment did not correspond to their gender in the
platform database.
V. Hypotheses
Our four hypotheses were registered before the execution of the experiment22
and all refer to workers who do not beat the odds. These are all low-wage work-
ers who faced a payment scheme with (i) equal low wages without chances, (ii)
fair chances to receive a high wage, or (iii) low chances to receive a high wage,
and all high-wage workers who faced a payment scheme with (i) equal high
wages without chances, (ii) fair chances to receive a high wage, or (iii) high
chances to receive a high wage. We only consider those workers because too
21These individuals went over the time limit of 65 minutes despite being explicitly forbidden
from doing so in the experiment description on the platform, and being provided with a time
countdown from 65 to 0 minutes during their work to remind them of the time limit.
22American Economic Association’s Randomized Control Trials Registry (ID: AEARCTR-
0002655).
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few workers beat the odds for an informative statistical analysis. The first three
hypotheses are based on the optimal labor supply derived in the theoretical
framework presented in Section III.23
Table 2.3: Predicted Labor Supply in Each Payment Scheme
Low-Wage Worker i
Payment Scheme
EQLOW lEi (wl) = wl
UNEQFAIR lFi (wl) = wl − Pi(wl, wh)
UNEQUNFAIR lUi (wl) = wl − Pi(wl, wh)−Ai(Ewl, Ewh)
UNEQDISCR lDi (wl) = wl − Pi(wl, wh)−ADi (Ewl, Ewh)
High-Wage Worker i
Payment Scheme
EQHIGH lEi (wh) = wh
UNEQFAIR lFi (wh) = wh − Pi(wh, wl)
UNEQUNFAIR lUi (wh) = wh − Pi(wh, wl)−Ai(Ewh, Ewl)
UNEQDISCR lDi (wh) = wh − Pi(wh, wl)−ADi (Ewh, Ewl)
Note: The predicted labor supply of a worker i is given by Equation (2.4) in Section III:
l∗i = wi − Pi(wi, wj) − Ai(Ewi, Ewj), where the term ADi (Ewi, Ewj) indicates the
presence of gender-discriminatory chances (ADi (Ewi, Ewj) > Ai(Ewi, Ewj)). Predictions
are for workers who do not beat the odds.
Table 2.3 shows the predicted labor supply in each payment scheme, in the
upper part for low-wage workers, and in the lower part for high-wage workers.
Recall that, for unequal wages and unfair chances, Pi and Ai take on positive
values, and for unfair chances, Ai takes on smaller values than ADi . From the
table, it then follows straightforwardly that,
for a low-wage worker i,
lEi (wl) > l
F
i (wl) > l
U
i (wl) > l
D
i (wl),
and for a high-wage worker i,
lEi (wh) > l
F
i (wh) > l
U
i (wh) > l
D
i (wh).
This leads to our first two hypotheses.
HYPOTHESIS 1, LOW-WAGE WORKERS: For low-wage workers, labor supply
ranks across payment schemes as follows: EQLOW > UNEQFAIR > UNEQUN-
FAIR > UNEQDISCR.
HYPOTHESIS 2, HIGH-WAGE WORKERS: For high-wage workers, labor supply
ranks across payment schemes as follows: EQHIGH > UNEQFAIR > UNEQUN-
FAIR > UNEQDISCR.
23The theoretical optimal labor supply is based on the interior solution. We conducted a pilot
study in advance to ensure that the parameters of the experiment (e.g., piece-rate wages, length
of lines, duration) do not produce too many corner outcomes where workers do not work at
all or finish all tasks. As we will see later in Section VI, workers in the experiment indeed
overwhelmingly choose an interior outcome.
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Recall that we assume that being in a disadvantageous position (low wage or
low chance of receiving the high wage) creates a larger marginal disutiliy from
inequality than being in an advantageous position (high wage or high chance of
receiving the high wage).24 We also assume that gender-discriminatory unfair
chances are disliked more than unfair chances from an unspecified source, and
that negative discrimination is worse than positive discrimination. This implies
that, at a given wage, unequal wages, unfair chances, and gender discrimina-
tion each decrease the optimal labor supply more for a low-wage worker than
for a high wage worker. More formally, it holds that25
lEi (wl)− lFi (wl) > lEi (wh)− lFi (wh),
lFi (wl)− lUi (wl) > lFi (wh)− lUi (wh), and
lUi (wl)− lDi (wl) > lUi (wh)− lDi (wh).
Our third hypothesis is therefore as follows.
HYPOTHESIS 3, DISADVANTAGE VS. ADVANTAGE: For each of the following com-
parisons, the labor supply decrease is greater for low-wage workers than for
high-wage workers: UNEQFAIR vs. EQLOW/EQHIGH, UNEQUNFAIR vs. UNEQ-
FAIR, and UNEQDISCR vs. UNEQUNFAIR.
As gender discrimination is generally experienced by women rather than
by men in society, discriminating against women might have a different effect
on labor supply than discriminating against men. However, the a priori direc-
tion of the difference is not clear. On the one hand, discrimination against
women worsens existing inequalities and may be especially painful for them,
and men might perceive discrimination against them as a justified compensa-
tion for everday discrimination of women. This might lead to a strong negative
labor supply reaction by women but a positive or neutral one by men. On the
other hand, women may have weaker negative labor supply reactions because
they are used to discrimination, and men may be habituated to higher chances
so that their new experience of lower chances may be especially frustrating
and thus strongly decrease their labor supply. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis,
which concerns this possible gender difference, is not directed and we state the
null hypothesis.
24See Section III, Equations (2.2) and (2.3) together with αi > βi and α′i > β
′
i.
25To obtain these three inequalities we use Table 2.3. For the first inequality we have
lEi (wl)− lFi (wl) = Pi(wl, wh) and lEi (wh)− lFi (wh) = Pi(wh, wl). Because αi > βi, it holds that
Pi(wl, wh) > Pi(wh, wl). The two other inequalities are obtained in the same manner.
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HYPOTHESIS 4, GENDER AND NEGATIVE DISCRIMINATION: The difference in la-
bor supply between UNEQUNFAIR and UNEQDISCR is equal for both genders.
VI. Results
In this section we first report descriptive statistics regarding labor supply un-
der the different payment schemes followed by tests of our four hypotheses.
Thereafter, we present some exploratory analyses on potential gender differ-
ences beyond our hypotheses and on labor supply responses at the extensive
and intensive margins. Recall that we measure labor supply as the number of
lines entered during the experiment and that workers could stop working at
any time.
VI.A. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 2.2 and Table 2.4 summarize labor supply by type of worker and pay-
ment scheme.26 The left part of the figure and table present the labor supply of
low-wage workers, and the right part that of high-wage workers. For low-wage
workers, the scheme EQLOW generates the largest mean labor supply, followed
by UNEQUNFAIR and UNEQFAIR (with little difference between them), and then
by UNEQDISCR. For high-wage workers, all schemes produce a comparable
mean labor supply.27
Table 2.4: Labor Supply per Payment Scheme
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean SD Min. Max. N
EQLOW/EQHIGH 43.20 27.63 .04 .16 128 44.03 28.93 .04 .20 128
UNEQFAIR 37.44 29.16 .06 .17 125 43.23 29.64 .03 .20 127
UNEQUNFAIR 39.22 27.76 .04 .15 143 43.50 28.85 .02 .20 143
UNEQDISCR 33.62 26.41 .08 .11 143 45.74 26.72 .02 .16 145
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges
from 0 to 85. Min. and Max. indicate the percentage of workers completing the
minimum and maximum number of lines.
26Workers beating the odds are excluded unless we state otherwise (see Section V).
27A comparison between low and high wages shows a significantly larger labor supply when
a high wage is paid only if gender discrimination is involved (EQLOW/EQHIGH, p = 0.72; UN-
EQFAIR, p = 0.12; UNEQUNFAIR, p = 0.20; UNEQDISCR, p < 0.001; two-sided t-tests). Non-
parametric Mann-Whitney tests qualitatively lead to the same results. The implied wage elas-
ticities of labor supply for our task are 0.02 in EQLOW/EQHIGH, 0.16 in UNEQFAIR, 0.11 in
UNEQUNFAIR, and 0.36 in UNEQDISCR. Overall, these elasticities are in keeping with those es-
timated on online labor platforms. For instance, Dube et al. (2018) estimate the market-wide
elasticity on Amazon Turk to be around 0.10.
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Figure 2.2: Mean Labor Supply per Payment Scheme
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges from 0 to 85.
N ranges from 127 to 145 workers per payment scheme.
VI.B. Test of Hypotheses
To test our hypotheses we employ non-parametric rank tests as well as Tobit
regressions to account for lower-bound and upper-bound censoring of the de-
pendent variable. For the few cases where the two techniques lead to different
results in terms of statistical significance, we give priority to the non-parametric
tests.28 Table 2.5 shows coefficient estimates of the Tobit regressions of labor
supply on dummies for the payment schemes, separately for low-wage workers
and high-wage workers. The payment schemes EQLOW and EQHIGH, respec-
tively, serve as baselines.
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we start by testing the null hypothesis of equality
of all schemes, and then conduct pairwise comparisons between the schemes
using non-parametric Dunn’s tests as well as the regression estimates.29 Both
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis (KW) tests and parametric Wald tests (on the
restriction that the three scheme coefficients from the regression are jointly
equal to zero) confirm that labor supply differs across the four schemes for low-
wage workers, but not for high-wage workers (low-wage workers: p = 0.033
KW, p = 0.006 Wald; high-wage workers: p = 0.825 KW, p = 0.901 Wald;
28We do so because non-parametric tests do not assume that error terms are normally dis-
tributed. For the Tobit regressions, we use robust standard errors because we find evidence of
heteroscedasticity in our data. In the regressions, we also include control variables (age, gender,
ethnicity, student status, employment status, experience on the platform, an index reflecting the
percentage of approved participation in tasks on the platform, and day and time of participa-
tion).
29The Dunn’s test (Dunn, 1964) allows us to conduct multiple pairwise comparisons, and is
considered to be the correct test after a Kruskal-Wallis test. In the regressions, removing the
controls does not change the results qualitatively.
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Table 2.5: Tobit Regressions of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Scheme (1) (2)
UNEQFAIR −4.144 −1.309
(4.337) (4.547)
UNEQUNFAIR −4.008 −1.607
(4.115) (4.397)
UNEQDISCR −13.610∗∗∗∗ 1.146
(4.051) (4.220)
Controls Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.001 0.010
Pseudo R2 0.011 0.008
N 533 542
Note: EQLOW/EQHIGH serves as baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided
p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
two-sided tests). For the pairwise comparisons, we use one-sided tests because
our hypotheses are directional. Table 2.6 presents the p-values of the tests
for the three main comparisons contained in each of the two hypotheses, with
and without the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) correction for multiple hypothesis
testing within each hypothesis.30
Table 2.6: P-values of Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment Schemes
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.017 0.170 0.050 0.255 0.371 0.387 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.878 0.513 0.878 0.513 0.780 0.473 1.000 0.709
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.021 0.006 0.031 0.019 0.886 0.752 0.886 0.752
N 539 533 539 533 543 542 543 542
Note: One-sided p-values in the direction predicted. BH corrections account for multiple
hypothesis testing.
For low-wage workers, Table 2.6 shows that UNEQFAIR significantly de-
creases labor supply compared to EQLOW if we use non-parametric Dunn’s
tests, in line with Hypothesis 1. However, in contrast to this hypothesis, un-
fair chances have no additional negative effect, as labor supply in UNEQFAIR
and UNEQUNFAIR are not significantly different. Finally, UNEQDISCR signifi-
cantly reduces labor supply compared to UNEQUNFAIR, as predicted.31 The
30Table 2.13 in the Appendix presents the same for the six possible pairwise comparisons; the
results are the same. The BH correction (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995) is a common False
Discovery Rate procedure, which controls for the probability of false positives among signifi-
cant results. It differs from Family-wise Error Rate procedures such as Holm-Bonferroni (Holm,
1979), which control for the probability of at least one false positive among significant results.
31Table 2.13 in the Appendix shows that UNEQDISCR also reduces labor supply compared to
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detected effects are also economically significant, which can be assessed us-
ing Table 2.4. Unfair chances due to gender discrimination decreases mean
labor supply from 43.20 in EQLOW to 33.62 in UNEQDISCR, corresponding to
a reduction of 22%. Mean labor supply in UNEQUNFAIR is 39.22, indicating
that gender-discriminatory unfair chances reduce mean labor supply by 15%
compared to unfair chances from an unspecified source. Moreover, mean la-
bor supply in UNEQFAIR is 37.44, representing a decrease of 13% compared to
EQLOW.32
For high-wage workers, Table 2.6 reveals that none of the predicted inequal-
ities in Hypothesis 2 hold. That is, high-wage workers provide similar labor
supply across payment schemes. We summarize our first two results as follows.
RESULT 1, LOW-WAGE WORKERS: (a) Gender-discriminating unfair chances (UN
EQDISCR) lower labor supply, compared to each other scheme. (b) Unfair chances
from an unspecified source (UNEQUNFAIR) do not decrease labor supply compared
to fair chances from an unspecified source (UNEQFAIR). (c) UNEQFAIR and UN-
EQUNFAIR reduce labor supply compared to EQLOW.
RESULT 2, HIGH-WAGE WORKERS: All payment schemes (UNEQDISCR, UNEQUN-
FAIR, UNEQFAIR, EQHIGH) produce similar labor supply.
We now turn to Hypothesis 3, which states that the labor supply decrease
is larger for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers, when comparing
the payment schemes UNEQFAIR with EQLOW/EQHIGH, UNEQUNFAIR with UN-
EQFAIR, and UNEQDISCR with UNEQUNFAIR, respectively. We evaluate the hy-
pothesis with a Tobit regression using dummy variables for UNEQFAIR, UN-
EQUNFAIR, and UNEQDISCR as well as their interactions with a dummy variable
for high-wage workers. We also include a set of controls that is common to both
low-wage and high-wage workers. Table 2.7 presents the coefficient estimates.
The overall null hypothesis, that there is no difference in labor supply between
low-wage and high-wage workers in all payment scheme comparisons simulta-
neously, is represented by Restriction I at the bottom of the table. A Wald test
marginally rejects this restriction (two-sided p-value = 0.073).33
Table 2.8 presents p-values from Wald tests conducted separately for each of
the three inequalities that compose Hypothesis 3. It shows that the decreases
EQLOW and UNEQUNFAIR. Moreover, UNEQUNFAIR reduces labor supply compared to EQLOW.
32In terms of pooled standard deviations, UNEQDISCR decreases labor supply by 0.35 standard
deviations compared to EQLOW, and by 0.21 standard deviations compared to UNEQUNFAIR.
The scheme UNEQFAIR reduces labor supply by 0.20 standard deviations relative to EQLOW. We
estimate that our design can detect differences between schemes of approximately 0.20 standard
deviations with medium statistical power (≥ 50%).
33Without controls, the p-value is 0.154.
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Table 2.7: Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes with Both Types of
Workers
Scheme All Workers
UNEQFAIR −4.636
(4.385)
UNEQUNFAIR −4.432
(4.098)
UNEQDISCR −13.133∗∗∗
(4.058)
UNEQFAIR × HighWage 2.030
(6.318)
UNEQUNFAIR × HighWage 4.066
(6.050)
UNEQDISCR × HighWage 13.307∗∗
(5.790)
HighWage 2.291
(4.352)
Controls Yes
Prob > F 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.008
N 1075
Restriction I
UNEQFAIR × HighWage = 0
UNEQUNFAIR × HighWage = UNEQFAIR × HighWage
UNEQDISCR × HighWage = UNEQUNFAIR × HighWage
Wald Test (two-sided p-value) = 0.073
Note: EQLOW serves as baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided p-values:
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 2.8: P-values of Predicted Differences in Labor Supply Effect of Payment Schemes
between Low-Wage Workers and High-Wage Workers
All Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2)
Technique Tobit Tobit
BH Correction No Yes
UNEQFAIR × HighWage > 0 0.374 0.561
UNEQUNFAIR × HighWage > UNEQFAIR × HighWage 0.503 0.503
UNEQDISCR × HighWage > UNEQUNFAIR × HighWage 0.023 0.070
N 1075 1075
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
in labor supply caused by UNEQFAIR compared to EQLOW/EQHIGH and by
UNEQUNFAIR compared to UNEQFAIR are not significantly larger for low-wage
workers than for high-wage workers, rejecting the first and second inequality
of the hypothesis. However, as predicted, the labor supply reduction caused
by UNEQDISCR relative to UNEQUNFAIR is (marginally) significantly larger for
low-wage workers. Overall, our analysis provides evidence only in favor of the
discrimination part of Hypothesis 3. We state our third result as follows.
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RESULT 3, DISADVANTAGE VS. ADVANTAGE: (a) The decrease in labor supply
caused by gender-discriminating unfair chances (UNEQDISCR) relative to unfair
chances from an unspecified source (UNEQUNFAIR) is larger for low-wage work-
ers than for high-wage workers. (b) The decreases caused by unfair chances from
an unspecified source (UNEQUNFAIR) relative to fair chances from an unspecified
source (UNEQFAIR) and by UNEQFAIR relative to EQLOW/EQHIGH are similar for
both types of workers.
Finally, we evaluate whether low-wage men and women respond differ-
ently to gender-discriminating unfair chances (UNEQDISCR) relative to unfair
chances coming from an unspecified source (UNEQUNFAIR), as stated in Hy-
pothesis 4. Table 2.9 presents descriptive statistics regarding labor supply for
the two schemes, separately by gender. The right part of the table shows that
the mean labor supply of women differs considerably between the two schemes
(42.37 in UNEQUNFAIR and 30.38 in UNEQDISCR; roughly 28%). In contrast, as
can be seen in the left part of the table, the mean labor supply of men is essen-
tially equal in both schemes (36.13 in UNEQUNFAIR and 36.92 in UNEQDISCR).
Table 2.10 presents the estimates from a Tobit regression for low-wage work-
ers in the two schemes with UNEQUNFAIR serving as the baseline, a dummy
variable for women, and an interaction term of UNEQDISCR with the dummy
variable for women. For men, discrimination does not significantly alter la-
bor supply compared to unfair chances, as the coefficient of UNEQDISCR is in-
significant (p = 0.805). However, the interaction term is negative and signifi-
cant (p = 0.040), indicating that the labor supply decrease caused by gender-
discriminatory chances relative to the same unfair chances without gender dis-
crimination is stronger for women than for men.34 Our fourth result is as fol-
lows.
RESULT 4, GENDER AND NEGATIVE DISCRIMINATION: The decrease in labor sup-
ply caused by UNEQDISCR relative to UNEQUNFAIR is greater for low-wage women
34The interaction term is also significant without controls (p = 0.043).
Table 2.9: Labor Supply of Low-Wage Men and Women in UNEQUNFAIR and UN-
EQDISCR
Low-Wage Men Low-Wage Women
Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean SD Min. Max. N
UNEQUNFAIR 36.13 27.44 .04 .14 72 42.37 27.92 .04 .15 71
UNEQDISCR 36.92 29.27 .06 .15 71 30.38 23.00 .11 .06 72
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges from 0 to 85.
Min. and Max. indicate the percentage of workers completing the minimum and maximum
number of lines.
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Table 2.10: Tobit Regression of Labor Supply in UNEQUNFAIR and UNEQDISCR, for
Low-Wage Men and Women
Scheme Low-Wage Workers
UNEQDISCR −1.363
(5.510)
UNEQDISCR × Woman −16.105∗∗
(7.805)
Woman 1.736
(6.077)
Controls Yes
Prob > F 0.039
Pseudo R2 0.012
N 283
Note: UNEQUNFAIR serves as baseline. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses. Two-
sided p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
than for low-wage men.
In summary, we find partial support for our hypotheses. In payment schemes
involving chances to receive a low wage or a high wage, low-wage workers
reduce labor supply relative to a scheme in which the low wage payment is
the same for everyone. This effect is especially pronounced when chances are
gender-discriminatory. Interestingly, there is no difference between fair and
unfair chances when these come from an unspecified source. For high-wage
workers, labor supply appears to be unaffected by the nature of the payment
scheme. There is also partial evidence that the decrease in labor supply is
stronger for low-wage workers than for high-wage workers, especially when
gender-discriminatory chances are involved. Finally, women respond more
strongly to gender-discriminatory chances than men do.
VI.C. Exploratory Analyses
Here we report some additional analyses that go beyond our pre-registered
hypotheses. We first delve into other potential differences between genders
and we then examine the effect of payment schemes on labor supply at the
extensive and intensive margins.
Further Gender Differences. Figure 2.3 and Table 2.11 show descriptive statis-
tics regarding the labor supply of workers in each payment scheme, separately
for men and women. A comparison of the behavior of low-wage workers shows
that the labor supply reactions to the different types of payment schemes dif-
fer considerably between genders. Men lower their labor supply in response
to any of the three payment schemes with unequal wages, whereas women
29
decrease their labor supply only in response to unequal wages resulting from
gender-discriminatory chances.
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Figure 2.3: Mean Labor Supply per Gender and Payment Scheme
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges from 0 to 85.
N ranges from 62 to 75 workers per payment scheme.
Table 2.11: Labor Supply per Gender and Payment Scheme
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Mean SD Min. Max. N Mean SD Min. Max. N
Men
EQLOW/EQHIGH 44.40 27.20 .02 .18 65 42.83 27.95 .06 .16 64
UNEQFAIR 32.46 28.70 .10 .13 63 44.85 29.35 .03 .19 62
UNEQUNFAIR 36.13 27.44 .04 .14 72 45.13 30.05 .01 .23 69
UNEQDISCR 36.92 29.27 .06 .15 71 39.12 25.08 .04 .09 75
Women
EQLOW/EQHIGH 41.95 28.24 .06 .14 63 45.23 30.05 .02 .25 64
UNEQFAIR 42.50 28.97 .03 .21 62 41.68 30.05 .03 .20 65
UNEQUNFAIR 42.37 27.92 .04 .15 71 41.97 27.80 .03 .16 74
UNEQDISCR 30.38 23.00 .11 .06 72 52.83 26.77 .03 .23 70
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges from 0 to 85.
Min. and Max. indicate the percentage of workers completing the minimum and maximum
number of lines.
We test for differences in labor supply across payment schemes separately
for men and women, using non-parametric Dunn’s tests and Tobit regression
estimates.35 Table 2.12 reports the p-values of the tests for the three inequalities
predicted by our first two hypotheses, now separately for men and for women.
The tests corroborate the impression one has from looking at the descriptive
statistics. Low-wage male workers significantly decrease their labor supply in
UNEQFAIR compared to EQLOW, but do not further decrease labor supply in
35For the regression, we use the same specification as in Table 2.5, but include a dummy
variable for women and interact this variable with the payment schemes. These Tobit regression
estimates can be found in Table 2.14 of the Appendix.
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response to the additional inequalities contained in UNEQFAIR and UNEQDISCR.
In contrast, low-wage female workers significantly decrease their labor supply
only in UNEQDISCR relative to UNEQUNFAIR. Moreover, relative to EQLOW,
low-wage men do significantly decrease their labor supply in reaction to any
of the three types of inequalities (p-values between 0.002 and 0.106, depending
on test and BH correction), whereas low-wage women significantly decrease
their labor supply only when facing gender-discriminatory chances (p ≤ 0.009
and p ≥ 0.548 otherwise). In contrast, workers who receive a high wage do
not significantly reduce their labor supply in response to the different payment
schemes, irrespective of their gender.36
Table 2.12: Tests of Inequalities in Labor Supply between Payment Schemes, for Men
and Women
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Men
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.002 0.016 0.006 0.049 0.818 0.783 0.818 0.783
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.920 0.716 0.920 0.716 0.248 0.508 0.372 0.762
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.238 0.398 0.358 0.598 0.063 0.123 0.190 0.369
N 271 268 271 268 270 270 270 270
Women
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.767 0.732 0.767 0.732 0.104 0.206 0.311 0.619
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.751 0.305 1.000 0.457 0.801 0.517 1.000 0.775
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.003 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.994 0.981 0.994 0.981
N 268 265 268 265 273 272 273 272
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
For high-wage female workers the descriptive statistics suggest an interest-
ing pattern opposite to Hypothesis 2, namely an increase in labor supply in
response to positive discrimination (see, e.g., Panel (b) of Figure 2.3). We com-
pare UNEQDISCR and UNEQUNFAIR as well as UNEQDISCR and EQHIGH without
imposing the predicted direction on our tests. We find that high-wage women
in UNEQDISCR significantly increase their labor supply relative to UNEQUNFAIR
(p ≤ 0.038, two-sided). The increase is also marginally significant relative to
36More precisely, high-wage men reduce their labor supply in UNEQDISCR compared to UN-
EQFAIR, but only at marginally significant levels without the BH correction. For details on those
comparisons, please see Table 2.15 in the Appendix.
31
EQHIGH if we use non-parametric tests (p = 0.055, two-sided).37
Extensive and Intensive Margins. To evaluate whether different payment
schemes affect labor supply of low-wage workers at the extensive or the in-
tensive margin, we use a two-equation hurdle model with a lower bound. We
find that relative to UNEQUNFAIR, the scheme UNEQDISCR reduces both the
probability that low-wage workers start to work at all (p = 0.026 without and
p = 0.079 with BH correction) and the labor supply of those who do decide to
work (p = 0.029 without and p = 0.086 with BH correction). The negative effect
on labor supply of UNEQFAIR relative to the scheme EQLOW appears to affect
only the intensive margin (intensive margin: p = 0.044 without and p = 0.087
with BH correction; extensive margin: p ≥ 0.228).38
VII. Discussion
VII.A. Unequal Wages and Labor Supply
Bracha et al. (2015), Breza et al. (2018), and Dube et al. (2019) (henceforth
BGL, BKS, and DGL) study the effect of unequal wages on labor supply, but do
not investigate the role of chances and discrimination. BGL conduct a labo-
ratory experiment, BKS employ a field experiment, and DGL exploit a natural
experiment. Here, we briefly compare our results concerning unequal wages
resulting from fair chances or unfair chances with an unspecified source (that
is, UNEQFAIR or UNEQUNFAIR) to the results of these three studies.39
In line with these three studies, we obtain the result that unequal wages
significantly decrease labor supply of low-wage workers. In addition, our find-
ing that unequal wages do not affect labor supply of high-wage workers is
also found by BGL and DGL, although BKS report evidence that such workers
may reduce their labor supply. Furthermore, regarding gender differences, we
37Table 2.16 in the Appendix reports p-values of comparisons and tests.
38P -values are one-sided in the predicted direction. Appendix Tables 2.17 and 2.18, respec-
tively, show the results of the estimation and the p-values for the pairwise comparisons be-
tween payment schemes. In the Appendix we also provide further supplementary analyses.
Tables 2.19–2.22 detail labor supply reactions to the payment schemes for four additional demo-
graphic groups: the young and the old, and the full-time and part-time employed or unemployed.
Furthermore, our pre-registered measure of labor supply is the number of lines, but other mea-
sures of labor supply are conceivable. Tables 2.23 and 2.24 show workers’ responses to the
different payment schemes if we use time spent in the experiment as the labor supply measure.
Note that this measure does not only include time spent working on the task. As such, it is most
likely not an appropriate measure of labor supply. Nevertheless, the results are very similar to
our pre-registered measure. Lastly, for completeness, Tables 2.25 and 2.26 describe how the
relatively few workers who beat the odds respond to the different payment schemes.
39BGL and BKS also consider cases where unequal wages may be justified, e.g., by productivity
differences. We do not discuss these results.
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find that only low-wage men negatively respond to wage differences, whereas
women do not. This is consistent with the result reported in BGL that only men
respond to wage inequality.40
Thus, our findings corroborate the existing results on the negative labor
supply effects of wage inequality and add evidence that this may be mainly
driven by low-wage men.
VII.B. Fairness of Chances
One motivation of our research is to explore how the (un)fairness of initial
chances between two workers affects their labor supply decisions once wages
are known. To the best of our knowledge, no other study investigates this ques-
tion. However, a number of scholars have analyzed the effect of ex ante fairness
more generally. Closest to our research are the studies examining whether and
how fairness of ex ante chances between individuals influences their equity
judgments.
Starting with Diamond (1967), many have argued that an unequal outcome
is more acceptable if it is generated by fair chances than if it is generated by
unfair chances (see Section II.B). However, there may be a tension between ex
ante and ex post fairness (e.g., Myerson, 1981; Fudenberg and Levine, 2012;
Saito, 2013). Nevertheless, experimental studies have shown that individuals
are more likely to accept an unequal outcome that results from fair chances
than one that results from unfair chances (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005; Grimalda
et al., 2016). In stark contrast, we find that behavior of workers is insensitive
to initial chances when they are generated by an unspecified source, as labor
supply is almost identical under the payment schemes UNEQFAIR and UNEQUN-
FAIR.41 However, workers in our study do respond to unfair chances coming
from gender discrimination, a prominent form of procedural unfairness. This
complements findings that workers’ reaction to unequal wages depends on the
reason behind wage inequality (e.g., workers may accept or even demand wage
inequality if it reflects productivity differences, Abeler et al., 2010; Breza et al.,
2018, or if some other justification is provided, Bracha et al., 2015).
Our research carries a potential implication for managerial policy. Managers
40BKS only sample men and DGL do not report effects by gender. There are also other de-
mographic differences between the four studies. For instance, BGL employ American university
students, DGL use young American part-time workers, and BKS use Indian temporary workers
who may be older. We use online UK workers with a median age of 36, most of whom are either
full-time or part-time employed.
41We note that, as in the aforementioned experiments, in UNEQFAIR and UNEQUNFAIR chances
are assigned without a specific reason.
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might be tempted to believe that offering initially fair chances will mitigate
the negative effects of unequal wages in bonus or promotion schemes. How-
ever, our results suggest that, ceteris paribus, unequal wages resulting from fair
chances will still exert a detrimental effect on disadvantaged workers’ labor
supply.
VII.C. Discrimination, Labor Supply, and the Gender Gap in Earnings
Goldin (2014) and Blau and Kahn (2017) report that the most important deter-
minant of the modern gender earnings gap is that women exhibit lower labor
supply. Women are less present in high-pay occupations, which usually demand
long working hours (e.g., lawyer, manager, professor), and women work less
and earn less within the same occupation, which typically offer rapidly-rising
returns to working hours. The main explanation for the lower labor supply put
forward in the literature is that women prefer temporal flexibility at work, no-
tably working less hours, because they have to bear a much greater share of
household responsibilities (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010; Flabbi and Moro, 2012;
Goldin, 2014; Goldin and Katz, 2016; Wiswall and Zafar, 2017; Cortés and Pan,
2019).42
Our result that women decrease their labor supply in response to gender-
discriminatory chances offers a complementary explanation for women’s lower
labor supply and lower earnings. Consider the following example. A young
female lawyer starts at a law firm, and is as willing as anyone to work extra
hours. The older partners promote similar young male lawyers in her place be-
cause they wrongly believe that, being a woman, she will be less willing to work
extra hours. Our result then suggests that, unsatisfied at being discriminated,
she chooses not to work extra hours whenever she can, thereby decreasing her
value to the firm. Observing her behavior over time, the older partners are
comforted in their initial choice, because their (formerly wrong) belief is now
confirmed. Thus, the discrimination that women experience in labor markets
may decrease their willingness to enter potential high-income occupations and
may also reduce their willingness to work long hours for a given salary within
an occupation. In this case, the effect of discrimination on labor supply can
42In a recent field experiment Mas and Pallais (2017) find that women indeed have greater
preference for temporal flexibility, but that this is not enough to explain the gender earnings gap.
There is evidence supporting other explanations for the modern gender earnings gap, including
discrimination (e.g., Neumark et al., 1996; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Reuben et al., 2014; Sar-
sons et al., 2019), differences in bargaining behavior and competitiveness (e.g., Niederle and
Vesterlund, 2007; Buser et al., 2014; Card et al., 2015), differences in productivity (e.g., Mulli-
gan and Rubinstein, 2008), social norms (e.g., Coffman, 2014; Bertrand et al., 2015; Bursztyn
et al., 2017), and stereotypes (e.g., Bordalo et al., 2019).
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become a self-fulfilling prophecy, and breaking this cycle may therefore prove
to be no small feat.
Our result that gender-based unfair chances reduce female labor supply also
challenges a commonly made assumption in the estimation of discrimination.
Discrimination is regularly estimated by measuring the difference in earnings
between men and women with the same characteristics—e.g., age, education,
experience, hours worked and occupation—under the assumption that these
characteristics are themselves unaffected by discrimination (see Oaxaca, 1973;
Blinder, 1973, and Fortin et al., 2011 for an overview of the method). However,
finding that men earn higher wages because they work longer hours—and that,
hence, men and women would earn similar wages if they worked the same
hours—can hide that women work less hours (and incur disutility) exactly be-
cause of discrimination (see our argument above). That is, the impact of gender
discrimination is likely underestimated.
Finally, our data also provide suggestive evidence that positive gender dis-
crimination may increase labor supply of women. Specifically, the labor supply
of women is greater under unequal high wages with positive discrimination of
women (UNEQDISCR) than under unequal high wages with unfair chances from
an unspecified source (UNEQFAIR) and than under equal high wages (EQHIGH).
This is consistent with a few studies finding beneficial effects of positive discrim-
ination in other settings (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013;
Ibañez and Riener, 2018), even though our study controls for monetary incen-
tives. However, we are careful in drawing definite conclusions on this matter
and leave this important question for future research.
VII.D. Possible Extensions
We have chosen an experiment design that allows us to explore the effects of
unfair chances and gender discrimination in the cleanest possible way. Nat-
urally, several extensions are conceivable to account for features of labor de-
cisions that are not part of our design. The following four extensions appear
particularly interesting. First, since employers often cannot fully contract ef-
fort, and it has been shown that employees tend to reciprocate higher wages
with higher effort (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993, 1998b), one could study how the
presence of discrimination affects reciprocal effort. It is conceivable that the
possibility of gift-exchange—giving workers the possibility to negatively (pos-
itively) respond to an employer who negatively (positively) discriminates—by
changing work effort will reveal even greater effects of discrimination on work
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behavior than those observed in our setting of complete contracts. Second, one
could augment our design to account for team production, and study how dis-
crimination impacts the ability of teams to cooperate, coordinate, and produce.
In such a setting discrimination may generate negative external effects on non-
discriminated workers. Third, since promotion chances often take the form of
multi-period tournaments where effort influences chances of promotion (e.g.,
Lazear and Rosen, 1981), one could study the effect of discrimination on labor
supply in a more complex tournament-style design. Fourth, it may be inter-
esting to study whether other common forms of discrimination, such as ethnic
discrimination, generate similar effects as those we find for gender.
VIII. Conclusion
We provide the first causal evidence regarding how unfair chances to receive
a low or high wage—stemming from an unspecified source of from gender
discrimination—affect labor supply decisions. We find that, at a given wage,
explicit gender discrimination in chances considerably reduces the labor supply
of disadvantaged workers compared to an equal-wage setting (−22%). This is
the case even though workers only hurt themselves by working less. Moreover,
low wages stemming from gender-discriminatory chances reduce labor supply
almost twice as much as low wages resulting from fair chances (−13%). Inter-
estingly, in the absence of discrimination, low-wage workers are insensitive to
whether unequal wages result from fair or unfair chances. Advantaged workers
are unresponsive to any type of inequality that we examine.
Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that men and women respond dif-
ferently to unfair chances and discrimination. Men reduce their labor supply
when they are in a disadvantaged wage position, irrespective of the reason be-
hind the disadvantage, whereas women decrease their labor supply only when
their low wage can be attributed to gender-based discrimination in chances.
Our findings provide a novel supply-side effect of gender discrimination in
labor markets, and offer a complementary way to account for the lower supply
of women and the gender gap in earnings. More broadly, our study opens new
avenues for research on the reactions of workers who face discrimination.
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Appendix
2.A. Additional Tables
We provide additional figures and tables in Section 2.B and the instructions of
the experiment as seen by the workers in Section 2.C. Each figure and table is
referred to in the main text by its number.
2.B. Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 2.4: Task
Note: In the upper screenshot, the worker sees a line of characters, and decides whether to
type the line or to leave the experiment. In the lower screenshot, if choosing not to leave,
the worker is required to enter the line.
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Table 2.13: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.017 0.170 0.050 0.212 0.371 0.387 1.000 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.058 0.165 0.087 0.248 0.426 0.357 1.000 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.001 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.853 0.607 1.000 0.910
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.878 0.513 0.878 0.513 0.780 0.473 1.000 0.946
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.081 0.013 0.102 0.025 0.905 0.720 0.905 0.900
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.021 0.006 0.031 0.019 0.886 0.752 1.000 0.752
N 539 533 539 533 543 542 543 542
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.14: Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Men and
Women
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Men Women
Men &
Women
Men Women
Men &
Women
Scheme (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UNEQFAIR −12.788∗∗ 3.919 −12.682∗∗ 4.947 −5.478 3.238
(5.950) (6.311) (5.909) (6.307) (6.674) (6.351)
UNEQUNFAIR −9.366∗ 0.715 −8.896 5.069 −5.213 3.342
(5.585) (5.938) (5.669) (6.368) (6.347) (6.273)
UNEQDISCR −10.802∗ −15.378∗∗∗ −11.092∗ −1.698 7.046 −3.679
(5.952) (5.561) (5.831) (5.640) (6.390) (5.649)
UNEQFAIR × Woman 17.242∗∗ −8.769
(8.605) (9.269)
UNEQUNFAIR × Woman 9.878 −9.287
(8.163) (8.848)
UNEQDISCR × Woman −5.021 10.430
(7.966) (8.533)
Woman −5.400 5.317
(6.212) (6.854)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.003
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.010 0.010
N 268 265 542 270 272 542
Note: EQLOW/EQHIGH serves as baseline. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Two-sided p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 2.15: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes, for Men and Women
Men
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.002 0.016 0.012 0.098 0.818 0.783 0.818 0.979
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.021 0.047 0.041 0.095 0.818 0.787 1.000 0.787
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.018 0.035 0.055 0.106 0.111 0.382 0.222 0.764
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.920 0.716 0.920 0.716 0.248 0.508 0.372 0.762
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.912 0.630 1.000 0.787 0.065 0.122 0.196 0.731
UNEQUNFAIR >
DISCRHANCE
0.238 0.398 0.358 0.598 0.063 0.123 0.380 0.369
N 271 268 271 268 270 270 270 270
Women
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.767 0.732 0.958 0.732 0.104 0.206 0.621 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.768 0.548 0.768 0.685 0.139 0.206 0.418 0.618
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.005 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.972 0.864 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.751 0.305 1.126 0.457 0.801 0.517 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.004 0.001 0.012 0.004 0.996 0.977 0.996 1.000
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.003 0.001 0.018 0.004 0.994 0.981 1.000 0.981
N 268 265 268 265 273 272 273 272
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
Table 2.16: P-Value of Test that Positive Discrimination of Women does not Affect their
Labor Supply
High-Wage Women
Inequality (1) (2)
Technique Dunn Tobit
EQHIGH 6= UNEQDISCR 0.055 0.271
UNEQUNFAIR 6= UNEQDISCR 0.012 0.038
N 273 272
Note: Two-sided p-values are presented. The Tobit estimates come from specification (5) of
Table 2.14.
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Table 2.17: Hurdle Model (Labor Supply on Payment Schemes), for Low-Wage Workers
Scheme Low-Wage Workers
Extensive Margin
UNEQFAIR −4.417
(5.927)
UNEQUNFAIR −4.406
(5.413)
UNEQDISCR −15.442∗∗∗
(5.715)
Intensive Margin
UNEQFAIR −0.516∗
(0.302)
UNEQUNFAIR −0.304
(0.316)
UNEQDISCR −0.773∗∗
(0.307)
Controls Yes
Prob > F 0.032
Pseudo R2 0.013
N 533
Note: EQLOW serves as baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-sided p-values:
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 2.18: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes, Hurdle Model
Low-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4)
Margin Extensive Intensive
BH Correction No Yes No Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.228 0.285 0.044 0.087
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.208 0.312 0.168 0.210
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.003 0.021 0.006 0.035
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.501 0.501 0.787 0.787
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.039 0.078 0.138 0.206
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.026 0.079 0.029 0.086
N 533 533 533 533
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.19: Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Young (age
≤ 36) and Old (age > 36)
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Young Old Young Old
Scheme (1) (2) (3) (4)
UNEQFAIR −5.633 −4.065 −9.100 5.953
(6.245) (6.183) (7.093) (6.122)
UNEQUNFAIR −10.527∗ 0.962 −5.550 1.650
(6.099) (5.712) (6.463) (6.260)
UNEQDISCR −18.440∗∗∗ −9.274∗ −0.442 3.300
(6.241) (5.360) (6.158) (5.940)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.034 0.088 0.000 0.625
Pseudo R2 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.007
N 260 273 290 252
Note: Median age is 36 in the sample. EQLOW/EQHIGH serves as baseline. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Two-sided p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 2.20: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes, for Young (age ≤ 36) and Old (age > 36)
Young
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.086 0.184 0.108 0.230 0.054 0.100 0.321 0.602
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.047 0.043 0.094 0.086 0.106 0.196 0.318 0.587
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.003 0.002 0.018 0.010 0.751 0.471 1.000 0.943
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.187 0.207 0.187 0.207 0.851 0.712 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.036 0.017 0.108 0.052 0.952 0.918 0.952 0.918
UNEQUNFAIR >
DISCRHANCE
0.058 0.088 0.087 0.132 0.901 0.823 1.000 1.000
N 263 260 263 260 291 290 291 290
Old
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.032 0.256 0.096 0.384 0.877 0.834 0.877 0.834
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.191 0.567 0.287 0.709 0.791 0.604 1.000 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.032 0.042 0.190 0.127 0.863 0.711 1.000 0.888
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.950 0.792 0.950 0.792 0.162 0.244 0.974 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.755 0.186 0.944 0.371 0.229 0.322 0.687 0.966
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.049 0.023 0.099 0.140 0.821 0.607 1.000 0.911
N 276 273 276 273 252 252 252 252
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.21: Tobit Regression of Labor Supply on Payment Schemes, for Employed Full
Time and Not Employed Full Time
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Full-Time Not Full-Time Full-Time Not Full-Time
Scheme (1) (2) (3) (4)
UNEQFAIR −7.091 0.891 −1.010 −3.379
(6.546) (5.955) (6.384) (6.724)
UNEQUNFAIR −7.809 −0.410 2.169 −5.549
(6.109) (5.661) (6.374) (6.327)
UNEQDISCR −10.922∗ −15.172∗∗∗ 5.921 −5.965
(6.074) (5.578) (5.872) (6.239)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.301 0.002 0.003 < 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.017 0.004 0.017
N 254 279 296 246
Note: Workers who are full-time employed account for 51% of the sample. Those who
are not full-time employed are: part-time employed (20%), unemployed (6%), not in a
paid job (18%) or other (5%). EQLOW/EQHIGH serves as baseline. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Two-sided p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 2.22: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Labor Supply between Payment
Schemes, for Employed Full Time and Not Employed Full Time
Employed Full Time
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.033 0.140 0.066 0.280 0.183 0.437 1.000 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.029 0.101 0.086 0.304 0.752 0.633 1.000 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.016 0.037 0.094 0.220 0.944 0.843 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.244 0.455 0.244 0.455 0.821 0.694 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.183 0.256 0.275 0.384 0.973 0.889 0.973 0.889
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.187 0.280 0.234 0.349 0.947 0.749 1.000 1.000
N 254 254 254 254 296 296 296 296
Not Employed Full Time
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.089 0.559 0.133 0.559 0.249 0.308 0.249 0.616
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.216 0.471 0.270 0.589 0.221 0.191 0.286 0.572
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.004 0.004 0.023 0.021 0.165 0.170 0.990 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.889 0.415 0.889 0.622 0.222 0.361 0.278 0.452
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.041 0.005 0.082 0.009 0.167 0.338 0.502 0.507
UNEQUNFAIR >
DISCRHANCE
0.006 0.004 0.018 0.011 0.190 0.471 0.380 0.471
N 279 279 279 279 246 246 246 246
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.23: Tobit Regression of Time Spent in the Experiment on Payment Schemes
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Scheme (1) (2)
UNEQFAIR −1.478 −0.729
(1.935) (2.002)
UNEQUNFAIR −0.720 −0.062
(1.803) (1.946)
UNEQDISCR −4.621∗∗∗ 2.060
(1.760) (1.923)
Controls Yes Yes
Prob > F 0.002 0.004
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.008
N 533 542
Note: Time spent in the experiment is measured in minutes. Mean times are 22.65 (SD =
14.96) minutes for low-wage workers, and 28.19 (SD = 16.02) minutes for high-wage
workers. Note that our time measure is not necessarily time worked since it starts when
workers begin reading the instructions and ends when they quit the experiment or at 65
minutes if they have not quit by then. Moreover, this measure does not account for the
breaks that workers can take. Therefore, it is most likely not an appropriate measure of
labor supply. EQLOW/EQHIGH serves as baseline. Standard errors are in parentheses. Two-
sided p-values: ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Table 2.24: P-Values of Six Predicted Differences in Time Spent in the Experiment
between Payment Schemes
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
BH Correction No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQFAIR
0.028 0.223 0.057 0.334 0.148 0.358 0.889 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.180 0.345 0.225 0.431 0.247 0.487 0.741 1.000
EQLOW/EQHIGH >
UNEQDISCR
0.006 0.004 0.037 0.027 0.921 0.858 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR
0.949 0.657 0.949 0.657 0.852 0.639 1.000 1.000
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.137 0.042 0.205 0.083 0.907 0.929 0.970 0.929
UNEQUNFAIR >
UNEQDISCR
0.013 0.010 0.039 0.029 0.926 0.879 1.000 1.000
N 539 533 539 533 543 542 543 542
Note: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted. BH corrections account
for multiple hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.25: Labor Supply per Payment Scheme, for Workers not Beating the Odds and
Workers Beating the Odds
Low-Wage Workers Mean SD Min. Max. N
Workers not Beating the Odds
EQLOW 43.20 27.63 .04 .16 128
UNEQFAIR 37.44 29.16 .06 .17 125
UNEQUNFAIR 39.22 27.76 .04 .15 143
UNEQDISCR 33.62 26.41 .08 .11 143
Workers Beating the Odds
UNEQUNFAIR(BEATODDS) 37.98 27.58 .02 .16 50
UNEQDISCR(BEATODDS) 38.15 32.10 .04 .24 46
High-Wage Workers Mean SD Min. Max. N
Workers not Beating the Odds
EQHIGH 44.03 28.93 .04 .20 128
UNEQFAIR 43.23 29.64 .03 .20 127
UNEQUNFAIR 43.50 28.85 .02 .20 143
UNEQDISCR 45.74 26.72 .02 .16 145
Workers Beating the Odds
UNEQUNFAIR(BEATODDS) 42.55 28.34 .02 .17 47
UNEQDISCR(BEATODDS) 40.72 27.79 .02 .15 46
Note: Labor supply is measured by the number of lines completed and ranges from 0 to 85.
Min. and Max. indicate the percentage of workers completing the minimum and maximum
number of lines. Low-wage workers beating the odds had high chances, and high-wage
workers beating the odds had low chances.
Table 2.26: P-Values of Tests on Difference in Labor Supply between Payment Schemes,
for Workers Beating the Odds
Low-Wage Workers High-Wage Workers
Predicted Inequality (1) (2) (3) (4)
Technique Dunn Tobit Dunn Tobit
UNEQFAIR >
UNEQUNFAIR(BEATODDS)
0.181 0.316 0.241 0.454
UNEQUNFAIR(BEATODDS) >
UNEQDISCR(BEATODDS)
0.811 0.658 0.192 0.279
N 221 219 220 219
Notes: One-sided p-values are presented, in the direction predicted by the model.
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2.C. Instructions of the Experiment
2.C.A. Invitation Email
[Notes: Potential participants see the time limit that they have to complete the
experiment]
We would like to invite you to participate in an online economic experiment
about decision making. You will be paid a reward of £0.70 for about 5 minutes
of participation. Thereafter, as will be explained in the instructions, you can
earn more money with the decisions you make by participating in this experi-
ment for a longer time.
IMPORTANT: All information provided will be collected and stored ANONY-
MOUSLY.
*********************
You receive this invitation because you are registered at Prolific. Please consult
the Prolific website in case you want your data to be removed from the platform.
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2.C.B. Instructions
[Notes: Participants are provided with a countdown from 65 to 0 minutes.]
Instructions
Welcome to this economic experiment,
You can earn a considerable amount of money with the decisions you make.
Please read these instructions carefully. Importantly, unlike experiments in
some other social sciences, economic experiments employ a strict non-deception
policy. This means that all information you receive is truthful.
The only way to leave this economic experiment and be paid is to click on the
button “Leave”and go to the next page. Once you do this, you will see a mes-
sage that the experiment is now over and that you can close your browser page.
You will not be paid if you leave at any moment by closing your browser win-
dow without clicking on the button “Leave” and going to the next page that
tells you that the experiment is over.
This economic experiment consists of a Practice Part, where you cannot yet
earn money, followed by a Task Part where you can earn money. The Prac-
tice Part consists of these Instructions, some comprehension questions, and a
practice exercise. It is important that you answer the comprehension questions
correctly by yourself. Please do not consult other people when answering these
questions. In case you do not answer a question correctly, you will have two
more chances to correct your answer. If you do not answer all questions cor-
rectly after these two additional chances, you will not be able to participate in
the Task Part and the experiment ends for you. In that case you will be paid
£0.45. When you have answered all comprehension questions correctly you can
participate in the Task Part. In the Task Part, you can earn money by working
on a task. You can stop working on the task whenever you prefer.
Recall, that to leave this economic experiment and to be paid you need to click
on the “Leave button” and go to the next page. Once you have done this, you
will see a message that the experiment is over for you and that you can close
your browser page. You will not be paid if you leave the experiment without
following the described procedure.
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Note that you cannot leave the experiment and be paid before you finish the
Practice Part (which lasts about 5 minutes). Thereafter you can leave the ex-
periment at any time.
After you leave the experiment using the “Leave” button, the money you have
earned will be paid to you through Prolific.
Task Part
In the Task Part of this experiment, you can earn money by working on a task.
You can decide how much of the task you want to complete. The task is to enter
preset lines of random numbers and/or letters on your computer. You will re-
ceive a payment for each line you copy correctly. Nobody else than yourself will
derive any earnings from your work, including the experimenters. The lines of
numbers and/or letters you enter have no further use for anyone.
You will see one line at the time. Once you have entered a line correctly, you
can go to the next page to see the next line. Each time you see a new line, you
can decide whether you would like to type this line or leave the experiment.
In case you make a mistake when entering the line, the software will tell you
so. You will need to correct this mistake before you can proceed to the next line.
The length of the sequences of random numbers and/or letters will increase as
you complete more lines. That is, lines will be relatively short at the beginning
but get longer over time.
You will be informed of your payment per line at the beginning of the Task Part.
In the Task Part you may also receive anonymous payment information regard-
ing another participant.
Leave the Experiment
You can stop entering lines at any moment. Note, however, that the only way
to stop and to be paid is to click on the ”Leave” button and then go to the
next page. You will then see a message that the experiment is over for you, that
you need to click on a Prolific link to validate your participation, and that you
can then close your browser window.
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You will see the “Leave” button whenever you are presented a new line. If you
decide to leave, you will not be able to start working again. That is, once you
leave the experiment you cannot go back.
Payment
When you leave the experiment according to the described procedure you will
receive a payment per line you entered correctly. You will be informed about
the amount of the payment per line when you see the first line to be entered.
In addition, you will also receive a fixed amount of £0.70, irrespective of the
number of lines entered.
Decision
The decision you make in this economic experiment is to choose how much of
the task you want to complete. You are the only one deciding how much you
work. Your decision only affects your own earnings.
Practice Part
In the Practice Part, we ask you to correctly answer a number of comprehension
questions. It is important that you answer these comprehension questions by
yourself. For each question you will have three chances. If you do not correctly
answer all comprehension questions you will not be able to participate in the
Task Part. In this case the experiment will end for you and you will be paid
£0.45.
After having correctly answered all comprehension questions, you will enter
two practice lines to make you familiar with the task. Neither can you earn
payments per line with these practice lines, nor will these practice lines affect
the Task Part in any way.
This is the end of the instructions.
I confirm that I have read the instructions carefully and I am ready to start the
Practice Part. I will not be able to go back to the instructions once I go to the
next page.
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Chapter 3
On Your Own Side of the Fence
Abstract
This paper explores the causal mechanism behind the literature’s finding that
living close to poor individuals of another ethnicity decreases support for in-
come redistribution. We employ a laboratory experiment to extract causal re-
lationships for some of the plausible forces at play. Highly-paid participants
(“the rich”) are randomly assigned to interact with poorly-paid participants
(“the poor”) of different ethnicities or with other highly-paid participants. They
then propose redistribution schemes affecting a larger group of rich and poor.
In contrast to previous studies, the results show that proximity with the poor
increases redistribution—regardless of the poor’s ethnicity. Moreover, our de-
sign allows us to examine the counterfactual possibility that participants avoid
certain types of interactions if they are not exogenously enforced. We report
that, given the choice, Caucasians tend to avoid interactions with minorities.
This suggests that inter-ethnic proximity with the poor does not directly affect
preferences for redistribution; rather, compared to intra-ethnic proximity, it can
decrease contact with the poor nearby, which in turn reduces redistribution.
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I. Introduction
They should rise, yes, but on their own side of the fence. —Mrs. Chestny, Every-
thing That Rises Must Converge (O’Connor, 1965)1
Economists and political scientists alike have long recognized that ethnic
differences feature prominently in redistributive policy decisions. Woodward
(1955) documents that Reconstruction-era Democrats successfully framed re-
distribution proposals as transfers from Caucasians to African-Americans. Both
Becker (1957) and Orr (1976) formalize the idea that dislike of minority wel-
fare recipients can lower redistribution levels. More recently, Alesina et al.
(2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that dislike for minorities shape
welfare differences between the ethnically heterogeneous U.S. and relatively
homogeneous European countries.2 Among the important contributions to this
literature are Luttmer (2001) and subsequently Dahlberg et al. (2012). Both
studies provide evidence that inter-ethnic proximity with the poor is a spe-
cific channel by which ethnic differences decrease the support for redistribu-
tion. The causal support, however, is restricted and it is unclear how proximity
might actually alter support for redistribution. This paper delve into the causal
mechanism behind this effect at a fine-grained level—using the controlled en-
vironment provided by a laboratory experiment.
Using U.S. data, Luttmer (2001) shows that Caucasians (African-Americans)
living near African-American (Caucasian) welfare recipients exhibit lower sup-
port for welfare measures, whereas those living close to Caucasian (African-
American) welfare recipients have no such tendency, after controlling for cor-
relates of proximity. Dahlberg et al. (2012) offer causal support for this first
result in Sweden: cities receiving more (quasi-randomly-allocated) immigrants
from outside of the OECD experience a decrease in support for redistribution,
especially among their richer inhabitants. These findings are striking and con-
1While this highlights animosity in contact, another fictional character, Harry Lime, played
by Orson Welles in The Third Man (Reed et al., 1949), illustrates instead that remoteness might
inhibit social conscience: I never feel comfortable [meeting them, the] victims? Look down there.
Tell me. Would you really feel any pity if one of those dots stopped moving forever?
2There is a large literature connecting ethnic divisions and lower redistribution levels as well
as lower provision of public services with a redistributive component, among which are Gilens
(1995, 1996); Easterly and Levine (1997); Poterba (1997); Goldin and Katz (1999); Alesina
et al. (1999); Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Glaeser (2005);
Lee and Roemer (2006); Roemer and Van der Straeten (2006); Lind (2007); Roemer et al.
(2007); Shayo (2009); Baldwin and Huber (2010); Bandiera and Levy (2011); Swee (2015);
Kuziemko and Washington (2018). See the overviews by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and
Stichnoth and Van der Straeten (2013).
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sistent with the proposition in sociology that immediacy between ethnic groups
competing for status, economic or political power worsens inter-group dislike
(Blumer, 1958).3
However, the literature has yet to establish causality for other ethnic groups
than relatively recent immigrants in Sweden. At least two streams of literature
that have examined inter-group interactions at more micro levels also stand
to some extent at odds with the results. The first is Contact Theory (Allport,
1954), a prominent social psychology concept that has been influential in Amer-
ican court rulings regarding desegregation and Affirmative Actions (e.g., Brown
v. Board of Education in 1954, Fisher v. University of Texas in 2016). It contends
that, at least under favorable conditions, inter-group contact should improve
inter-group attitudes.4 Although studies in this area do not investigate the ef-
fect of proximity with the poor of another ethnicity on redistributive decisions,
the theory might predict a positive effect. The second is the Identifiable Vic-
tim Effect (Schelling, 1968), which states that identifying the person affected
by one’s choices leads to heighten care for this person, although this literature
does not explore the possible role of ethnic differences.5
Moreover, it is unclear how exactly proximity might influence support for re-
distribution as the process by which it happens is still somewhat of a black box.
An obvious explanation is that proximity with poor minorities makes salient
that welfare recipients are likely to be from another ethnic group and that this
triggers intra-group self-interest. Nonetheless, other explanations are plausible.
An increase in heterogeneity can engender changes in neighborhood dynamics.
For instance, it could decrease interactions with the poor of a different ethnicity
and lower social capital (as suggested, among others, by Alesina and La Fer-
rara, 2005; Putnam, 2007; and Algan et al., 2016), which may in turn affect
3Also see Bobo and Hutchings (1996). For a discussion of this literature, see Bobo (1999).
4Theoretical contributions to Contact Theory include Pettigrew (1998) and Brown and Hew-
stone (2005). For a recent overview of the evidence, see Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) and chapter
9 of Brown (2011). The theory is applied to several types of groups, including ethnic and in-
come groups. It has recently attracted interests from economists, who report positive effects of
contact that is much longer in nature than the interactions we study here (e.g., Boisjoly et al.,
2006; Camargo et al., 2010; Burns et al., 2015; Carrell et al., 2015; Finseraas et al., 2016; and
Rao, 2019). Notably, Rao (2019) finds a positive effect of contact with the poor on benevolence
toward them.
5Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011) model this intuition at the
societal level, proposing that increased distance between groups decreases support for redistri-
bution by the rich. A number of studies in experimental economics and psychology have found
a positive effect on generosity of divulging information about potential recipients or allowing
short-term interactions between donors and recipients (e.g., Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Batson
et al., 2002; Small and Loewenstein, 2003; Charness and Gneezy, 2008; and Andreoni and Rao,
2011).
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support for redistribution.6 These changing features are difficult to account for
in uncontrolled settings and it is therefore at least as difficult to identify their
potential effects on support for redistributive policies.
In the present laboratory experiment, we study the effect of intra-ethnic
and inter-ethnic proximity with the poor on the rich’s income redistribution
decisions. In our setting, proximity generates social interactions and redistri-
bution decisions are monetarily incentivized.7 The experiment is conducted at
a large public university in the American Southwest, which readily provides
the required ethnic diversity. Participants are assigned fixed unequal wages for
completing an individual task. Proximity of highly-paid participants (“the rich”)
with poorly-paid participants (“the poor”) as well as ethnic differences between
the rich and the poor are manipulated.8 After interacting with another individ-
ual, a participant proposes a redistribution scheme affecting a larger group of
10 participants. This larger group consists of all individuals taking part in an
experimental session, including the participant, and has a fixed total income.
We measure the within-subject effects of contact with poor Caucasians and poor
minorities on the redistribution scheme proposed by the rich, compared to in-
teracting with another rich. In addition, using a methodology that prevents
statistical discrimination based on ability, we examine the avoidance of inter-
actions with two types of participants: those of a different ethnicity, and those
who are assigned to be poor.9
Four factors play in favor of a laboratory experiment as a methodology of
choice here. First, it allows us to investigate the causality in the link between
proximity and support for redistribution by exogenously varying intra- and
inter-ethnic proximity. Second, it allows us to measure redistribution decisions.
Third, we can ensure that proximity translates into interactions. Fourth, it also
enables us to examine the counterfactual possibility that, given the opportunity
6For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that U.S. residents of more unequal and
more ethnic- or income-diverse Metropolitan Statistical Areas participate less in social and com-
munity activities. At a smaller level, Algan et al. (2016) show that almost-randomly-allocated
residents of nationality-diverse social housing blocks in France report to interact less with their
neighbors, which in turn appears to reduce their ability to maintain the local public good that is
housing quality.
7Distributional choices of participants in economic experiments have been shown to correlate
with behavior outside of those experiments, such as loan repayments (Karlan, 2005), donations
and other pro-social behaviors (Benz and Meier, 2008; Baran et al., 2010; Franzen and Pointner,
2013), voting decisions (Finan and Schechter, 2012; Fisman et al., 2017), work productivity
(Cohn et al., 2015), and socially-responsible investments (Riedl and Smeets, 2017).
8The “rich” and “poor” wording is used for convenience.
9In this respect, an experimental design related to ours is Hedegaard and Tyran (2018), which
measures the extent to which individuals with Muslim-sounding names are avoided in a Danish
workplace.
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to initiate contact, individuals actually avoid certain types of interactions.10
The main findings are as follows. First, both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic
contact with the poor increase the redistribution levels proposed by the rich.
The average increase corresponds to approximately 1/4 of a standard deviation.
We find no statistical differences between the effects produced by intra-ethnic
and inter-ethnic contact. Second, when facing the choice to interact with either
Caucasian or minority participants, Caucasian participants tend to favor inter-
actions with other Caucasians. That is, they select on average approximately
25% more Caucasians for their preferred interactions. Minority participants do
not exhibit significant ethnic inclination regarding whom they interact with.
Third, the majority of the rich avoid contact with the poor. In fact, a mere 5%
of the rich elect to interact with the poor, and 29% are indifferent to interacting
with fellow rich or with the poor.
Our first result contrasts with the negative inter-ethnic effect of proximity
reported in Luttmer (2001) and Dahlberg et al. (2012). However, our second
finding suggests a possible rationale for this difference. Our result regarding
proximity arises after interactions in the experiment are enforced, whereas,
when given the choice, we find that Caucasians tend to avoid inter-ethnic in-
teractions. Consequently, inter-ethnic proximity with the poor can affect sup-
port for redistribution indirectly, by decreasing contact with the poor nearby.
Specifically, relative to proximity with the poor of one’s own ethnicity, the de-
creased interactions with the poor stemming from proximity with the poor of
another ethnicity reduce the rich’s preferred levels of redistribution. As such,
our experiment offers a new and distinct interpretation of the negative effect of
inter-ethnic proximity with the poor on redistribution.
Our third result, that the rich avoid the poor, is consistent with a recent liter-
ature regarding moral behavior and social preferences, which argues that many
individuals avoid to place themselves in situations where they become gener-
ous (e.g., Dana et al., 2006; DellaVigna et al., 2012 and Andreoni et al., 2017).
For example, individuals are more generous when a person engages them and
asks them to donate for a cause, but often actively avoid such a person. Based
on our data, preserving some distance with the poor is a successful strategy for
the rich who prefer to be selfish, but somehow find it difficult to control their
generosity (or to justify their selfishness) once they face the poor.
10Moreover, the negative effect observed in Luttmer (2001) and Dahlberg et al. (2012) is at
least as strong for the rich as for the poor in the first and stronger for the rich than for the poor
in the second. As a university degree is a common characteristic of high-income earners, the
students at a large (non-elite) public university in this study should be somewhat representative
of high-income earners who graduated in the near past.
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We recognize that this study does not capture all channels that might drive
the effects of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts with poorer neighbors on
redistribution. Rather, the goal of this experiment is to cleanly examine some of
the plausible forces at play that are difficult to assess with other methodologies.
In doing so, it also joins a variety of experiments crafted to evaluate ethnic
discrimination in other settings (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; List, 2004;
Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Castillo and Petrie, 2010; Hedegaard and
Tyran, 2018; Cettolin and Suetens, 2019).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II details the experimental design.
Section III provides the hypotheses regarding the effect of contact. Section IV
tests our hypotheses and analyses choices regarding inter-ethnic and inter-
income interactions. Section V briefly discusses possible ramifications of our
findings.
II. Experimental Design
The experimental design recreates in a highly-controlled fashion the situation
of neighborhood proximity and adds a redistribution decision. There are three
identical rounds in the experiment, only one of which is randomly chosen to be
paid. At the start of the session, each participant is assigned one wage to be
paid for completing an individual task during a round, and this wage stays un-
changed across rounds. The task consists in copying lines of characters. More-
over, in each round, before they complete the individual task, two participants
are assigned to interact with each other in a pair. There are 10 participants in a
session, which allows us to vary the income and ethnic composition of the pairs
across rounds, while keeping the total income within a session fixed. After com-
pleting the task, each participant proposes a redistribution scheme affecting the
distribution of earnings among the 10 participants.
To examine preferences for interacting with others with a different ethnic-
ity or a different income, we add another stage at the start of every round.
In this stage, participants select which other participants they prefer to inter-
act with. To create incentives, there is a small probability that their choice is
implemented.
At the very beginning of the session, participants are given a written copy of
the entire instructions. They then already read the first section, which provides
a comprehensive overview of the experiment. The instructions are available in
the Appendix.
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II.A. Wage and Ethnicity
We use real ethnicity, which we simplify by dividing participants into two over-
arching groups: Caucasians and minorities. We invite approximately the same
number of participants from both groups in every session. This ethnic compo-
sition is natural for participants, as it resembles the composition of the univer-
sity’s student body. At the start of the session, six rich participants are privately
assigned the high wage (20.50 USD), and four poor participants the low wage
(7 USD).11 Wages are provided for completing the individual task described in
Section II.C in a round. A participant’s wage stays the same for each of the
three rounds. Participants know the distribution of wages, but not which par-
ticipant has which wage. No reason is provided for how wages are distributed.
Unknown to the participants, wages are randomized separately for Caucasians
and for minorities, i.e., the wages of individuals inside each group are drawn
from a distribution of three high wages and two low wages.12
II.B. Interaction
For the duration of a round, participants are matched in pairs in areas that are
physically separated by partitions. The members of a pair are seated next to
each other, at individual desks that are roughly one meter apart. They can see
each other and be seen by the experimenter, but they cannot observe partici-
pants in other areas. Participants are re-matched at the start of the next round
and cannot be paired again with the same participant. Participants are not told
how the matching is made. We generally paired a rich participant with the
following three neighbors throughout the session, in random order: (i) a poor
Caucasian, (ii) a poor minority, (iii) a rich participant of any ethnicity. These
11The terms “low-wage participant” and “high-wage participant” are employed to designate
participants during the experiment.
12There are obviously different ethnicities among minority participants. However, it would
have been impossible to recruit enough participants of a specific group to conduct this
study. We catalogue six categories within minorities; the resulting pool is diverse: “Cau-
casians/Whites” account for 53%, “Asians/Asian-Americans” for 23%, “Latino(a)s/Hispanics” for
14%, “Blacks/African-Americans” for 8%, and “Members of one of the Native Nations of North
America”, “Mixed”, and “Others” for 3%. The actual ratios are more often 4:6, 6:4, 3:7 or 7:3
than 5:5 due to no-shows. We also tried to balance ethnic groups by gender in the invitations.
Furthermore, upon the arrival of participants, the experimenter had to classify them into Cau-
casians or minority, because the information regarding the ethnicity of invited students could
not be accessed at that moment. Classification was based on names as well as visual appearance.
Participants also reported their ethnicity at the end of the session. In the few cases in which
there was a difference between the two classifications, self-reported ethnicity was then used in
the data analysis. When the Caucasians to minorities ratio differed from 5:5, then the extra Cau-
casian (minority) participants received wages drawn from the minority (Caucasian) participants’
distribution.
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Table 3.1: Treatments—Types of Contact with the Poor by the Rich
Treatment Description
NO CONTACT Rich interacts with another rich of any ethnicity
INTRA-ETHNIC CONTACT Rich Caucasian (minority) interacts with a poor Caucasian (minority)
INTER-ETHNIC CONTACT Rich Caucasian (minority) interacts with a poor minority (Caucasian)
Note: Treatments indicate the type of contact with the poor made by the rich.
pairs correspond to our three treatments, which indicate the type of contact
with the poor faced by the rich in a round and which we detail in Table 3.1: NO
CONTACT, INTRA-ETHNIC CONTACT, and INTER-ETHNIC CONTACT. The treat-
ments are implemented within subject in order to increase statistical power.13
The interaction is short and consists in the disclosure of personal informa-
tion, which participants had consented before the experiment to communicate
to others. Participants in a pair disclose the following to one another in pre-
determined turns: name, age, academic major, and year of study. They also
reveal their own wage to each other, by showing a card with their wage written
on it.
II.C. Task
After the interaction, each participant individually completes the task for his or
her own wage. We emphasized from the start of the experiment that the com-
pletion of the task is strictly individual; there are no possibilities of cooperation
or competition. The task is to copy by hand a set of lines from a text in Latin.
The lines are the same for everyone, but the rich copy the full set of lines, while
the poor copy two-thirds of them. The rich work more in order to make the
situation reflects the common belief that effort plays at least some role in the
higher income of the rich relative to the poor. This feature is constant across
treatments.14 Participants earn their assigned wage only if they complete the
13Our design requires five Caucasian and five minority participants per session for these inter-
actions to occur for all rich. Because of no-shows, some rich interacted twice with a Caucasian
or with a minority poor. We note that our within-subject design might generate inertia in the
participants’ choices, which would prevent us from observing differences between treatments.
Nevertheless, we do obtain within-subject variation in redistribution choices. Moreover, the
point estimates of the effects of intra- and inter-ethnic contacts on redistribution decisions (Sec-
tion IV.B) would be similar if we were instead to analyze only the first round to simulate a
between-subject design.
14We provide the task in the Appendix. Participants are given the sheet with the entire set of
lines, on which the part for the poor to complete is indicated. The poor cannot copy a greater
part of the text to earn more. The experimenter inspects the work of each participant in the first
minutes to confirm that they do it correctly, and inspects it again at the end of the time limit to
ensure that the task has been properly completed.
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task within a given time. The task was piloted to be easy enough for partici-
pants to complete with reasonable effort (and every participants did complete
the task in every round on time).
II.D. Redistribution Decision
At the end of the round each participant individually and anonymously chooses
the income redistribution scheme to be implemented for all 10 participants in
the session. This was known to all participants from the beginning of the ses-
sion. The redistribution schemes are presented in the form of redistribution
rates corresponding to earning distributions for the six rich and for the four
poor of the session. Table 3.2 shows the distribution resulting from each rate.
It is made clear that, irrespective of the rate chosen, there are minimal devi-
ations in the total earnings of the 10 participants in the session—i.e., income
redistribution does not decrease efficiency.15
Participants can select any redistribution rates from −10 to 115, in incre-
ments of 5. A higher rate increases the earnings of the poor; a lower rate
increases those of the rich. Note that the rate of 115 makes the poor richer
than the rich, 100 equalizes earnings, 0 leaves initial wages unchanged, and
−10 makes the rich even richer. The rates correspond to the percentage of each
participant’s income that is taken from them, and then redistributed equally
among all participants. As such, it replicates a feature of many redistributive
public policies: services are often paid by a tax corresponding to a percentage
of income, and offered more or less equally to members of a society, e.g., edu-
cation, healthcare, and public transport. For convenience, our income tax rate
is flat.
A single redistribution rate from one of the three rounds is randomly chosen
to be implemented for the session. Participants receive no feedback between
rounds.
II.E. Choosing Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Income Interactions
In order to observe decisions to engage in inter-ethnic and inter-income inter-
actions, we insert an additional stage at the start of every round. In order to do
that, at the beginning of the experimental session, participants are given large
15Minimal deviations occur because we round earnings to the nearest quarter. The exact ta-
ble presented to participants is part of the instructions in the Appendix. The choice to round
earnings to the nearest quarter was motivated by the (repeated, but anecdotal) observation that
students are unhappy with small coin denominations and can even return them. The redistribu-
tion decision is entered on a computer. It was computerized using z-Tree software (Fischbacher,
2007).
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Table 3.2: Redistribution Rates and Resulting Distributions of Earnings
Redistribution
Rate
Earnings of
the Poor
Earnings of
the Rich
Redistribution
Rate
Earnings of
the Poor
Earnings of
the Rich
-10 6.25 21.00 55 11.50 17.50
-5 6.50 20.75 60 11.75 17.25
0 7.00 20.50 65 12.25 17.00
5 7.50 20.25 70 12.75 16.75
10 7.75 20.00 75 13.00 16.50
15 8.25 19.75 80 13.50 16.25
20 8.50 19.50 85 14.00 16.00
25 9.00 19.25 90 14.25 15.75
30 9.50 19.00 95 14.75 15.25
35 9.75 18.50 100 15.00 15.00
40 10.25 18.25 105 15.50 14.75
45 10.75 18.00 110 16.00 14.50
50 11.00 17.75 115 16.25 14.25
Note: Earnings are in USD. Each participant chooses a redistribution rate. The experiment
always comprises four poor and six rich in a session. The rates change the distribution of
earnings between rich and poor, but the total earnings of the 10 participants is virtually
constant.
identification numbers that they wear visibly for the session.16 At the start of
the round, the 10 participants are seated around a large table. They clearly see
all other participants and their identification numbers. There, each participant
individually chooses other participants to be paired and interact with for the
round. They write down their choices on a form behind a ballot-style box that
prevents any other participants from observing their answers. They make two
types of selection choices.
The first type of selection choices, which we use to measure preferences
for inter-ethnic interactions, proceeds as follows. Participants rank all other
participants from the one they most prefer to interact with to the one they least
prefer to interact with. The ranking is made using the identifying numbers. The
ethnicity of the participant indicated in each rank is then employed to examine
the ethnicity of those selected in the most and least preferred ranks. If this
method is chosen to count, the pairs are made by randomly drawing a first
participant and creating the pair with his or her favorite participant with whom
16The identifying numbers, ranging from 1 to 10, are given in the following manner. The
group of Caucasians and the group of minorities each randomly receives a set of five consecutive
numbers. For instance, in a session Caucasians receive numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and minorities
receives 8, 9, 10, 1, 2. In another session, Caucasians receive 9, 10, 1, 2, 3, and minorities
receive 4, 5, 6, 7, 8. Within each ethnic group, numbers are handed to participants on their
arrival, and were not perfectly randomized. Moreover, as discussed before, since most sessions
did not have five Caucasians and five minorities, some Caucasians were given numbers intended
for minorities, and vice-versa, depending on no-shows. As a robustness check in Section-IV.C,
where we analyze decisions to engage in inter-ethnic interactions, we provide evidence that the
identification numbers themselves have no impact on the results.
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he or she was not paired in a previous round. Then, a second participant is
drawn and paired with his or her favorite available participant whom he or
she was not paired with in a previous round, and so on. Ranking all other
participants in the session is therefore only incentive compatible in the first
round.17
The second type of selection choices is used to measure preferences for con-
tact with the poor. Participants choose one of the three available options: (1)
CONTACT: to be paired and interact with a poor participant, (2) NO CONTACT:
to be paired and interact with a rich (instead of a poor) participant, or (3) IN-
DIFFERENT: to be randomly paired and interact with a poor or rich participant.18
If this method is selected to count, participants are randomly drawn one by one
and their choices are implemented as long as those choices are available.
Each round, a random draw is made and there is a 2% probability that one
of the two types of choices is used to form the pairs. There is an equal proba-
bility that each type is selected. The experimenter does not reveal whether the
selection choices have been used to create the pairs. While this technique intro-
duces a small amount of endogenous interactions in the experiment, it leaves
almost all interactions exogenous.19
At the moment of making selection choices, participants know how the rest
of the experiment will proceed. Importantly, it has been stressed to them that
they will never cooperate or compete, which is necessary to avoid statistical
discrimination based on beliefs about ability in the task. Participants make
selection choices in each of the three rounds, but we only analyze those from
the first round. This is because: (1) those choices are untainted by experience,
and (2) for decisions regarding inter-ethnic interactions, those choices are the
only incentive-compatible ones, as previously explained.
17For instance, in the second round, participants can write down that their most preferred
participant is the one they were paired with during the first round. This choice, however, cannot
be implemented. We also note that, by mistake, two participants were matched together twice
in a session where choices were implemented.
18The options are presented to participants as: paired with a low-wage participant, paired
with a high-wage participant, and indifferent. Since each session contains six rich and four poor,
choosing the indifferent option also gives one higher chances to be paired with a rich. We still
treat the option as real indifference. Counting indifference choices as avoidance of the poor
would only reinforce our result regarding inter-income interactions in Section IV.C.
19Since there is only a small probability that their selection choices are implemented, partic-
ipants might not take those choices seriously and take the simplest route by randomizing their
answers. In our design, random choices would introduce a bias against finding any selection
preferences in terms of ethnicity or wage. Furthermore, the small amount of endogenous selec-
tion does not affect the result regarding the effect of contact (see footnote 24 in Section IV.B).
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II.F. Friendships
The structure of our invitations for the experiment minimizes, but does not
eliminate, the possibility of having friends in a session. To begin with, we in-
vited potential participants from a large pool of approximately 1,000 students
registered to be invited for economic experiments, across two separate aca-
demic years.20 Then, we invited a subset of students in the pool to register for
very few sessions at a time (generally one or two sessions), and waited for the
session(s) to be full before sending out invitations for new sessions. Most of
the time, registration was completed quickly, limiting possible coordination on
a session. The first sessions were typically full within a few minutes, the middle
ones within a few hours or so, and the last ones within a day or two.
Nevertheless, ignoring that some might register with a friend can bias our
results of the effect of contact with the poor on redistribution. In our design,
one’s friend is more likely to be rich than to be poor—there are six rich and
four poor inside a session. If a participant is assigned to be rich and has one
friend in the session, the friend has a 5/9 probability to also be rich. The
times that a participant meet his or her friend in one of the two interactions
with the poor reveal that the friend is poor with certainty. Then, contact with
the poor friend can lead one to support more redistribution.21 In contrast,
not meeting one’s friend in the interaction with the poor slightly increases the
probability that one’s friend is rich, which might then reduce one’s preferred
levels of redistribution. Similarly, by the same argument, meeting one’s friend
in the only encounter with the rich can decrease support for redistribution, and
not meeting one’s friend in the interaction with the rich increase it.
Hence, whether an aggregate bias arises in the effect of contact on redistri-
bution, and whether it exhibits a positive or negative sign depends on partic-
ipants’ relative reactions to those possible events and their ability to correctly
update their beliefs. For this reason, we first collect data on whether partici-
pants had a friend in the session.22 A non-negligible minority of rich partici-
pants (26%) report to have at least one friend in the session—almost always
one friend.23 We leave out those participants with a friend in our analysis
20The pool consists of students from the University of Arizona, which has 44,000 students. A
majority comes from the faculty of business (which has around 6,000 students), but some also
come from other faculties such as engineering, sciences, and social sciences. The pool changes
from year to year, as graduating students leave the pool and new students enter.
21Goeree et al. (2010) show that individuals in economic experiments are indeed more gener-
ous with friends.
22Self-reported friendships are commonly employed in economics (e.g., Leider et al., 2009;
Branas-Garza et al., 2010; Goeree et al., 2010; Camargo et al., 2010).
23Note that, in one session, we resorted to use Qualtrics software instead of z-Tree to ask end-
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of contact. The evidence from our data is that, on average, including those
participants with a friend creates a negative bias on the effect of both intra-
and inter-ethnic contacts. That is, the point estimates of both effects would
decrease.
Second, we also collected data on whether one was paired with a friend for
each round. This allows us to report the bias for those who interacted with a
friend when meeting a poor participant separately from those who interacted
with a poor participant who is a stranger. Although the aggregate bias on the
effect of contact is negative, the few rich who interacted with a poor friend
indeed exhibit a positive bias. Moreover, no rich met a friend when interacting
with another rich. We return to this issue further in footnote 26 of Section IV.B.
In Section IV.C, we explain how we account for possible biases created by
the presence of a friend when we analyze decisions to engage in inter-ethnic
interactions.
II.G. Additional Procedural Details
We conducted the experiment at the Economic Science Laboratory of the Uni-
versity of Arizona, with 240 participants in 24 sessions, in 2016 and 2017. Due
to a crash of the recruiter software, 17 individuals participated twice, but we
identified them afterwards, and removed their second participation from the
data. This leaves us with 223 participants. Selection choices were implemented
in one round of two sessions. Participants were all students at the university.
They were paid their after-redistribution wages as well as a 3 USD show-up
fee. The resulting mean earning was 19.30 USD. The sessions lasted for 90
minutes. Participants read a comprehensive overview of the experiment at the
very beginning of the session. Then, for the first round, they also read a short
detailed section for every part of the experiment right before it occurred. The
experimenter read aloud each section with the participants, and encouraged
them to ask questions.
of-session questions, and the software did not let participants record that they had no friends
in the session. In response, almost all 10 participants entered the highest possible number,
which was higher than the maximum number of friends possible in a session. We treated those
participants as having zero friends. Moreover, in one session, one participant reported to have
10 friends in the session, which we took as a mistake since it is impossible, and corrected the
number to one.
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III. Hypotheses
The first hypothesis concerns the effect of intra-ethnic contact with the poor
on the redistribution decisions of the rich. As discussed in the introduction,
experiments related to the Identifiable Victim Effect have shown that identifica-
tion of a recipient increases benevolence of potential donors, although without
considering whether ethnic similarity plays a role. On a larger scale, Luttmer
(2001) reports that, in the U.S., intra-ethnic proximity with the poor in the
United States is not significantly correlated with support for redistribution. We
still propose the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: Intra-ethnic contact with the poor increases the rich’s support for
redistribution, relative to interacting with other rich.
The second hypothesis pertains to the effect of inter-ethnic contact with the
poor on the redistribution decisions of the rich. Luttmer (2001) and Dahlberg
et al. (2012) provide empirical evidence that proximity with the poor from an-
other ethnic group is correlated with lower support for redistribution in the
U.S., and causally decreases support for redistribution in Sweden, respectively.
We test the following hypothesis in our own causal setting with Americans.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Inter-ethnic contact with the poor decreases the rich’s support for
redistribution, relative to interacting with other rich.
In addition, in exploratory analyses, we examine patterns of decisions to en-
gage in inter-ethnic and in inter-income interactions. Specifically, we evaluate
whether Caucasian and minority participants are more likely to choose to inter-
act with Caucasian or with minority participants. Similarly, we analyze whether
the rich and the poor are more likely to select interactions with the rich or with
the poor.
IV. Results
IV.A. Overview Redistribution Decisions
Table 3.3 provides the means and standard deviations of redistribution rates
proposed by the rich, separated by the type of contact they experience. In addi-
tion, it divides data for Caucasian and minority participants. We have a total of
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Table 3.3: Summary of Redistribution Rates Chosen by the Rich
Redistribution Rates
All Caucasians Minorities
Treatments Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
NO CONTACT 7.23 24.01 103 5.20 22.69 51 9.23 25.29 52
INTRA-ETHNIC CONTACT 11.60 31.43 100 8.13 27.82 48 14.81 34.38 52
INTER-ETHNIC CONTACT 16.22 34.11 94 13.06 31.57 54 20.50 37.26 40
Note: Treatments indicate the type of contact with the poor. We show mean, standard
deviation and number of participants per treatment. Redistribution rates range from −10 to
115. There are 99 rich participants (51 Caucasians and 48 minorities). A few participants
encountered the same treatment twice, so that they did not experience all three treatments.
99 rich participants (51 Caucasians and 48 minorities).24 Contact with the poor
appears to increase redistribution, for Caucasians as well as for minorities. Cru-
cial to our investigation, participants do not respond negatively to either types
of contact. Although not shown, there is also substantial lower bound censor-
ing in the redistribution rates chosen: 45% of the rich’s decisions correspond to
the minimum rate of −10, which maximizes their own earnings.
IV.B. Testing the Hypotheses
To analyze our data, we employ a linear random-effects regression (RE), as well
as a Tobit random-effects regression (Tobit RE) accounting for lower bound
censoring of the redistribution rates at −10. The Tobit RE is our preferred
regression considering the amount of censoring in our data. Let RedistRateit be
the redistribution rate proposed by a rich individual i at the end of round t. We
employ two specifications. The first uses a single term for contact; the second
distinguishes between intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts. Those are
RedistRateit = Contactitω + Xiα + δt + δi + εit, and
RedistRateit = IntraContactitωintra + InterContactitωinter + Xiα
+ δt + δi + εit.
The variable Contactit takes value 1 if i has contact with any poor in round t,
and 0 otherwise. The variable IntraContactit has value 1 if a Caucasian (minor-
ity) i has contact with a Caucasian (minority) poor in round t, and 0 otherwise.
24This is after removing participants with a friend, as explained in Section II.F. Moreover, we
use data from all 24 sessions, but Result 1 would be the same if we exclude the two sessions that
contain one round in which pairing choices were implemented. Note again that participants are
not told whether their pairing decisions are implemented. Furthermore, we ignore the redistri-
bution decisions of the poor because they do not face any treatments (and neither of the two
hypotheses regarding the effect of contact concerns them).
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Table 3.4: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor on
the Rich’s Support for Redistribution
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 5.920∗∗ 9.429∗∗∗
(2.474) (3.570)
ωintra 4.224∗ 6.837
(2.373) (4.238)
ωinter 7.606∗∗ 11.767∗∗∗
(3.133) (4.118)
Wald Test .183 .260
N 297 297
Note: We report two-sided p-values of Wald tests evaluating the difference between ωintra
and ωinter. There are three observations (N) per individual. We employ robust standard
errors for the RE regression. Clustering standard errors at the session level in the RE regres-
sion provides the same results. Using the wild cluster bootstrap (see Cameron et al. (2008),
calculation package by Roodman et al. (2019)) with a linear fixed-effect regression (FE)
would also not change the results. p-values: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Similarly, the variable InterContactit is 1 if a Caucasian (minority) i experiences
contact with a minority (Caucasian) poor in round t, and becomes 0 otherwise.
Consequently, the effect of contact with any poor is measured by ω. The effects
of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts reside in ωintra and ωinter, respectively.
We control for two demographic characteristics in Xi.25 The regression also
includes a trend coefficient, δt, and an individual constant, δi. The error term
is denoted by εit.
Table 3.4 shows the estimates of the effect of contact on redistribution levels.
In both regressions, the estimates reveal that contact with the poor increases
redistribution (ω, RE p = .017, Tobit RE p = .008). This is also true once
we separate intra- and inter-ethnic contacts, although the effect of intra-ethnic
contact is very close to marginal significance using our preferred regression
and marginally significant otherwise (ωintra, RE p = .075, Tobit RE p = .107;
ωinter, RE p = .015, Tobit RE p = .004). Wald tests show that intra-ethnic and
inter-ethnic contacts produce statistically indistinguishable effects.26
25Those controls are included for their potential to influence altruistic behavior in this context,
but Result 1 stays the same if we exclude them.
26Table 3.8 shows the estimates from the same regressions, but adding rich participants with
a friend to the sample. As discussed in Section II.F, including those participants can bias our
estimate of the effect of contact. Our data suggests that, relative to Table 3.4, their inclusion
creates a negative aggregate bias on the effect of both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts.
Moreover, the direction of the bias varies as predicted based on whether or not those with a
friend encountered that friend in their interactions with the poor. Table 3.9 show the regression
estimates if we include the rich who interact with a poor friend. Relative to Table 3.4, their
inclusion positively biases the effect of both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts. Finally, Table
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We return to Table 3.3 to estimate the size of the effect. Contact approxi-
mately increases the mean redistribution rate by 6.00, starting from 7.00. To
interpret this effect, we provide two measures. First, the effect of contact cor-
responds to an increase in redistribution rates close to 1/4 of a standard devi-
ation. Second, using Table 3.2, which converts redistribution rates into after-
redistribution earnings, the effect translates in a reduction of the rich’s income
from approximately 2.6 to 2.4 times the poor’s income.27 In sum, the very
short-term contact that we implement has a moderate, but positive effect on
the redistribution levels chosen by the rich.
We write our first result, which supports Hypothesis 1 and goes against Hy-
pothesis 2, as follows.
RESULT 1: Both intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts with the poor increase in-
come redistribution by the rich. Taken together, their effect is significant; individ-
ually, the inter-ethnic effect is significant, the intra-ethnic effect marginally signif-
icant or close to.
In addition, as a robustness check, we estimate the coefficients from the
same regressions, but accounting for a few different minority groups. We do
not report the analysis here, but the results show again that intra-ethnic and
inter-ehnic contacts do not produce significantly different effects. Moreover,
both effects are qualitatively positive and only the effect of inter-ethnic contact
is significant. This is unsurprising because accounting for multiple minority
groups reduces the number of observations classified as intra-ethnic contact.
IV.C. Exploratory Analyses—Interaction Decisions
We examine the interaction choices of participants in light of the ethnicity and
of the wage of the participants they decide to interact with. We include choices
of rich and poor participants in our analyses, since both face the same interac-
tion choices. As explained in Section II.E, we only use decisions made in the
first round, to prevent that experience plays a role and to maintain incentive
compatibility.
3.10 shows the estimates if we include the rich with a friend, but who do not encounter him or
her in their interactions with the poor. Their presence engenders a negative bias.
27We make this comparison by using the change in earnings resulting from a change of redis-
tribution rate from 10 to 15 in Table 3.2. In dollar terms, the income distribution changes from
$7.75 for the poor and $20.00 for the rich, to $8.25 for the poor and $19.75 for the rich.
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Table 3.5: Percentage of Participants Choosing to be paired with a Caucasian in Each
Rank, for Caucasians and Minorities
Preferred Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Caucasians 60.0% 54.4% 52.2% 46.7% 44.4% 44.4% 37.8% 37.8% 49.4%
N 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 85
Minorities 54.4% 50.0% 48.9% 58.9% 53.3% 52.2% 47.8% 52.2% 44.3%
N 90 90 90 89 90 90 90 90 79
Note: We indicate the percentage of participants choosing to be paired with a Caucasian
(instead of a minority) participant in each rank, separately for Caucasians and minorities.
The lower the rank, the more likely an interaction is to occur. We exclude participants
who write their own identification number in a rank or who write a number twice. A few
observations are missing for some ranks because participants did not select someone in
those ranks.
Inter-Ethnic Interactions
Table 3.5 presents the percentage of participants choosing to interact with a
Caucasian in each of the nine ranks (1 being the most preferred rank, 9 the
least preferred). The upper part of the table presents the data for Caucasians
and the lower part the data for minorities. The ranking shows that Caucasians
choose more often to be paired with Caucasians in their first than in their last
ranks. Minorities exhibit less clear-cut preferences in this regard.
The variable ∆i is our measure of whether participant i exhibit a preference
to be paired with Caucasians. It denotes the number of Caucasian participants
that i selects in the first four ranks minus the number of Caucasian participants
that i selects in the last four ranks. Therefore, ∆i ranges from −4 to 4. It takes
value −4 if i chooses no Caucasians in the first four ranks and only Caucasians
in the last four ranks. Similarly, it takes value 4 if i chooses only Caucasians in
the first four ranks and none in the last four ranks.
We use OLS regressions to test whether participants exhibit a preference to
interact with Caucasians, separately for Caucasians and minorities. The de-
pendent variable is ∆i and the independent variable of interest is the constant
term. The constant captures the mean number of additional Caucasian partic-
ipants chosen in the first four ranks relative to the last four ranks. Table 3.6
presents the coefficient estimates for the constant, with and without control
variables. Those controls are for gender, for whether one has a friend in the
session, and for ID numbers.28
28For the analysis, we exclude participants who write their own identification number in a
rank, who write some number twice or who write nothing for a rank. The controls are as
follows. First, we account for one’s gender and the difference in the gender of participants
selected in the first and last four ranks. We do this by adding a dummy variable for gender, a
variable measuring the number of men in the first four ranks minus the number of men in the
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Table 3.6: OLS Regression Estimates—Difference in Number of Caucasians in First and
Last Four Ranks, for Caucasians and Minorities
∆i
Caucasians Minorities
Constant 0.424∗∗ 0.492∗∗ 0.644∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 0.165 0.254 -0.044 -0.251
(0.171) (0.208) (0.274) (0.363) (0.203) (0.216) (0.272) (0.428)
Controls
Friend No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Gender No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
ID number No No No Yes No No No Yes
Fcontrols > 0 .509 .854 .682 .343 .389 .500
N 85 85 85 85 79 79 79 79
Notes: The dependent variable ∆i is the difference in the number of Caucasians that i se-
lected in the first four ranks relative to the last four ranks. We conduct separate regressions
for Caucasian and minority participants. F-tests indicate the joint significance levels of con-
trol variables. We employ robust standard errors. Clustering standard errors at the session
level provides the same results (with and without the wild cluster bootstrap). p-values:
∗p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
The estimates of the constant confirm the patterns observed in the descrip-
tive data. On average, Caucasian participants are significantly more likely to
select other Caucasians in the first relative to the last four ranks. Moreover,
this is not the case for minority participants. The control variables are never
jointly significant, and do not alter the results. The difference for Caucasians is
substantial: they choose on average roughly 0.5 more Caucasians among their
four preferred individuals to interact with than among their four least preferred.
Using descriptive data from Table 3.5, this translates into Caucasians choosing
approximately 25% more Caucasians for their preferred than for their least pre-
ferred interactions.
Our second result is thus as follows.
RESULT 2: Caucasian participants elect to interact with Caucasians more often
than with minorities. Minority participants exhibit no significant ethnic prefer-
last four ranks, and an interaction term between those two variables. We do this to capture the
possibility that participants select members of their own or the other gender more frequently.
Second, we correct for friendships by including a dummy variable for those participants with a
friend in the session. The inclusion of this variable prevents that our constant captures a choice
to interact more frequently with those of the same ethnicity in the preferred ranks because of
the presence of a friend. Third, we account for the identification number (ID) that we employ
(see Section II.E). We include a dummy variable for being assigned a number in the upper half
of the number range. We also add a variable for the difference between the sum of the numbers
for participants selected in the first four ranks and in the last four ranks. That is, we cover
the possibility that being assigned a low or high number or having a tendency to select low or
high numbers in the preferred ranks could drive our findings. Moreover, a handful of participants
choose the numbers following their own number in ascending order as their preferred four ranks,
and controlling for them with a dummy variable in the regression would not affect the results.
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ences in their interactions.
In addition, we report that the effect of inter-ethnic contact with the poor
on the redistribution proposals of those Caucasian rich who choose more often
to interact with other Caucasians appears similar as for our entire sample of
rich. That is, the effect of inter-ethnic contact is positive and significant at the
5% level using Tobit RE, and positive but not significant using RE. Table 3.11
provides the estimates from the same regressions as the ones used for Table
3.4, but for this specific subgroup. We do note, however, that this analysis
essentially relies on one quarter of our full sample of rich (leaving us with only
26 participants), which decreases our statistical power.
Inter-Income Interactions
The left part of Table 3.7 presents the percentage of participants choosing each
of the three options regarding contact with the poor. Recall that the options are:
(1) CONTACT: interaction with the poor, (2) NO CONTACT: interaction with the
rich (instead of the poor), and (3) INDIFFERENT: whether interaction is with the
poor or the rich is randomized. The data is separated for the rich and the poor.
As for the choices of inter-ethnic interactions, we include participants with a
friend in the session.
The right part of the table shows the p-values from tests evaluating whether
participants choose CONTACT and NO CONTACT with the same frequency, as
well as whether participants choose CONTACT/INDIFFERENT and NO CONTACT
with the same frequency. We employ Logit regressions to obtain those tests.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a participant
chooses NO CONTACT, and 0 otherwise. The independent variables only include
a constant term. The p-values presented are for the constant.
Overall, the table shows that participants rarely choose CONTACT. Notice-
ably, the rich almost never select CONTACT. Both the poor and the rich prefer
NO CONTACT significantly more often than CONTACT. Moreover, the rich select
NO CONTACT significantly more often than CONTACT and INDIFFERENT joined
together. We also note that the results would be the same if we were to control
for having a friend in the session.
Our third result reflects the behavioral patterns regarding the choices of
inter-income interactions.
RESULT 3: Neither the rich nor the poor seek contact with the poor; most of the
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Table 3.7: Choices of Contact with the Poor, and Tests of Equality of Choices, for the
Poor and the Rich
Choice of Contact with the Poor (percentage) Test Equality of Choices (p-value)
CONTACT INDIFFERENT NO CONTACT
CONTACT 6=
NO CONTACT
CONTACT/INDIFFERENT
6= NO CONTACT
Poor 20.0% 28.9% 51.1% Poor <.001 .834
(N=90) N 64 90
Rich 5.3% 28.6% 65.4% Rich <.001 <.001
(N=133) N 95 133
Note: There are three options regarding contact with the poor: (1) CONTACT: interaction
with the poor, (2) INDIFFERENT: interaction with the poor or the rich is randomized, and
(3) NO CONTACT: interaction with the rich. The last two columns show p-values from
Logit regressions. We employ robust standard errors. Clustering standard errors at the
session level provides the same results (with and without the wild cluster bootstrap). One
participant did not provide an answer and is therefore excluded from the analysis.
rich avoid contact with the poor.
Moreover, the effect of contact with the poor on redistribution is positive and
significant for the specific subgroup of rich who choose to avoid contact with
the poor. Table 3.12 reproduces the regression estimates from Table 3.4, but for
that specific subgroup. If anything, the point estimates are qualitatively larger
than for the full sample. This means that those rich who choose NO CONTACT
increase their support for redistribution when they are exogenously assigned to
interact with the poor.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Previous influential studies (Luttmer, 2001; Dahlberg et al., 2012) have docu-
mented that inter-ethnic proximity with the poor decreases support for income
redistribution. Nevertheless, this effect is somewhat at odds with some other
literature described in the introduction, and the channel by which inter-ethnic
proximity with the poor influences redistributive choices is still unknown. Us-
ing a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the causal mechanism
behind this effect. We fail to find that inter-ethnic proximity with the poor
(poorly-paid) participants decreases the amount of redistribution preferred by
the rich (highly-paid) participants. In fact, we find that both intra-ethnic and
inter-ethnic contacts with the poor similarly increase redistribution by the rich.
Our experiment is also designed to measure participants’ avoidance of cer-
tain types of interactions. Among our participants, on average, Caucasians tend
to avoid interactions with minorities, even though our design rules out the pos-
sibility of statistical discrimination based on ability. This finding enables us to
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speak to a possible indirect effect of ethnic heterogeneity on support for in-
come redistribution: that it decreases interactions with the poor, which can
then lower redistribution. Transposed outside of the laboratory, this means
that, relative to living nearby poor of one’s own ethnicity, living close to poor
of another ethnicity could weaken support for redistributive measures. We also
note that our finding that minority participants show no significant average
preference for interacting with Caucasians or minorities might result from the
heterogeneity of minority groups among our participants.
This additional finding can be useful for public policy aiming to prevent
or alleviate a negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on redistribution. It sug-
gests that such policy should aim to increase inter-ethnic interactions within
ethnically-diverse neighborhoods, to create a positive externality on support for
redistribution. One could wonder whether those who specifically avoid inter-
ethnic interactions can really be positively affected by inter-ethnic interactions
with the poor. Our results provide some evidence that this is indeed the case.
That is, our subsample of rich Caucasians who choose to interact more fre-
quently with other Caucasians than minorities does not appear to respond any
differently than the entire sample.
Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, recent findings have shown that
individuals can avoid situations where they give more to others. We show that
the majority of rich participants in our experiment avoid interacting with poor
participants when given the choice. Some rich are indifferent between inter-
acting with the poor or not, and almost none actively seeks to interact with the
poor. Avoiding this contact is not necessarily intended to avoid being generous,
but it proves effective to refrain one from giving. For instance, not interacting
with the poor can allow enough distance to be stingy with the poor at the same
time as preserving a positive self-image (see Bénabou and Tirole (2006) for an
example of self-image concerns). This perhaps allows one to avert painful cog-
nitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962; Akerlof and Dickens, 1982). As a caveat, we
note that the very strong avoidance of the poor that we find may overestimate
avoidance in the field, where affinity for a neighbor can obviously exist on other
grounds than income.
The short-lived interactions that we employ enable participants to recog-
nize an individual affected by their redistribution choices, as do interactions
with poorer individuals in one’s neighborhood.29 As such, the Identified Victim
Effect literature suggests that this recognition renders individuals more empa-
29We do not claim that individuals know the exact income of their neighbors as in this experi-
ment, but that they have an idea of whether those neighbors are poor or not.
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thetic and altruistic. However, repeated interactions with nearby poorer neigh-
bors may generate a larger positive effect on support for redistribution. For
instance, Contact Theory suggests that acquaintance with an out-group mem-
ber can improve knowledge about and empathy toward other income or ethnic
groups.
One limitation of our study is that we employ only one format of interactions
between individuals, which is relatively neutral, and that we do not vary the
quality of those interactions. For instance, a difference in the effect of intra-
ethnic and inter-ethnic interactions with the poor could arise because inter-
ethnic interactions are more frequently negative. Another limitation is that
we do not vary the source of income inequality; it is always assigned in our
design, and sources of inequality and beliefs about those sources have been
shown to influence redistribution decisions (e.g., Fong, 2001; Cappelen et al.,
2007). Whether interactions with or identification of the poor whose income is
generated through a mix of effort and luck has the same effect as the one we
find remains to be explored.
Finally, future studies could investigate whether the indirect effect of inter-
ethnic proximity that we uncover is indeed found in the field. Future research
could also try to assess the importance of this effect relative to other possible
forces.
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Appendix
3.A. Additional Tables
Table 3.8: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor on
the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including All Participants with a Friend in the
Session
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 3.148 5.734
(2.483) (3.710)
ωintra 3.051 5.534
(2.533) (4.430)
ωinter 3.242 5.918
(2.969) (4.331)
Wald Test .937 .934
N 399 399
Note: Compared to Table 3.4, the aggregate bias induced by including participants with a
friend on the effect of intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic contacts is negative. We report two-sided
p-values of Wald tests evaluating the difference between ωintra and ωinter. There are three
observations (N) per individual. We employ robust standard errors for the RE regression.
Clustering standard errors at the session level in the RE regression provides the same results.
Using the wild cluster bootstrap with an FE regression has also no bearing on the results.
p-values: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.9: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor
on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including Participants with a Friend who
Interact with their Friend in their Contact with the Poor
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 6.581∗∗∗ 11.300∗∗∗
(2.383) (3.659)
ωintra 5.163∗∗ 9.221∗∗
(2.350) (4.312)
ωinter 8.026∗∗∗ 13.241∗∗∗
(2.979) (4.234)
Wald Test .242 .365
N 318 318
Note: Compared to Table 3.4, as predicted, the bias induced by including participants who
interacted with their poor friend is positive. We report two-sided p-values of Wald tests
evaluating the difference between ωintra and ωinter. There are three observations (N) per
individual. We employ robust standard errors for the RE regression. Clustering standard
errors at the session level in the RE regression provides the same results. Using the wild
cluster bootstrap with an FE regression has also no bearing on the results. p-values: ∗p <
.10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table 3.10: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor on
the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Including Participants with a Friend who do not
Interact with their Friend in their Contact with the Poor
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 2.469 3.988
(2.567) (3.677)
ωintra 2.231 3.442
(2.593) (4.422)
ωinter 2.693 4.478
(3.091) (4.285)
Wald Test .854 .824
N 378 378
Note: Compared to Table 3.4, as predicted, the bias induced by including participants with a
friend who did not encounter their friend in their interactions with the poor is negative. We
report two-sided p-values of Wald tests evaluating the difference between ωintra and ωinter.
There are three observations (N) per individual. We employ robust standard errors for the
RE regression. Clustering standard errors at the session level in the RE regression provides
the same results. Using the wild cluster bootstrap with an FE regression has also no bearing
on the results. p-values: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 3.11: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor on
the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Subgroup of the Caucasian Rich who Choose
more often to Interact with Caucasians
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 6.418 11.550∗
(4.525) (6.608)
ωintra 5.507 6.785
(4.185) (8.275)
ωinter 7.101 14.484∗∗
(5.219) (7.291)
Wald Test .611 .337
N 78 78
Note: We use the subsample of the 26 Caucasian rich participants choosing more Caucasians
in their preferred four ranks than in their least preferred four ranks of participants to in-
teract with. We report two-sided p-values of Wald tests evaluating the difference between
ωintra and ωinter. There are three observations (N) per individual. We employ robust stan-
dard errors for the RE regression. Clustering standard errors at the session level in the RE
regression provides the same results. Using the wild cluster bootstrap with an FE regression
has also no bearing on the results. p-values: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
81
Table 3.12: Estimates of the Effect of Intra- and Inter-Ethnic Contact with the Poor
on the Rich’s Support for Redistribution—Subgroup of the Rich who Choose to Avoid
Contact with the Poor
Redistribution Rate
RE Tobit RE
ω 9.349∗∗∗ 14.125∗∗∗
(3.394) (5.074)
ωintra 7.034∗∗ 11.587∗
(3.098) (5.991)
ωinter 11.758∗∗ 16.541∗∗∗
(4.591) (5.901)
Wald Test .223 .428
N 189 189
Note: We report two-sided p-values of Wald tests evaluating the difference between ωintra
and ωinter. There are three observations (N) per individual. We employ robust standard
errors for the RE regression. Clustering standard errors at the session level in the RE regres-
sion provides the same results. Using the wild cluster bootstrap with an FE regression has
also no bearing on the results. p-values: ∗p < .10, ∗∗p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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3.B. Instructions
Part 1 – General Instructions30
Welcome. In this experiment, the instructions are simple and you can earn
a considerable amount of money by following them. You are not allowed to
talk with other participants except when instructed otherwise. If anything is
unclear, please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter. You can do so at any
time by raising your hand. At the end of the experiment, the earnings you have
made will be paid to you in cash on top of a $3 show-up fee.
You will go through 3 rounds of a game called the Neighborhood Game. Each
round, you have to complete a task within 8 minutes. The task is done individ-
ually. It is to copy some text by hand. It can be done on time with moderate
effort. You receive a wage for completing the task. There are 6 participants
who receive a high wage of $20.50 and 4 participants who receive a low wage
of $7. The length of the text to copy is smaller for participants with a low wage.
This wage will be determined for each of you in a moment. This wage does not
change throughout the rounds. If you are assigned a low or high wage now,
you will keep this same wage for the 3 rounds. Hide your wage in your pocket
and do not reveal it to others except when instructed otherwise.
After completing the task, each of you proposes a redistribution rate for the
group. The redistribution rates proposed are anonymous. After the end of the
experiment, one of the 3 rounds is randomly selected to count for payment.
One redistribution proposal from the selected round is randomly chosen and
implemented for everyone. Each participant is paid his/her after-redistribution
wage for the selected round. Participants are not paid for the 2 rounds that are
not selected.
Every round, each of you will be paired with another participant. Before en-
gaging in the task, which is performed individually, you will be asked to reveal
the following information to the participant you are paired with: name, age,
major, year of study, and your wage for the task. After doing so, you can start
the task and may not communicate with the participant you are paired with or
anyone else. More information will be provided once you are seated.
30Note to the reader: Participants were knowingly videotaped for a part of the session. We
subsequently did not use the videos because of an error in the recording software.
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Part 2 – Selection
Before each round, you have a chance to select which participant you would
prefer to be paired with. You will have a new chance to do this before each
round. This selection will never be revealed to other participants. You make a
selection in two ways. First, you can choose whether you would prefer to be
paired with a high or a low wage participant. Second, you can rank the other
participants in order of preference to be paired with. To do so, you can use
the identification number of each participant. No participants can be paired
together twice.
There is a 2% chance that one of the two ways of pairing is selected. Each way
has an equal chance of being selected. Therefore, each way has a 1% chance of
being selected.
If one of the ways is selected, one participant is drawn randomly first and given
his/her first choice. If the participant has already been matched with the par-
ticipant of his/her choice, he/she will be paired with his/her next preferred
choice. Then, another participant is drawn and given his/her preferred choice
that is still available. This goes on until there is no participant left. This process
is conducted by the experimenter and is not revealed to any participant.
If neither the first way nor the second way is randomly selected, the exper-
imenter allocates participants to others, without taking into account partici-
pants’ choices in the selection questions.
Moreover, to ensure the privacy of your answers with respect to other partici-
pants, it will not be revealed if one of the ways by which you can select others
yourself has been picked to assign participants. The experimenter will simply
bring everyone’s answers to another room and come back with the seat number
of each participant.
The experimenter will call you to go to a table to make your choices without
others being able to see. There will be a paper on the table to write down your
choices. There is a reminder of what you should do on this paper. Once you are
done with writing down your choices, please fold the paper in two and place it
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in the box on the table.
Part 3 – Communication
Before we go to the task, we kindly ask you to introduce yourself to the partici-
pant seated next to you. To do so, please reveal the following information: your
name, age, major, and year of study. Please also reveal your wage by showing
the card your wage is written on. We ask you not to communicate anything
else. The participant on the aisle side can start.
Part 4 – Task and Redistribution Proposal
You are asked to complete individually a task to earn your wage. The wage
cannot be earned without completing the task on time. The task is to copy the
text on your desk onto the empty sheet of paper, also on your desk. It is simple
and can be completed by all participants on time with moderate effort. Each of
you has the exact same text. Participants with the high wage of $20.50 have to
copy the full text. Participants with the low wage of $7 have to copy 2/3 of the
text. Only the part of the text in gray has to be copied by participants with a
low wage. Participants with a high wage have to copy the part in gray and the
part in black.
You will be given 8 minutes to complete the task. You will be reminded when
there are 4 minutes left and when there are 2 minutes left. The experimenter
will also come to each of you in the first few minutes to make sure that you are
doing the right thing. Even if all participants finish earlier, everyone will still
have to wait for the 8 minutes to pass.
Once the time is over, you are asked to propose a redistribution rate. This pro-
posal will not be revealed to other participants. At the end of the experiment,
one of the 3 rounds will be selected randomly. One redistribution rate proposed
in the round selected will be randomly chosen to count for everyone’s payment.
Only this selected rate will be revealed and not who proposed it. If you do not
complete the task, you can neither propose a redistribution rate for the round
nor receive payment for the round.
The redistribution rate can be any rate from −10% to 115%, in any increment
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of 5%. A higher redistribution rate makes the after-redistribution wages more
equal up to the rate of 100%. A redistribution rate of 0% leaves them as they
were originally. The after-redistribution wages will be paid for the round se-
lected at the end of the experiment.
Please keep in mind that each participant’s wage will be the same in each of
the 3 rounds. Please also keep in mind that there are 6 participants with a
high wage and 4 with a low wage. The following table gives you the after-
redistribution wages in dollars of both types of participants for all possible re-
distribution rates:
Redistribution Rate (%) After-Redistribution Wage
Low-Wage Participant ($) High-Wage Participant ($) Total Group Earnings ($)
-10 6.25 21.00 151
-5 6.50 20.75 150.5
0 7.00 20.50 151
5 7.50 20.25 151.5
10 7.75 20.00 151
15 8.25 19.75 151.5
20 8.50 19.50 151
25 9.00 19.25 151.5
30 9.50 19.00 152
35 9.75 18.50 150
40 10.25 18.25 150.5
45 10.75 18.00 151
50 11.00 17.75 150.5
55 11.50 17.50 151
60 11.75 17.25 150.5
65 12.25 17.00 151
70 12.75 16.75 151.5
75 13.00 16.50 151
80 13.50 16.25 151.5
85 14.00 16.00 152
90 14.25 15.75 151.5
95 14.75 15.25 150.5
100 15.00 15.00 150
105 15.50 14.75 150.5
110 16.00 14.50 151
115 16.25 14.25 150.5
The experimenter will give you a moment to examine the table. Understanding
the table is crucial to understanding how the redistribution rate you propose
can affect your payment and the payments of others. If you have any questions,
please do not hesitate to ask.
3.C. Task
Low-wage participants copy only the part of the text in blue and high-wage
participants copy the whole text.31
31Note for the reader: the three tasks have the same length, and correspond to the task in
round 1–3. The text for the low-wage participants is highlighted in gray. The text consists of the
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TASK 1
(1) Arma virumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab
(2) oris Italiam, fato profugus, Laviniaque venit
(3) litora, multum ille et terris iactatus et alto
(4) vi superum saevae memorem Iunonis ob iram;
(5) multa quoque et bello passus, dum conderet urbem,
(6) inferretque deos Latio, genus unde Latinum,
(7) Albanique patres, atque altae moenia Romae.
(8) Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso,
(9) quidve dolens, regina deum tot volvere casus
(10) insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores
(11) impulerit. Tantaene animis caelestibus irae?
TASK 2
(1) Urbs antiqua fuit, Tyrii tenuere coloni,
(2) Karthago, Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe
(3) ostia, dives opum studiisque asperrima belli;
(4) quam Iuno fertur terris magis omnibus unam
(5) posthabita coluisse Samo; hic illius arma,
first 33 lines of Virgil’s Aeneid.
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(6) hic currus fuit; hoc regnum dea gentibus esse,
(7) si qua fata sinant, iam tum tenditque fovetque.
(8) Progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci
(9) audierat, Tyrias olim quae verteret arces;
(10) hinc populum late regem belloque superbum
(11) venturum excidio Libyae: sic volvere Parcas.
TASK 3
(1) Id metuens, veterisque memor Saturnia belli,
(2) prima quod ad Troiam pro caris gesserat Argis-
(3) necdum etiam causae irarum saevique dolores
(4) exciderant animo: manet alta mente repostum
(5) iudicium Paridis spretaeque iniuria formae,
(6) et genus invisum, et rapti Ganymedis honores.
(7) His accensa super, iactatos aequore toto
(8) Troas, reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli,
(9) arcebat longe Latio, multosque per annos
(10) errabant, acti fatis, maria omnia circum.
(11) Tantae molis erat Romanam condere gentem!
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Chapter 4
Reciprocity under Brief and
Long Time Delays
Abstract
We report the results from three experiments embedded in the same overarch-
ing design, which extends the Gift Exchange paradigm for the study of worker-
employer relationships. We focus on the effect of the length of the delay, be-
tween the time at which workers learn their wage and when they choose an
effort level, on the relationship between wage and effort. We compare effort
choices made within a few hours after workers learn their wage, with those
made several weeks afterward. Our two effort choices are single “cold” choices,
but the varying delay allows us to identify any dissipation of reciprocal behav-
ior. We find that the strength of the wage-effort relationship decreases over
time, and this change appears to be driven by those workers who receive low
wages. We extend our study of delays to the wage-effort relationship below self-
reported fair wages. Our findings suggest that workers’ inclination to punish
stingy employers weakens over time.
A version of this chapter, co-authored with Charles N. Noussair, appears in the July 2020
issue of Economic Inquiry.
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I. Introduction
Experimental research on the behavior of labor markets in which worker effort
is not contractible, beginning with Fehr et al. (1993), has yielded a number
of important insights. Even in one-shot interactions, the average wages paid to
workers considerably exceed the competitive market-clearing level. In addition,
worker effort tends to be greater than the minimum effort possible, despite the
fact that exerting effort is costly to the worker. A robust relationship of workers
reciprocating higher wages with greater effort is observed. These findings have
spawned a large literature (e.g.,, Fehr et al., 1996, 1997, 1998a,b; Fehr and
Falk, 1999; Gächter and Falk, 2002; Hannan et al., 2002; Brandts and Charness,
2004; Brown et al., 2004; Charness, 2004). See Fehr et al. (2009), Charness
and Kuhn (2011), Casoria and Riedl (2013), and Cooper and Kagel (2016) for
surveys.
Although worker-employer relationships may be short-term or long-term in
nature, the laboratory studies cited above consider immediate behavior, in the
sense that all wage and effort decisions are made within one laboratory session,
which is typically under two hours in duration. Several recent studies report
field experiments focused on whether the reciprocal relationship between wage
and effort is durable over longer time horizons. Reciprocity, in the form of
increased effort by workers, is commonly found within a few hours following
a wage increase. In contrast, the few studies analyzing behavior over a longer
timeframe provide some evidence that the tendency toward reciprocation can
survive for at least one day. The results are consistent with the notion that
reciprocity fades over horizons of days or weeks.
Specifically, several experimental studies have considered worker reciprocity
over a time frame of several hours. Kube et al. (2012) observe higher effort for
the three hours they monitor after a one-time non-monetary gift, but not for a
comparable monetary gift. Gilchrist et al. (2016) detect a similar effect for four
hours following an unexpected wage increase, but not when the wage increase
is expected.Kube et al. (2013) find no reciprocal response to a wage increase,
but do observe a sharp decrease in productivity following a wage decrease,
over the six hours of their experiment. In a study spanning two work days,
Gneezy and List (2006) observe that reciprocity lasts only for a few hours after
an increase in workers’ hourly wage. A few studies have observed an effect
for a longer time span, but these studies are not conclusive. Bellemare and
Shearer (2009) find reciprocity lasting for one day after a one-off bonus pay-
ment, and thereafter workers’ effort comes back down to previous levels. Cohn
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et al. (2015) report higher productivity following increases in hourly wages for
the entire time horizon of their study, which was several days. However, they
vary workers’ wages more than once, which may renew the stimulus. Hossain
and List (2012) find an increase in productivity lasting for four weeks after a
one-time monetary payment, though they rely on a relatively small sample of
workers.1
Those studies differ from each other in many aspects. The time horizons an-
alyzed differ, ranging from a few hours to four weeks. Effort decisions are also
typically repeated, and thus some workers might exhibit a decline in effort be-
cause they feel like they have already reciprocated for any prior employer wage
decisions. Furthermore, worker behavior might depend on the context (List,
2006; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2010; Kube et al., 2012, 2013; Gilchrist et al.,
2016), the perception of the fairness of the baseline wage (Fehr et al., 2009;
Cohn et al., 2015), prior history (Bellemare and Shearer, 2009), or anticipated
future interaction between worker and employer (Hossain and List, 2012).
In the experiments reported here, we consider whether reciprocal behavior
is long-term in nature, and we do so in a very simple one-shot design. This fea-
ture rules out any effect of past or anticipated future interaction. We compare
the decisions of “short-term” workers choosing their effort within three hours of
learning their wage, with those of “long-term” workers making their choice four
weeks after receiving their wage information. Before long-term workers are re-
quired to make their effort decision, they are reminded of the wage decision
their employer made four weeks previously. This is similar to the typical situa-
tion of an employee or contractor who learns her wage when hired, and is then
reminded about her wage at the time she actually starts the job later on.2 Our
short-term delay represents the case of workers who learn their wage shortly
before their work begins, and then choose how much effort to exert. Under
the “hot vs. cold” terminology, both of our effort decisions are “cold” decisions,
made after a period of reflection.3 The longer delay allows us to measure the
dissipation of the reciprocity motive between the two time horizons. There is
1In most of these studies, it is unclear whether the observed wage-effort relationship consists
of positive or negative reciprocity. This is because reference wages, which are needed to classify
reciprocity as positive or negative, are not elicited.
2To conduct this experiment, it is imperative to remind long-term workers of the wage that
they were offered previously. Otherwise, many would forget the wage that they were offered,
and we could not be sure that their effort decisions were taken with the knowledge of the wage
that they had received.
3“Hot” decisions are made instantaneously, whereas “cold” decisions allow for more reflec-
tion. See, for example, the articles by Brandts and Charness (2000) and for a discussion of
differences in the two settings.
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exactly one decision made by each worker. This allows us to clearly identify
any and all reciprocal behavior that the worker exhibits.4 The experiment is
decontextualized to the extent that is typical in laboratory experiments. Inter-
actions are anonymous so that prior or future interactions between participants
are not relevant to their decisions.
We conduct three separate experiments, where we extend the laboratory
Gift Exchange paradigm for the study of employer-worker relationships to long
time horizons. The experiments are embedded in the same overarching design
that allows scope for a reciprocal worker-employer relationship to emerge. The
second experiment improves possible censoring issues faced by the first, and
the third experiment employs a richer design that allows us to consider reci-
procity from additional perspectives. To take advantage of the entire database
(266 workers), we analyze our three experiments together whenever possible.
In all three experiments, we consider whether workers choose effort levels to
reciprocate employers’ wage decisions when wages were set either less than
three hours or one month previously. Subjects are divided into groups of three:
one employer and two workers (a short-term and a long-term worker).5 The
employer chooses one wage level that applies to both workers. The short-term
worker then chooses an effort level after leaving the laboratory, but at most
three hours afterward. The long-term worker submits the effort decision four
weeks after the experimental session. At the time their decision is due, long-
term workers receive a reminder informing them of the wage they received and
the payoff structure in effect.6
We structure our three experiments to allow application of the Partial Gift
Exchange version of the Efficiency Wage hypothesis of Akerlof (1982) to the
data. Our third experiment is designed to allow a test of a key part of a later
4One can ask whether reciprocal behavior decreases beyond a certain threshold precisely
because workers feel that they have reciprocated a past wage increase. While this is a very
interesting question, we believe it is important to first ask whether reciprocity decreases over
time when only a single decision is taken. This is because finding that reciprocity decreases in
a repeated setting could simply reflect the fact that workers are less inclined to reciprocate with
the passing of time.
5Maximiano et al. (2007) show that the reciprocity found in Gift Exchange laboratory exper-
iments is also observed when multiple workers are matched with one employer who offers the
same wage to all workers. Other studies considering the case of multiple workers and one em-
ployer in Gift Exchange settings include Güth et al. (2001), Charness and Kuhn (2007), Abeler
et al. (2010), Gächter and Thöni (2010), Cohn et al. (2014), and Charness et al. (2016). Most
of these studies investigate social comparison effects when workers receive different wages. In
our experiments, we circumvent these effects by constraining employers to offer the same wage
to both of their workers.
6The reminder creates roughly the typical level of information a worker has when one starts
a job (though the wage may have been set considerably in advance, workers typically have not
forgotten how much they are getting paid when work begins on a project).
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refinement of the hypothesis, the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis of Akerlof and
Yellen (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), in each of the two timeframes.
The two models describe the worker-employer relationship in an environment
in which effort is not contractible. In the first model, Akerlof (1982) assumes
that higher wages offered by the employer are reciprocated with greater effort
on the part of workers. In the second model, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume
that workers form a belief regarding what the fair wage is, and that they exhibit
an asymmetric response to the wages about this fair wage. Wages below those
that workers perceive as fair are punished with low effort, but those in excess
of fair levels do not result in additional effort. Cohn et al. (2015) recently
obtained support for this second model, finding that the sustained reciprocity
they uncover in their field experiment is driven by the subset of workers who
felt that they were paid unfairly before a wage increase. That is, only those
workers who felt that they were paid an unfair wage before increased their
productivity in response to the increase, at least over the timespan of several
days that they study. We test whether we observe reciprocity when wages are
below fair wages (which we refer to as negative reciprocity) as well as when
wages are above fair wages (which we call positive reciprocity), and whether
one type of reciprocity dissipates more than the other with time.7
One reason that reciprocity may be weaker in the long term than in the
short term is the role of emotions. In justifying their Fair Wage-Effort hypoth-
esis, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) propose that wages below those considered as
fair trigger a reaction of anger on the part of workers, and in turn the feel-
ing of anger triggers low effort. There exists empirical evidence in economics
and social psychology that anger is correlated with immediate (over seconds
or a few minutes) negatively reciprocal behavior ((Bosman and Van Winden,
2002); Offerman, 2002; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen, 2003;
Xiao and Houser, 2005; (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007); Reuben and van Winden,
2008; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009; Reuben and van Winden, 2010, (Bolle
et al., 2014); van Leeuwen, Noussair, Offerman, Suetens, van Veelen, and van
de Ven, 2018; Harth and Regner, 2017) in contexts other than the Gift Ex-
change paradigm. Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini, (2006) observe a sim-
ilar relationship in the Gift Exchange setting. Psychological research has also
7That is, wages lower (higher) than the fair level are assumed to lie in a negative (positive)
domain for the worker, with the potential to trigger negative (positive) reciprocity. Several
authors have used fairness concerns to differentiate positive and negative reciprocity. In addition
to Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990), which we discuss below, we note
the work of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), where negative deviations
from fair or equitable behavior that are perceived as intentional generate negative reciprocity.
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highlighted the role of anger in aggression and retaliation more generally, and
that anger differs among individuals facing the same situation, i.e., it is influ-
enced by one’s personality traits as well as norms (e.g., Averill, 1983; Frijda,
1986; Eisenberger et al., 2004). Within economics, Battigalli et al. (2019) have
recently modelled anger and aggression, using the tools of psychological game
theory. Unlike Akerlof and Yellen (1990), they consider the possibility that
anger subsides over time and that the desire for retaliation wanes. In Appendix
4.A, we report some suggestive evidence that anger plays a role in the behavior
that we observe.
We obtain two main results in this study. First and foremost, the strength
of the reciprocal wage-effort relationship is weaker after several weeks than
it is within three hours. In particular, workers receiving low wages choose
greater effort after the long delay, indicating that workers are more inclined to
punish stingy employers in the short-term than later on. Second, we fail to find
evidence in favor of the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis. For short-term workers,
we observe that reciprocity is not significantly stronger for wages below self-
reported fair wages than for those above. There is a similar lack of asymmetry
in the effect of wages below and above fair levels for long-term workers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: section II describes the ex-
perimental design, section III presents the hypotheses, section IV reports the
results, and section V offers our conclusions.
II. Experimental Design
In this section we describe the structure of each of the three experiments. The
first two experiments were conducted in the Netherlands and the third one in
the United States. The first one is called Tilburg-L (Tilburg Low Efficiency),
the second is called Tilburg-H (Tilburg High Efficiency), and the third is called
Tucson-H (Tucson High Efficiency). Section-II.A describes the procedures that
were identical in the three experiments. Section-II.B then covers the aspects
that differed among them. It explains why three experiments were conducted
and how the last experiment, Tucson-H, allows testing of some hypotheses be-
yond those evaluated in the first two experiments.
II.A. Procedures Common to all Experiments
Participants are assigned randomly to one of three roles: 1) employer, 2) short-
term worker, or 3) long-term worker. The roles are private information. Groups
are formed, each consisting of one employer and two workers, one of each
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type. We describe the two workers as short- or long-term, based on when they
make their effort decision. The participants are informed that the groups are
randomly constituted and anonymous. It is emphasized to them that they will
play the game exactly once.
The game has two stages. In the first stage, the employer, endowed with
wealth a, decides on a wage w to pay to her two workers. The wage must be
equal for the two workers. The wage is costly to the employer and benefits the
workers. In the second stage, each worker, with initial endowment d, observes
his wage and chooses an effort level e. The worker’s effort is costly to himself,
with marginal cost c, and benefits the employer by the productivity parameter
b.
The short-term worker must submit an effort level, eI within three hours
after the end of the session. The long-term worker chooses an effort level eD
within a five-day interval beginning four weeks after the session.8 The workers,
therefore, do not choose their effort in the laboratory. They send their choice to
an email address provided to them. Participants are informed during the session
that the long-term workers would receive an email reminder, containing the
wage they have been awarded and a copy of the instructions.9 Participants are
also informed that if a worker does not send an email with her effort choice, she
would not be paid anything beyond the show-up fee and the employer would
be paid back the wage offered to that worker.10 The earnings of workers are
sent to them on the day after the receipt of their effort choice. The earnings
of the employer are sent on the day after the receipt of the effort choice of the
long-term worker she is matched with.
The payoffs to the three types of participants are given by:11
Employer: a− 2× w + b× (eI + eD)
8The time intervals for Tilburg-L differ slightly. Short-term workers were instructed to send
their effort choice within two hours, and long-term workers during a 24-hour window that began
one month after the session. This was not enough time for some workers to send in their effort
choice. We accepted effort choices from a few short-term workers after the two-hour deadline.
We informed long-term workers that they would have additional days to choose their effort, and
accepted choices up to eight days after the original deadline.
9The instructions are provided in Appendix 4.D and the email reminders are given in Ap-
pendix 4.E.
10Paying back the wage to employers when workers do not choose an effort level does not
change the fact that the least costly action of workers is choosing an effort of zero, and the
action of workers that earns the employer the most is choosing maximum effort.
11The payoff structure was presented to subjects in terms of these formulas, with the actual
values in effect, rather than the variables indicated. See Charness et al. (2004) for a discussion
of the effects of different formats of presentation.
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Short-Term worker: d+ w − c× eI
Long-Term worker: d+ w − c× eD
The ranges of possible wages, effort levels, effort costs and output differ
among the three experiments. The values are given in Table 4.1 along with
other procedural details. Wages and effort can be chosen in increments of 10
cents and 0.1 units, respectively. Note that the ratio b/c, denoting the benefit
of effort to the employer over the cost of effort to the worker, is constant within
each experiment (Gift Exchange experiments often feature a diminishing b/c
ratio). We use a constant ratio for simplicity, which is especially desirable since
participants only play the game once. Sessions generally had 9 or 12 partici-
pants and lasted for 40 minutes. Participants are 51.5% male and their mean
age is 22.1 (SD=3.0).
A session proceeds in the following manner. Participants arrive at the lab-
oratory and are seated individually at a computer. They are given a written
copy of the instructions, which the experimenter reads aloud. Participants are
forbidden from communicating with others. Before making their choices, they
must complete two practice exercises to confirm their understanding. They are
encouraged to ask questions and their individual answers are verified by the
experimenter. Help is provided if needed, as each participant is required to fill
in the correct answers to proceed further.12
II.B. Procedures Specific to Each Experiment
The Tilburg-L and Tilburg-H Experiments
The procedures for the Tilburg-L experiment are described fully in Section-
II.A. The Tilburg-H experiment differs from Tilburg-L in one main aspect: it
reduces the potential censoring of effort from above for low wages in Tilburg-
L. That is, unlike in Tilburg-L and as in standard Gift Exchange experiments,
the effort choice of workers in Tilburg-H is not limited by the wage offered.
In Tilburg–L, workers with low wages are restricted to choose low wages both
in the short and long term. This means that we cannot observe a possible
effect of the time delay on the effort choices of workers with low wages in
Tilburg-L. Moreover, the parameters in effect in Tilburg-H also ensure greater
productivity of effort. This is captured in the higher b/c ratio. We increased
12The game was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
98
Table 4.1: Procedural Details
Parameters, Range of Variables,
and other Details
Full Sample Tilburg-L Tilburg-H Tucson-H
a 12 EUR 8 EUR 11 USD
b 2.5 2.5 2.5
c 1 0.25 0.25
d 4 EUR 5 EUR 4 USD
e [0, w] [0, 2.4] [0, 4]
w [0 EUR, 4 EUR] [0 EUR, 2 EUR] [0 USD, 4 USD]
Show-up Fee 0 EUR 0 EUR 8 USD
Avg Earnings Employer 10 EUR 8 EUR 22 USD
Avg Earnings Short-Term Worker 6 EUR 6 EUR 14 USD
Avg Earnings Long-Term Worker 6 EUR 6 EUR 14 USD
Payment Method Bank Transfer Bank Transfer Cash and Mail
Time Period Conducted
March–May,
2015
April–June, Nov.
–Dec., 2015
Jan.–March,
2016
Location
CentER Lab
(Tilburg, NL)
CentER Lab
(Tilburg, NL)
ESL
(Tucson, US)
N Participants 431 138 99 194
Attrition Short-Term Workers 4% 0% 3% 8%
Attrition Long-Term Workers 10% 9% 9% 13%
Net N Participants 410 134 95 181
Net N Employers 144 46 33 65
Net N Short-Term Workers 138 46 32 60
Net N Long-Term Workers 128 42 30 56
Note: (a) Bank transfers are the most common method of payment in the Netherlands, even
for small payments. (b) One subject in the role of long-term worker participated twice. We
removed the second observation. (c) The wages are similar (i) for short- and long-term
workers who do not respond, and (ii) for workers who do not respond and workers who do
respond. This suggests that attrition is unlikely to drive differences between the behavior of
short- and long-term workers. First, as explained in section IV, we normalize wages by di-
viding the wage in each experiment by the maximum feasible wage offer in this experiment.
The mean normalized wages of short- and long-term workers who did not respond are 0.54
(SD=0.31, N=6) and 0.54 (SD=0.32, N=15), slightly above half of the maximum possible
wage and close to the mean normalized wage of 0.60 (SD=0.30, N=266) for workers who
did respond. Second, we find no significant relationships between attrition and wage offers
for either short-term or long-term workers using an OLS regression.
the ratio to reduce censoring from below, in order to be better able to observe
possible changes in effort over time.13 At the same time that he chooses a wage,
the employer also requests the same non-binding effort level from each worker.
The effort request is included in the reminder to long-term workers.
The Tucson-H Experiment
This experiment extends the design of Tilburg-H to allow us to consider reci-
procity in greater detail. Although the key ratio b/c remains the same, there
are other differences in the parameters, as indicated in Table 4.1. Moreover,
workers are asked to state what they think would be a fair wage before learn-
ing their actual wage. It is emphasized to them that this fair wage would not be
revealed to any other participant, including their employer, and therefore could
13Kessler (2013) found that a relatively high ratio tends to reduce the censoring of the effort
data at the lower bound.
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not affect the wage they receive. Participants receive a show-up fee of 8 USD at
the time of the session on top of their earnings from the game, which are paid
at a later time.
III. Hypotheses
The first two hypotheses apply to all three experiments, and concern the effect
of long vs. short time delays on effort choices. They originate from the re-
sults of prior experimental work. Hypotheses 3 and 4 apply exclusively to our
third experiment, Tucson-H. They emerged after the first two experiments and
guided the design of Tucson-H. These hypotheses posit asymmetries in worker
behavior between cases in which the wage is perceived as fair and as unfair.
We first consider the relationship between effort and time delay, conditional
on wage. That is, we test whether delay has any effect on the level of effort
or on the sensitivity of effort to wages received. In the regression specification
that we employ, these correspond to the intercept and slope coefficients, re-
spectively. We allow for (1) long-term workers choosing a different effort level
than short-term workers irrespective of the wage, and/or (2) long- and short-
term workers exhibiting different sensitivities of effort to wage. Prior evidence
that the level of effort may be affected by time delays comes from the dictator
game literature (Kovarik, 2009; Dreber et al., 2016), investigating the relation-
ship between altruism and time-lags. They find that when dictators have to
split money that is payable in the future, they keep more for themselves. How-
ever, our environment is very different, and it is unclear whether effort levels
would differ at the two time lags, controlling for wage level. Furthermore, as
we discussed in the introduction, while the current literature suggests that the
wage-effort relationship is weaker in the long term, the evidence is not exten-
sive. Therefore, we take a conservative approach and propose the following
null hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1: For a given wage, short-term workers exert the same effort as
long-term workers (eI |w = eD|w).
Hypothesis 2 specifically considers whether a positive relationship between
wage and effort appears with similar force within three hours and one month
after workers learn their wages. As discussed in the introduction, the overall ev-
idence from field experiments supports the contention that there is a decrease
in reciprocity after a long delay. The Gift Exchange version of the Efficiency
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Wage Hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982), on which most of the reciprocity labor litera-
ture is based, does not consider whether time should affect reciprocal behavior.
In laboratory studies comparing reciprocity under immediate response and a
short time delay in other types of interaction, the results are mixed, but gen-
erally find a decrease in reciprocity. Bosman et al. (2001) find that anger is
associated with rejections in the ultimatum game and that a one-hour delay
does not decrease rejections. However, in their study, only a handful of partici-
pants reject offers so that a decrease would be difficult to detect. More recently,
Grimm and Mengel (2011) find that a 10-minute delay reduces rejections in the
ultimatum game and Neo et al. (2013) observe a reduction of rejections in the
ultimatum game with a similar delay, but no effect of delay in the investment
game. Also related is the Internet-based experiment of Oechssler et al. (2015),
which finds that an opportunity to revise one’s decision 24 hours after having
made a decision to accept or reject an offer in an ultimatum game decreases
rejection in only one of their two conditions. Thus, our second null hypothesis
is as follows.14
HYPOTHESIS 2: The sensitivity of effort to wage is the same for short- and long-
term workers (deI/dw = deD/dw).
Hypothesis 3 is a test of the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen,
1988, 1990). The hypothesis relies on the assumption that workers respond to
a higher wage with higher effort only up to the point where the wage is con-
sidered fair. Workers do not reciprocate for an increase in wage above the fair
wage with greater effort. Cohn et al. (2015) are, to our knowledge, the only au-
thors who test whether there is an asymmetric response about the self-reported
fair wage. Because the study differs from ours, notably in terms of one-shot vs.
repeated effort decisions and of the timeframe employed, we maintain as our
null hypothesis that the wage-effort relationship is the same for workers whose
wage is below vs. above their belief about what constitutes a fair wage.15
HYPOTHESIS 3: Short-term workers receiving a wage below their self-reported fair
wage exhibit the same relationship between wage and effort as those receiving
14Logically, Hypothesis 2 is nested in Hypothesis 1, which asserts that effort, conditional on
wage, is identical for short-term and long-term workers. However, Hypothesis 2 is of special
interest because it captures any reciprocal behavior of the workers.
15Considering that negative reciprocity has been repeatedly found to be stronger than positive
reciprocity with reference measures other than the self-reported fair wage, our hypothesis could
also be one-sided.
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a wage above their fair level (deI/dwL,= deI/dwH for all wL and wH , where
wH > wF > wL and wF is the fair wage).
Hypothesis 4 concerns whether any asymmetry in reciprocity below vs. above
the fair wage for short-term workers continues to exist for long-term workers.
It is possible that negative reciprocity dissipates over time while positive reci-
procity does not. This could be the case if, for example, negative reciprocity is
caused by a strong negative emotion, such as anger, that would decrease over
time. In the absence of any prior evidence, our null hypothesis is that any asym-
metry in reciprocity is unaffected by a longer delay.
HYPOTHESIS 4: Short-term and long-term workers exhibit the same relationship
between wage and effort if (a) the wage they receive exceeds their reported fair
wage, and if (b) the wage they receive is less than their reported fair wage. (That
is, (a) deI/dw = deD/dw for w > wF , and (b) deI/dw = deD/dw for w < wF ).
IV. Results
This section is organized in two parts. The first part presents an overview of
the data, and the second reports the tests of our hypotheses.
IV.A. Summary of the Data
In Table 4.2, we summarize the average values of participants’ decision vari-
ables for the full sample, as well as for the three individual experiments. We
normalize wages and efforts in our full sample by dividing wages and efforts by
their maximum possible values in each experiment.16 For the full sample and
each individual experiment, the average effort of short- and long-term workers
is close to the midpoint of the range of possible wage levels, which is well in ex-
cess of the minimum of zero. There are no significant differences in the short-
and long-term average efforts in the full sample (t-test, p-value is 0.27). In
Tucson-H where fair wages are reported, the wage workers view as fair on av-
erage is roughly three times as far from the minimum as the maximum possible
wage, and exceeds the actual average wage. The fair wage is slightly, though
significantly, higher for long-term than short-term workers (t-test, p-value is
0.04).
In Table 4.3, we present the average effort levels for each half of the wage
16We normalize the data by dividing wages and efforts by 4 in Tilburg-L and Tucson-H, and
wages by 2 and efforts by 2.4 in Tilburg-H.
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Table 4.2: Summary of Participants’ Average Decisions
Experiment Full Sample N Tilburg-L N Tilburg-H N Tucson-H N
Wage 0.600 144 2.067 46 1.218 33 2.617 65
(0.303) (1.288) (0.683) (1.014)
Short-Term Effort 0.232 138 0.343 46 0.538 32 1.395 60
(0.285) (0.595) (0.727) (1.217)
Long-Term Effort 0.274 128 0.343 42 0.610 30 1.704 56
(0.331) (0.596) (0.833) (1.397)
Short-Term Fair Wage 3.134 65
(0.801)
Long-Term Fair Wage 3.413 64
(0.716)
Note: Effort and wage range from 0 to 1 in the Full Sample, and their range differs between
individual experiments (see Table 4.1 for details). In Tilburg-L, effort levels are limited
above at the wage received. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
range, for both types of workers.17 In the full sample, for short-term workers,
an increasing relationship between wage and short-term effort appears. For
long-term workers, the wage-effort relationship seems to be weaker. Specifi-
cally, wages in the first (lower) half of the wage range lead to greater effort
for long- than for short-term workers. Moreover, the picture is similar for each
individual experiment. This tendency for greater long-term effort in the lower
half is less pronounced in Tilburg-L, where the effort choices of workers are
bounded above by the wage offered, so that is impossible for workers with low
wages to select high effort levels (e.g., workers with a wage of 0 can only choose
an effort of 0). We can make similar observations from Figure 4.1, which illus-
trates the relationship between the wages workers receive and the effort they
choose. The graphs contain the normalized data from the full sample, for short-
and long-term workers separately. We highlight, in pale orange rectangles, the
effort at wages 0 and 0.1 in Tilburg-L, which are bounded above at 0 and 0.1,
respectively, in both the short and long term. We include the fitted regression
lines in the figure.
IV.B. Evaluation of Hypotheses
Hypotheses 1 and 2
The first two hypotheses concern differences in effort between short- and long-
term workers. To test for differences, we pool the normalized data of workers
in our three experiments and estimate the following Tobit specification.18
17Appendix 4.A shows the same table for each quarter of the wage range; the pattern of effort
is similar.
18We use a Tobit specification because there is a fair amount of lower censoring (35% of
observations) for the effort variable at 0, and some censoring above (6%) at the maximum effort
choice, as can be seen in Figure 4.1. We assume normalized effort to be censored below 0 and
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Table 4.3: Average Effort by Wage Range, for Short- and Long-Term Workers
Short-Term Workers Long-Term Workers
Wage Range Average Effort N Average Effort N
Full Sample
0.00-0.50 0.085 (0.149) 53 0.211 (0.286) 50
0.51-1.00 0.324 (0.310) 85 0.314 (0.353) 78
Tilburg-L
0.0-2.0 0.175 (0.439) 24 0.362 (0.571) 21
2.1-4.0 0.527 (0.694) 22 0.324 (0.634) 21
Tilburg-H
0.0-1.0 0.145 (0.157) 11 0.782 (1.001) 11
1.1-2.0 0.743 (0.823) 21 0.511 (0.730) 19
Tucson-H
0.0-2.0 0.622 (0.812) 18 1.128 (1.114) 18
2.1-4.0 1.726 (1.218) 42 1.976 (1.447) 38
Note: The numbers presented are averages. For the full sample, wage and effort are nor-
malized so that both range from 0 to 1. For the individual experiments, the variables are
not normalized. In Tilburg-L and Tucson-H, wage and effort range from 0 to 4, but effort
is limited above by the wage in Tilburg-L. In Tilburg-H, wage ranges from 0 to 2 and effort
from 0 to 2.4. The standard deviations are in parentheses.
ej = α+ βwagej + θwagejDj + αT ilbHT ilbHj + αTucHTucHj
+ T ilbHj + TucHj + γDj + εj .
(4.1)
In this equation, ej denotes the effort of worker j, wagej is the wage that
j has received, and Dj indicates a long delay (equals 0 for short-term workers
and 1 for long-term workers). To simplify, we will usually write “delay” instead
of “long delay”. There is also an interaction term between wage and the delay
included in the specification. We include two dummies, for the Tilburg-H and
Tucson-H experiments. The estimates are presented in column 1 of Table 4.4.
In column 2, we include interaction terms between the wage and Tilburg-H
and the wage and Tucson-H. In column 3, we add additional interaction terms
between the wage and delay that are specific to Tilburg-H and Tucson-H.
The first hypothesis is that the time delay has no effect on effort for a given
wage. That is, in terms of a regression of effort on wage, the delay affects nei-
ther the intercept (effort for the minimum wage) nor the slope (the wage-effort
sensitivity). We assess this proposition by testing whether the coefficients of
Wage x Delay and Delay in column 1 are both equal to zero. Note that our first
hypothesis differs from claiming that the average effort is the same for both
types of worker (as reported in the previous subsection, the average effort does
not differ). This is because similar average effort can hide a pattern in which a
long time delay causes effort to change in opposite directions for workers who
above 1 for simplicity in analyzing the data, even though in Tilburg-L effort is actually censored
at the wage offered. We use robust standard errors in all regressions.
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Figure 4.1: Scatter Plots of Short- and Long-term Efforts
Pale orange rectangles indicate efforts at wages 0 and 0.1 from Tilburg-L, which are limited
above at 0 and 0.1, respectively
receive low wages and workers who receive high wages. We reject the hypoth-
esis (F-test, p-value is 0.037). We obtain the same result for the coefficients of
columns 2 or 3. This yields our first result.
RESULT 1: For a given wage, short- and long-term workers make significantly dif-
ferent effort choices.
We now consider the nature of the effect of the time delay on the behavior
of short- and long-term workers. Our second hypothesis is that the wage-effort
relationship does not change with delay. The coefficient of Wage is positive
and significant (columns 1–3, p-values are < 0.001), replicating the common
finding that higher wages lead to higher effort on the part of workers.19 The
19Though not shown here, short-term workers providing their effort earlier vs. later within the
permitted time interval exhibit the same wage-effort relationship. That is, short-term workers
responding within 15 or 30 minutes after the session show no differences in their wage-effort
relationship compared to short-term workers responding later in the 3-hour interval. This sug-
gests that they recall the wage they receive equally well later in the three hour interval as they
do in the first few minutes. Because the long-term workers are reminded of their wage at the be-
ginning of the window in which they make their decision, we take this as confirmatory evidence
that the information that short-and long-term workers have at the time they choose their effort
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Table 4.4: Estimates of Tobit Regression (4.1)
Effort
Wage 0.680∗∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.169) (0.171)
Wage × D −0.478∗∗ −0.480∗∗ −0.525∗∗
(0.209) (0.200) (0.223)
D 0.355∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.130) (0.129)
Wage × TilbH −0.287 −0.247
(0.242) (0.254)
Wage × TucH 0.305 0.235
(0.218) (0.226)
Wage × D × TilbH −0.082
(0.208)
Wage × D × TucH 0.161
(0.177)
TilbH 0.229∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.408∗∗
(0.074) (0.167) (0.166)
TucH 0.416∗∗∗∗ 0.211 0.207
(0.059) (0.139) (0.137)
Constant −0.529∗∗∗∗ −0.522∗∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.115) (0.114)
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.200 0.218 0.223
N 266 266 266
Note: N denotes the sample size, which includes both types of workers, split almost evenly.
p-values: ∗0.10, ∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
coefficient of Wage × Delay in column 1 is, however, negative and significant
(p-value is 0.02). As column 2 shows, this is robust to including wage terms
for Tilburg-L and Tucson-H in the regression. This indicates that the long time
delay decreases the marginal effect of the wage on effort provided. Moreover,
we do not find significant reciprocity in the long term (for the F-tests of the
restriction that Wage + Wage × Delay = 0 in columns 1–3, the p-values are
> 0.23). In column 3, we can see that there are no significant differences
in the effect of time delay on the wage-effort relationship among the three
experiments (Wage × Delay × Tilburg-H, p-value is 0.70; Wage × Delay ×
Tucson-H, p-value is 0.36; p-value from the restriction that both equal zero is
0.44).
We supplement this parametric analysis with non-parametric tests. Table
4.5 presents the Spearman correlations between wage offered and effort cho-
sen, for both short- and long-term workers, in the full sample. We perform
Spearman’s rank correlation tests and indicate the p-values in square brackets.
The short-term wage-effort correlation is positive and significant, and, unlike
for the parametric analysis, the long-term wage-effort correlation is marginally
is similar.
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Table 4.5: Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort
Full Sample N
Short-Term Workers 0.467 [<0.001] 138
Long-Term Workers 0.173 [0.051] 128
Note: We indicate the two-sided p-values from Spearman’s rank correlation tests in square
brackets.
significant. Nevertheless, in line with the rest of the analysis, the correlation is
larger in magnitude in the short than in the long term (the long-term correla-
tion amounts to 37% of the short-term one).
We report, in Appendix 4.A, that the wage-effort relationship also weakens
over time if we use an approach based on wage ranges instead of the wages
themselves. As the descriptive statistics suggest, we show that this decrease is
driven by workers who receive wages in the lower half of the range of possible
wages. That is, long-term workers offered low wages provide more effort than
short-term workers offered the same low wages.20 This pattern provides the
basis for our second result.
RESULT 2: The wage-effort relationship is stronger within three hours, than four
weeks after, workers learn their wage. Specifically, low wages generate less shirking
in the long term.
Hypotheses 3 and 4
Our two remaining hypotheses apply only to our third experiment, Tucson-H,
and concern the asymmetry in reciprocity about the fair wage. Our sample
of workers consequently decreases from 266 to 116 for the analysis. There is
therefore a relatively small number of workers falling in the categories that we
compare to one another.
We analyze the behavior of workers as a function of their wage and an un-
fairness indicator variable I that denotes whether their wage is below their self-
reported fair wage. The indicator takes value 1 if the wage is below fair levels,
and 0 otherwise. In order to give an idea of the wage-effort relationship as well
as the unfairness indicator-effort relationship, Table 4.6 shows the Spearman
correlations between I and effort, separately for short- and long-term work-
20We note that the equitable payoff—which we take as an equal payoff to the employer and
to each employee, once the employer has decided on a wage—is achieved here when the em-
ployer offers a standardized wage of approximately 0.5. This corresponds to offering half of
the maximum possible wage, which is 1. This means that those short- and long-term workers
who are offered a wage below the wage generating the equitable payoff are the ones choosing
different effort levels. That is, long-term workers treated inequitably provide greater effort than
short-term workers.
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Table 4.6: Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort as well as between the
Unfairness Indicator I and Effort
Wage I N
Short-Term Workers 0.463 [<0.001] −0.188 [0.151] 60
Long-Term Workers 0.298 [0.026] −0.210 [0.121] 56
Note: The unfairness indicator I takes value 1 if Fair Wage > Wage and value 0 other-
wise. We indicate the two-sided p-values from Spearman’s rank correlation tests in square
brackets.
ers. We conduct Spearman’s rank correlation tests and present the p-values in
square brackets. We make two observations. First, the wage-effort correlation
is positive and significant for both short- and long-term workers, although the
magnitude of the short-term correlation is greater (the long-term correlation
corresponds to 64% of the short-term one). Second, for both short- and long-
term workers, the unfairness indicator-effort correlation is negative, indicating
that offering wages below the fair wage decreases effort, but the relationship is
not statistically significant.
To take into account both the effect of the absolute wage and the effect of
the wage being below the fair level, we estimate the following Tobit regression.
ej = α+ β1wagej + θ1wagejDj + α+ β2Ij + θ2IjDj + γDj + εj . (4.2)
The unfairness indicator variable Ij captures whether worker j receives a
wage below the fair wage.21 We include a variable for the wage, and to detect
differences between the short and the long term, we interact the wage and the
indicator with the time delay Dj .22
The estimates are presented in columns 1–3 of Table 4.7. Column 1 provides
estimates from the regression including only the wage variables. Column 2
includes the two variables containing the unfairness indicator, but excludes the
wage variables. Column 3 employs the full regression specification.
21Instead, we could analyze the behavior of workers as a function of their wage and whether
their wage is below their reported fair wage by a sufficiently large amount. The cutoff that cor-
responds to the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis is 0 USD, i.e., any wage that is below fair levels. For
the purpose of our analysis, choosing higher cutoffs might allow us to decrease the collinear-
ity between the wage and the indicator variable for whether the wage is below the fair wage.
However, the Pearson correlation between the wage and whether the wage is below fair levels
remains near 0.65 for a wide range of cutoffs (i.e., 0.50, 1.00, 1.50 or 2.00 USD). Consequently,
choosing cutoffs of 0.50, 1.00, 1.50 or 2.00 USD would provide the same Results 3 and 4 as the
cutoff of 0 USD. Note that, among short-term workers, 42 receive a wage below the fair wage
and 23 get a wage above, and among long-term workers, 44 have a wage below the fair wage
and 20 have a wage above. Moreover, 26 short-term workers receive a wage at least 1 USD
below the fair wage and 39 have a wage above, and 31 long-term workers have a wage at least
1 USD below the fair wage, while 33 get a wage above.
22Note that we do not include a variable for the self-reported fair wage among the explanatory
variables because it would be highly correlated with our unfairness indicator.
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Table 4.7: Estimates of Tobit Regressions (4.2)
Effort
Wage 0.918∗∗∗∗ 1.274∗∗∗∗
(0.233) (0.329)
Wage × D −0.312 −0.743∗
(0.355) (0.444)
I −0.638 1.011
(0.453) (0.613)
I x D −0.365 −1.254
(0.784) (0.888)
D 1.240 0.647 3.207∗
(0.916) (0.677) (1.664)
Constant −1.213∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗∗ −2.812∗∗
(0.596) (0.385) (1.213)
Prob. > F 0.000 0.149 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.016 0.062
N 116 116 116
Note: The unfairness indicator I takes value 1 if Fair Wage > Wage and value 0 otherwise.
Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values: ∗0.10, ∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
In column 1, we find a significant positive wage-effort relationship (wage,
p-value is < 0.001), but, unlike for the full sample, the decrease in this relation-
ship over time is not significant (wage × D, p-value is 0.382). This difference
can be explained by the loss in statistical power compared to the full sample.23
In column 2, the effect of a wage below the fair wage is negative but insignifi-
cant (I, p-value is 0.162), and the attenuation of the effect is also not significant
(I × D, p-value is 0.643).
To evaluate Hypothesis 3—that short-term workers would exhibit the same
wage-effort relationship for wages below and above their self-reported fair
wage—we use column 3, as it allows us to isolate the effect of the wage be-
ing below fair levels. We find that the wage has a significant impact (wage,
p-value is < 0.001), but that having a wage below the fair wage in itself does
not decrease effort significantly (the effect of I) column 3 is actually positive,
though only close to marginally significant, p-value is 0.102).24
We refer again to column 3 in order to examine Hypothesis 4—that the
asymmetry between negative and positive reciprocity would be the same for
short- and long-term workers. We see that the signs of the two coefficients
23For instance, simulations show that if we draw 10,000 random subsamples of 116 workers
(58 short-term and 58 long-term workers, without replacement) from our full sample, we detect
a decrease in reciprocity in 27% of them at the 5% significance level, and in 42% of them at the
10% significance level.
24In view of the fact that negative reciprocity has been found to be stronger than positive in
several other studies, using a one-sided p-value instead would also be reasonable here, and this
would make the difference very close to significant at the 5% level.
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of the interactions with time delay suggest an attenuation in the effect of the
wage, as well as the effect of the wage being below fair levels. The decrease
in the effect of the wage is marginally significant (Wage × D, p-value is 0.097),
but the change over time in the effect of having a wage below what is consid-
ered fair is not significant (I × D, p-value is 0.161). Results 3 and 4 describe
our findings concerning hypotheses 3 and 4.
RESULT 3: For short-term workers, the sensitivity of effort to wage is similar for
wages below fair levels than for those above.
RESULT 4: The difference in the sensitivity of effort to wage between wages below
and above fair levels does not differ significantly between short-term and long-term
workers.
In Appendix 4.B, we present an exploratory analysis regarding the rela-
tionships between workers’ wages, their emotions, and their subsequent ef-
fort choices, using data on emotional state obtained with Facereading software.
Our results are suggestive of a negative relationship between workers’ anger
and their effort levels in the short term, though not the long term.25
V. Conclusion
Akerlof (1982) formalizes the Gift-Exchange version of the Efficient Wage hy-
pothesis, in which employers offer wages that are higher than the market-
clearing wage and workers reciprocate higher wages with greater effort. While
much support for the existence of reciprocal provision of effort by workers has
been gathered in short-term interactions, studies of whether reciprocal behav-
ior persists over longer time periods have generally found that it persists within
a work day, but decreases afterwards (Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and
Shearer, 2009; Hossain and List, 2012; Kube et al., 2012, 2013; Cohn et al.,
2015; Gilchrist et al., 2016). Here, we consider whether the reciprocity work-
ers exhibit in their effort choices differs under a brief vs. a long delay (within
three hours vs. after four weeks) from the time at which they learn their wage.
We test whether a positive wage-effort relationship is observed in an environ-
ment that is more decontextualized (in the laboratory) and simpler (a one-shot
interaction) than previous studies concerned with reciprocity over long time
25In addition, Appendix 4.C details employers’ expectations of short-term and long-term efforts
choices.
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periods. This allows us to clearly isolate any decrease in reciprocal behavior
engendered by the passing of time over a long period.
In our third, more extensive experiment, we also consider one aspect of the
Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen (1988) and Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) that might differ across timeframes: the contention that workers shirk
in retaliation for wages below the level that they perceive as fair, but do not
reward wages greater than the fair level with more effort. The existence of this
asymmetry has been supported by the field experiment reported by Cohn et al.
(2015). We examine whether this asymmetry exists in our setting, both in the
short and long term.
Our main finding is that the strength of the reciprocal wage-effort relation-
ship observed for short-term workers (who choose their effort within three
hours of learning the wage) decreases for long-term workers (who wait one
month before choosing their effort). We also find that workers offered low
wages are the ones exhibiting different behavior over time. That is, long-term
workers with low wages choose greater effort than short-term workers with the
same low wages.
We obtain two additional findings from our third experiment that fail to
support the Fair Wage-Effort hypothesis. The first is that, once we take into
account the effect of the wage, workers do not reciprocate significantly more
strongly for a wage that falls below the self-reported fair wage. The second
is that this failure of the Fair-Wage effort hypothesis is present under both the
short and long delays. Because of the reduced sample size on which these last
two findings rest, they should not be taken as absolutely definitive. The signs
of the estimated coefficients point in the direction of stronger reciprocation for
wages below fair levels, as well as an attenuation of this asymmetry for long
term workers, but the effects are below conventional thresholds of significance.
Future research can shed more light on the presence of these two relationships.
Overall, our findings add to the evidence gathered by previous studies sug-
gesting that workers’ reciprocity weakens over long time periods. Moreover,
we report that the magnitude of the wage appears to influence the effect of
delays: wages need to be low enough for reciprocity to change over time. For
employers, our results imply that examination of the timing of the task at hand
relative to when wages are determined can benefit those trying to induce high
effort from their employees.
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Appendix
4.A. Supplemental Information Regarding Wage and Effort
Table 4.8 provides the average effort levels for each quarter of the wage range,
for both types of workers. The pattern mirrors the one in Table 4.3, which
reports the same exercise using halves instead of quarters. The wage-effort
relationship appears to weaken over time, mostly because long-term workers
with wages in the first (lowest) quarter of the wage range choose greater ef-
forts. Note again that in Tilburg-L the effort choices of workers are bounded
above by the wage offered, so that workers with very low wages cannot select
high effort levels.
We present additional analyses regarding the effect of delay on the wage-
effort relationship, to supplement the analyses we present in the main text for
Result 2. In column 1 of Table 4.9, we show estimates from a Tobit regression
that is similar to regression (4.1) in Table 4.4. The specification has separate
terms for each experiment, and we do not use normalized data because sepa-
rate estimates are made for each experiment.26 For robustness, and to further
identify which wages result in different effort choices over time, we present es-
timates from Tobit regressions using bins for different wage ranges in columns
2 and 3. In these regressions, we employ the normalized data. In column 2,
we use a dummy variable for a wage being in the upper (2nd) half of the wage
range, as well as two terms interacting separately the wage in the lower (1st)
half and the wage in the upper (2nd) half of the wage range with the long de-
lay. We do the same with quartiles of the wage range in column 3. This allows
us to identify which wages are affected by delay.
The estimates allow us to make a number of observations. First, in column 1,
we can see the individual effect of time delay on the wage for each experiment.
Compared to our full sample, this substantially reduces the number of workers
in each analysis (88 in Tilburg-L, 62 in Tilburg-H, and 116 in Tucson-H). While
26Consequently, for column 1, unlike for the other columns, we only account for censoring
below 0, as non-normalized efforts are censored above at different values across experiments.
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Table 4.8: Average Effort by Wage Range, for Short- and Long-Term Workers
Short-term
Workers
Long-term
Workers
Wage Range Average Effort N Average Effort N
Full Sample
0.00-0.25 0.022 (0.056) 25 0.203 (0.341) 23
0.26-0.50 0.142 (0.182) 28 0.218 (0.236) 27
0.51-0.75 0.267 (0.246) 44 0.280 (0.342) 40
0.76-1.00 0.385 (0.361) 41 0.351 (0.364) 38
Tilburg-L
0.0-1.0 0.015 (0.038) 13 0.018 (0.041) 11
1.1-2.0 0.364 (0.607) 11 0.740 (0.648) 10
2.1-3.0 0.480 (0.718) 10 0.130 (0.200) 10
3.1-4.0 0.567 (0.702) 12 0.500 (0.834) 11
Tilburg-H
0.0-0.5 0.100 (0.127) 6 1.380 (1.226) 5
0.6-1.0 0.200 (0.187) 5 0.283 (0.382) 6
1.1-1.5 0.491 (0.592) 11 0.278 (0.559) 9
1.6-2.0 1.020 (0.976) 10 0.720 (0.828) 10
Tucson-H
0.0-1.0 0.167 (0.408) 6 1.000 (1.000) 7
1.1-2.0 0.850 (0.880) 12 1.209 (1.221) 11
2.1-3.0 1.443 (0.947) 23 1.871 (1.420) 21
3.10-4.0 2.068 (1.435) 19 2.106 (1.513) 17
Note: The numbers presented are averages. In the full sample, wage and efforts both are
normalized to range from 0 to 1. In the individual experiments, wage and effort are not
normalized. In Tilburg-L and Tucson-H, wage and effort range from 0 to 4, but effort is
limited above by the wage in Tilburg-L. In Tilburg-H, wage ranges from 0 to 2 and effort
from 0 to 2.4. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
the three Wage × Delay coefficients are negative, the effect is only significant
in Tilburg-H (p-values are 0.25 in Tilburg-L, 0.02 in Tilburg-H, and 0.28 in
Tucson-H).27
Second, we consider the effect of delay on effort in the different wage bins.
In column 2, we observe that a wage in the upper half of the wage range in-
creases effort (p-value < 0.001). Delay also increases effort for wages in the
lower half (p-value is 0.01), but does not decrease effort for wages in the up-
per half (p-value is 0.57). Moreover, the two changes are significantly different
from each other (F-test, p-value is 0.02), confirming that reciprocity is weaker
in the long-term. In column 3, we see that a wage in any of the three upper
quarters of the wage range increases effort compared to a wage in the first (low-
est) quarter (p-values are all < 0.01). The time delay increases effort for wages
in the first quarter (p-value is 0.02), but leads to no significant differences in
effort for wages in any other quarter. An F-test does not quite reject the restric-
tion that the four coefficients for delay are all equal (p-value is 0.09), so that
27We only find significant reciprocity for long-term workers in Tucson-H (F-tests on the re-
striction Wage + Wage × Delay = 0, separately for each experiment; p-value for Tucson-H is
0.02).
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Table 4.9: Estimates of Tobit Regression of Effort on Wage and Delay
Effort Effort Effort
Wage 0.494∗∗∗∗ Wage 2nd Half 0.340∗∗∗∗ Wage 2nd Quarter 0.314∗∗∗
× TilbL (0.145) (0.069) (0.116)
Wage 0.770∗∗∗ Wage 1st Half 0.221∗∗ Wage 3rd Quarter 0.459∗∗∗∗
× TilbH (0.251) × Delay (0.086) (0.108)
Wage 0.799∗∗∗∗ Wage 2nd Half −0.038 Wage 4th Quarter 0.610∗∗∗∗
× TucH (0.192) × Delay (0.068) (0.118)
Wage × Delay −0.250 Wage 1st Quarter 0.363∗∗
× TilbL (0.219) × Delay (0.155)
Wage × Delay −1.121∗∗ Wage 2nd Quarter 0.135
× TilbH (0.472) × Delay (0.097)
Wage × Delay −0.310 Wage 3rd Quarter −0.023
× TucH (0.289) × Delay (0.085)
Delay 0.614 Wage 4th Quarter −0.057
× TilbL (0.512) × Delay (0.103)
Delay 1.379∗∗
× TilbH (0.643)
Delay 1.153
× TucH (0.755)
TilbH 0.670 0.236∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.073) (0.073)
TucH 0.492 0.426∗∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗∗
(0.606) (0.060) (0.059)
Constant −1.369∗∗∗∗ −0.329∗∗∗∗ −0.518∗∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.074) (0.110)
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.176 0.203
N 266 266 266
Note: N denotes the sample size containing both types of workers, split almost evenly by
type (see Table 4.1 for more detail). Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values: ∗0.10,
∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
we cannot clearly detect a change in reciprocity over time with this regression
specification. Overall, however, our more powerful specifications show that the
effect of wages on worker’s effort decreases with the long delay, and this is due
to higher effort for wages in the lower half of the wage range.
In addition, Table 4.10 provides the non-parametric Spearman correlations
between wage offered and effort chosen, for both short- and long-term workers,
in each experiment separately. We perform Spearman’s rank correlation tests on
each of the correlation coefficients and indicate thep-values in square brackets.
The patterns are similar as those in the full sample. The short-term wage-effort
correlations are positive and significant in each of the individual experiments.
The long-term wage-effort correlation is significant only in Tucson-H. Again,
the correlations are always smaller in magnitude in the long than in the short
term.
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Table 4.10: Spearman Correlation between Wage and Effort for Both Types of Worker
in Each Experiment
Tilburg-L N Tilburg-H N Tucson-H N
Short-Term Workers 0.420 [0.004] 46 0.438 [0.012] 32 0.463 [<0.001] 60
Long-Term Workers 0.162 [0.306] 42 −0.078 [0.681] 30 0.298 [0.026] 56
Note: We indicate the two-sidedp-values from Spearman’s rank correlation tests in square
brackets.
4.B. Analysis of the Relationship between Wages, Emotions, and
Effort, using FaceReader Software
Another feature of the design of Tucson-H compared to the two other experi-
ments is that we videotape participants for the entire session, with their con-
sent. The videotapes are then analyzed with Noldus FaceReaderTM software,
which tracks facial expressions and analyzes the emotions they express. The
software tracks facial movements and associates specific muscle movements to
the six basic universal emotions catalogued by Paul Ekman and his colleagues
(e.g. Ekman et al., 1987; Ekman and Friesen, 2003). The emotions are happi-
ness, fear, anger, disgust, surprise, and sadness. FaceReader also measures how
closely a facial expression conforms to a neutral state and generates an overall
measure of emotional valence. FaceReader has been employed in a number
of experimental economic studies focusing on emotions (Nguyen and Noussair,
2014; Breaban and Noussair, 2018; Fiala and Noussair, 2017; Van Leeuwen
et al., 2018), and has also been used in marketing (Teixeira et al., 2012; Lewin-
ski et al., 2014) and psychology research (Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai, 2010;
Gadea et al., 2015).
We consider whether there is a relationship between wages and resulting
worker emotions, as well as between worker emotion and effort provision, and
whether these relationships differ between the two types of worker. Specifically,
we are concerned with anger and overall emotional valence (net positivity).
Emotional valence is calculated by the FaceReader software as the intensity
of happiness minus the intensity of the strongest negative emotion, i.e., the
maximum intensity score of anger, disgust, fear, and sadness. To calculate the
change in an emotion in response to learning one’s wage, we take the differ-
ence between the average intensity of an emotion over the 45 seconds after
a worker learns her wage and the average intensity in the 45 seconds before
learning the wage. We use this time interval because many participants take
some time before they look and then read the text revealing their wage on their
computer. We drop any participant whose video recording malfunctioned due
to mechanical problems or whose video cannot be analyzed by the FaceReader
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software for at least 40% of the 45 seconds both before and after learning the
wage. Doing otherwise would result in several participants having relatively
few data points from which to create an average. We thus have to leave out
54% of the participants. This leaves 53 observations: 26 short-term workers
and 27 long-term workers.28
To test whether changes in emotions are related to effort, while accounting
for the multiple emotions and censoring of effort at 0, we estimate the following
Tobit regression.
ej = α+ βMj(1−Dj) + θMjDj + γDj + εj . (4.1)
where Mj includes either changes in the intensity of emotional valence or in-
dividual emotions. The regression includes all workers, but allows for a distinct
effect of each emotion on short- and long- term workers’ effort. The estimates
are given in Table 4.11. Columns 1–3 report estimates including only emotions,
while 4-5 contain anger and the wage as well. Demographic controls such as
age, gender, and nationality might all be related to emotional reactions. We
have estimated the same equations including these demographic variables but
do not present the estimates here, because they usually do not affect the signif-
icance of the anger coefficient. However, we do point out when including the
demographic variables changes the results.29
Column 1 shows that the estimate of the effect of emotional valence on both
short- and long-term effort is not significant when we include it in the regres-
sion without any of the specific emotions. In column 2, we show that, when
anger is the only emotion in the regression, its coefficient is negative and signif-
icant for short-term workers (p-value is 0.02), and near zero and insignificant
28We used the MuCap software package (Doyle and Schindler, 2015) to merge the z-Tree and
FaceReader output for analysis. Several participants could not be analyzed since their cameras
stopped recording because of malfunctions. Others did not conform to the FaceReader require-
ments for analysis (usually that the face must be in full view). Many participants started the
experiment seated such that the camera could record their whole face, but then leaned down
or slouched until a part of their face was out of view. A few others were covering their face
with their hands at the crucial moment at which they received their wage. We also excluded five
workers who did not choose an effort level. The 53 workers whose videos could be analyzed
by the software were offered the same average wage (2.61, SD=1.03) as the 63 workers whose
videos could be analyzed (2.63, SD=0.97; t-testp-value is 0.89). The two groups were also not
significantly different in terms of age and gender.
29Non-parametric Spearman correlations between wages, anger and effort levels show similar
patterns as those observed using the regressions. That is, short-term workers become angrier the
lower the wage they receive, and for them, greater anger is associated with lower subsequent
effort. For long-term workers, lower wages do not generate significantly more anger, and anger
is not associated with subsequent effort.
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Table 4.11: Estimates of Tobit Regressions of Effort on Emotions (4.1)
Effort
Short-Term Workers
Valence 1.152
(1.367)
Anger −3.594∗∗ −4.736∗∗ −2.092 −13.703∗∗
(1.491) (1.941) (1.318) (5.463)
Sadness −1.013
(1.362)
Disgust 3.613
(3.080)
Fear 5.506
(5.802)
Surprise 1.858
(1.820)
Happiness −18.232
(12.737)
Wage 0.980∗∗ 0.641
(0.444) (0.400)
Wage × Anger 4.732∗∗
(2.106)
Long-Term Workers
Valence 2.283
(2.393)
Anger 0.644 −0.405 1.093 −13.882
(4.847) (6.553) (4.259) (11.780)
Sadness −2.022
(5.175)
Disgust −1.754
(3.804)
Fear −12.037
(7.752)
Surprise −0.860
(3.223)
Happiness 3.871
(9.493)
Wage 0.469 0.269
(0.432) (0.460)
Wage × Anger 4.991
(4.281)
Delay 0.625 0.252 0.173 1.650 1.200
(0.635) (0.621) (0.697) (1.624) (1.594)
Constant 1.276∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗∗ 1.827∗∗∗∗ −1.199 −0.080
(0.388) (0.347) (0.452) (1.093) (0.923)
Prob. > F 0.505 0.130 0.303 0.039 0.066
Pseudo R2 0.014 0.022 0.064 0.056 0.076
N 53 53 53 53 53
Note: Each emotion has a separate intensity score from 0 to 1, and valence ranges from −1
to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values: ∗0.10, ∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
for long-term ones (p-value is 0.90). We cannot, however, statistically distin-
guish the two coefficients from each other (F-test, p-value is 0.41). This might
be due to the high standard errors for the estimates of anger for long-term
workers. A similar picture appears in column 3 when we include all emotions:
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the coefficient of anger is negative and significant only for short-term workers
(p-value is 0.02 for short-term workers and 0.95 for long-term workers), and no
other emotion has a significant effect. In column 4, including wage and anger
together yields a significant wage coefficient only for short-term workers, and
renders short-term anger insignificant (p-value is 0.12).30 This suggests that at
least some of the relationship between anger and effort in other specifications
is a consequence of the effect of wages on the anger level. We include the inter-
action of wage and anger in column 5. In the short term, wage is insignificant
(p-value is 0.12), anger is significant (p-value is 0.02), and the interaction term
is positive and significant (p-value is 0.03).31 In the long term, none of the
three coefficients is significant.
Although the number of observations is limited, this analysis indicates that
in the short term, the detrimental effect of low wages on effort is stronger
if workers become angry when learning their wage. Furthermore, we clearly
observe that among the emotions we measure, only anger has a consistent as-
sociation with effort decisions. The effect only appears for short term workers.
We also study the effect of wages on emotions. To do this, we regress each
emotion on wage individually using OLS.32 The estimates are shown in Table
4.12. The main finding is that the wage has a significantly negative impact on
the anger level of short-term workers (p-value is < 0.01) and no impact for
long-term workers (p-value is 0.77). The difference between the two is signif-
icant (F-test, p-value is 0.04), and long-term workers are also less angry when
offered a wage of zero (p-value is 0.04). These two last results do become
marginally insignificant, however, when demographics are included. Further-
more, a higher wage significantly increases the valence of both types of workers
and the happiness of long-term workers.
30Including demographics makes short-term anger significant (p-value is 0.04). The anger
variable is subject to potential endogeneity problems when included in the same equation as the
wage, as both effort and anger are correlated with the wage offered. Though not presented here,
using the wage as an instrument for anger in a Two-Stage Least Squares regression also yields a
significant negative coefficient of anger for short-term workers, which is about twice as large as
the coefficient reported in column 2 of Table 4.11.
31If we include demographic controls, the interaction term becomes insignificant (p-value is
0.09) and wage and anger are unaffected. However, using a one-sidedp-value instead is reason-
able in this instance, as we expect anger to either have no effect or reinforce the sensitivity to
the wage, and this would make the effect significant at the p < .05 level.
32We use a dummy variable for long-term workers, and separate the emotions of short- and
long-term workers, to obtain a separate estimate of the effect of each emotion on the effort of
each type of worker workers. We do not include demographics in the specification.
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Table 4.12: Effect of Wage on Emotional Changes in Workers
Anger Sadness Disgusted Fear Surprised Happiness Valence
Wage −0.089∗∗∗ −0.024 −0.041 0.003 0.045 0.007 0.132∗∗∗
× Short Term (0.032) (0.024) (0.038) (0.005) (0.042) (0.005) (0.045)
Wage −0.006 0.010 −0.052 −0.009 −0.046 0.018** 0.082∗∗
× Long Term (0.021) (0.022) (0.033) (0.007) (0.049) (0.009) (0.036)
Long Term −0.246∗∗ −0.086 0.073 0.054∗ 0.286 −0.054 0.089
(0.116) (0.090) (0.141) (0.029) (0.207) (0.033) (0.170)
Constant 0.304∗∗∗ 0.057 0.087 −0.011 −0.183 −0.011 −0.383∗∗
(0.105) (0.073) (0.110) (0.009) (0.130) (0.014) (0.144)
Prob. > F 0.064 0.761 0.148 0.328 0.569 0.075 0.002
R2 0.125 0.013 0.099 0.048 0.064 0.134 0.187
N 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Note: Each emotion has a separate intensity score from 0 to 1, and valence ranges from −1
to 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values: ∗0.10, ∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
4.C. Analysis of Employers’ Predictions
Table 4.13: Tobit Regression of Employers’ Effort Predictions on Short- and Long-term
Wage Offered, and OLS Regression of Employers’ Difference in Effort Predictions on
the Wage Offered
Predicted
Short-term Effort
Predicted
Long-term Effort
Predicted Long- Minus
Short-term Effort
Wage 0.541∗∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗∗ Wage −0.144∗∗ −0.141∗∗
(0.085) (0.110) (0.069) (0.070)
Tucson-H 0.046 0.017 Tucson-H −0.023
(0.045) (0.058) (0.040)
Constant 0.144∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ Constant 0.070 0.083∗
(0.064) (0.076) (0.044) (0.046)
Prob. > F 0.000 0.002 Prob. > F 0.040 0.075
Pseudo R2 1.353 0.213 R2 0.046 0.050
N 98 98 N 98 98
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. p-values: ∗0.10, ∗∗0.05, ∗∗∗0.01, ∗∗∗∗0.001.
In Tilburg-H and Tucson-H, employers are asked to predict the choices of
both the short- and the long-term workers whom they are matched with. One
of the two predictions is selected to count toward their payment. In Tilburg-
H, they earn 1 EUR if the prediction selected to count is within 0.2 units of the
actual effort chosen. In Tucson-H, they receive 1 USD if their selected prediction
is within 0.4 of the actual effort.33
We explore whether employers correctly anticipate the weaker wage-effort
relationship for long-term workers in the Tilburg-H and Tucson-H experiments.
First, we regress the effort predictions of employers on the wages offered by
the employers using a Tobit regression, for short- and long-term workers sep-
arately.34 We include a dummy for the Tucson-H experiment. We present the
33This methodology is not incentive compatible because participants have an incentive to
hedge. It is also not incentive compatible for beliefs close to the minimum or maximum. We
use it because it gives us a simple, although rough idea of the predictions of employers.
34We use normalized wages and effort predictions.
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estimates in columns 1-2 of Table 4.13. Employers who offer higher wages an-
ticipate significantly higher effort, both in the short and long term (p-values
are <0.001), although the relationship is flatter in the long-term. Second, we
regress the difference between the long-term and short-term effort predictions
of employers (predicted long-term effort minus predicted short-term effort) on
the wages that employers offered, using an OLS regression. The estimates are
shown in columns 3 and 4. We include a dummy for Tucson-H in column 4. The
wage term is negative and significant (p-values are 0.04 in column 1 and 0.047
in column 2). This means that, as wage offers increase, expected long-term
effort decreases relative to short-term effort.
4.D. Instructions (for Tucson-H)
We present the instructions for the Tucson-H experiment. The instructions are
very similar for the other two experiments. They are available on request.
Introduction
Welcome. The camera on top of your computer screen is currently turned
on and you will be filmed for the entire session. The video will be seen only
by the experimenters and will be destroyed once data have been gathered from
it. The content of the video will not affect your payment. If you disagree with
being filmed, you are free to leave at any time, and you will keep the show-up
fee, but you will not receive additional payment.
In this experiment, the instructions are simple and if you read them carefully
you can earn a considerable amount of money. Everything you earn is on top
of a 5 dollar show- up fee and a 3 dollar participation fee. You are forbidden to
communicate with other participants at any time. At the end the experiment,
the earnings you have made will be paid to you by sending you cash or a check
in the mail. Take a moment now to write down your name and your mailing
address on the envelope in front of you. Please be careful, as we will use this
envelope to send your payment. This experiment takes around 40 minutes in
the lab. In addition, depending on the role you are randomly assigned, you
might have to take 5 minutes outside the lab to send an email, either in the 3
hours after the session today or in 4 weeks. If anything is unclear during the
experiment, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you.
Roles
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In this experiment, participants are randomly assigned, with equal chance,
to 1 of the 3 roles: 1) employer, 2) employee choosing now or 3) employee
choosing later. You will be placed in a group of 3 made of 1 employer, 1 em-
ployee choosing now, and 1 employee choosing later. The identity of the mem-
bers of each group will be kept secret from all participants. Your role will be
now revealed to you on your screen. Do not reveal your role to others and do
not mention your role aloud to the experimenter.
General Instructions
This is an experiment about employer-employees interaction. First, the em-
ployer chooses a wage between 0 and 4 dollars for his/her 2 employees and
asks them to choose a specific effort level between 0 and 4. The wage is the
same for each employee. The employer cannot force the employees to choose
a specific effort level. Second, the employees learn their wage and each em-
ployee chooses an effort level between 0 and 4. The employee choosing now
will choose an effort level within 3 hours after the end of today’s session and
the employee choosing later will choose an effort level in 4 weeks. A higher
effort level costs an employee more but benefits the employer more. Each unit
of effort chosen costs the employee 25 cents and increases the earnings of the
employer by 2.50 dollars. Employees receive the wage, no matter what effort
level they choose. In addition, the employer is asked to make a prediction about
the effort of each employee. Also, before learning his/her wage, each employee
is asked to state the wage he/she thinks would be fair to receive.
Specific Instructions for the Employer
The employer chooses a wage between 0 and 4 dollars for each of the two
employees. The wage can be chosen in any increment of 10 cents. The wage is
the same for both employees. The employer has to pay the wage twice because
there are two employees, one choosing an effort today and one choosing an
effort in 4 weeks. The wages are costly for the employer and benefit the em-
ployee. The wages are deducted from the employer’s earnings. The wage for
one employee is added to that employee’s earnings. The employer also asks for
a specific effort level from each employee. The specific effort asked is the same
for each employee. The employer cannot force an employee to choose a spe-
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cific effort. Each employee is free to choose an effort level that is the same or
different from the level that is asked. Each unit of effort chosen by an employee
will cost him/her 25 cents and pay the employer 2.50 dollars. Your payment
calculation is described in the section Payment Calculation for All Roles.
In addition, the employer is asked to predict the effort level of each em-
ployee. This pre- diction will not be revealed to any participant. Once both
employees have chosen their effort level, the prediction for one employee will
be randomly chosen. If this prediction is within 0.4 of the effort chosen by the
employee, the employer will receive an additional 1 dollar.
The payment to the employer will be sent by mail on the day after the receipt
of the effort level chosen by the employee choosing in 4 weeks. The employer
has no email to send. If an employee does not choose an effort level, the em-
ployer is paid back the wage that was given to the employee.
Specific Instructions for the Employee Choosing Now
The employer will offer each employee a wage between 0 and 4 dollars
and ask for a specific effort level between 0 and 4. The wage chosen is de-
ducted from the employer’s earnings. The employer cannot force an employee
to choose a specific effort, he/she can only ask for it. The employee will then
have to choose an effort between 0 and 4. The effort can be chosen in any in-
crement of 0.1. The effort is costly for the employee and benefits the employer.
Each unit of effort chosen by an employee will cost him/her 25 cents and pay
the employer 2.50 dollars. Your payment calculation is described in the section
Payment Calculation for All Roles.
The employee choosing now chooses his/her effort level within the 3 hours
after the end of today’s session. He/she does not choose the effort level during
the session. He/she chooses the effort level by sending an email to the exper-
imenter. The email address of the experimenter is written on the last page of
these instructions. You can leave with the last page of the instructions after
today’s session. Thus you can also write anything you might need on the last
page. The envelope with your payment will be mailed on the day after the
receipt of your email. Please respect the 3 hour deadline as it will be enforced.
If you send your effort choice more than 3 hours after the end of this session,
you will only be paid your show-up and participation fees.
In addition, before learning his/her wage, each employee will be asked what
is the wage that he/she would consider fair to receive. The wage can be any-
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thing between 0 and 4 dollars, in any increment of 10 cents. This fair wage will
not be revealed to any participant in the experiment. It cannot influence the
wage that an employee receives. Please simply try to be truthful even if it does
not influence your earnings.
Specific Instructions for the Employee Choosing Later
The employer will offer each employee a wage between 0 and 4 dollars
and ask for a specific effort level between 0 and 4. The wage chosen is de-
ducted from the employer’s earnings. The employer cannot force an employee
to choose a specific effort, he/she can only ask for it. The employee will then
have to choose an effort between 0 and 4. The effort can be chosen in any in-
crement of 0.1. The effort is costly for the employee and benefits the employer.
Each unit of effort chosen by an employee will cost him/her 25 cents and pay
the employer 2.50 dollars. Your payment calculation is described in the section
Payment Calculation for All Roles.
The employee choosing later chooses his/her effort level only in 4 weeks af-
ter today’s session. He/she does not choose the effort level during the session.
He/she chooses the effort level by sending an email to the experimenter. The
email address of the experimenter is written on the last page of these instruc-
tions. You can leave with the last page of the instructions after today’s session.
Thus you can also write anything you might need on the last page. The date
in 4 weeks is also written on the last page. You will have 5 days to send your
effort then, with the starting day being the date in 4 weeks. The envelope with
your payment will be mailed on the day after the receipt of your email. Please
respect the 5 day period beginning in 4 weeks. If you send your choice of ef-
fort before or after the 5 day period, you will only be paid your show-up and
participation fees. An email reminder will be sent to you on the starting day
in 4 weeks. The wage, the effort asked by the employer, and a copy of these
instructions will be in the email reminder.
In addition, before learning his/her wage, each employee will be asked what
is the wage that he/she would consider fair to receive. The wage can be any-
thing between 0 and 4 dollars, in any increment of 10 cents. This fair wage will
not be revealed to any participant in the experiment. It cannot influence the
wage that an employee receives. Please simply try to be truthful even if it does
not influence your earnings.
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Payment Calculation for All Roles
Earnings in dollars for participants in each of the 3 roles are described by
these formulas:
Employer: 11 − 2 × wage + 2.5 × (effort of employee choosing now + effort
of employee choosing later)
Employee choosing now: 4 + wage − 0.25 × effort of employee choosing now
Employee choosing later: 4 + wage − 0.25 × effort of employee choosing later
Note that the 5 dollar show-up fee, the 3 dollar participation fee, and the
potential payment for the employer’s predictions are not included. Please take
a minute to study these formulas carefully as your earnings depend on under-
standing them.
Practice
During the experiment, you can choose only once. Before you start, please
practice with 2 examples on the last page. The examples will not affect your
earnings. When you have completed them, please raise your hand and the
experimenter will verify your answers. This is the best time to ask questions to
the experimenter to be sure that you under- stand. Please do not hesitate to
ask. Your earnings depend on your understanding of the instructions.
At the end of the session, when you are done with the questionnaire, please
stay seated and raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and ask
you to sign a sheet before you can leave. Please do not communicate with
others during that time and leave your envelope at your seat. You are free
to leave with the last page of the instructions, on which the email address is
written.
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You can leave with this page after today’s session. Feel free to write
anything on it.
Example 1: The employer chooses a wage of U, one employee chooses ef-
fort T, and the other employee chooses effort L. Do not replace the variables
with numbers. Please write down the earnings for each role:
Employer:
Employee choosing effort T:
Employee choosing effort L:
Example 2: The employer chooses a wage of Z, one employee chooses effort
Q, and the other employee chooses effort S. Do not replace the variables with
numbers. Please write down the earnings for each role:
Employer:
Employee choosing effort Q:
Employee choosing effort S:
Date today: xx—xx—2016
Date in 4 weeks: yy—yy—2016
Wage can be anything between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1.
Effort level can be anything between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1.
Email to send choice of effort: XXXXXXXXX@XXXXX
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4.E. Email Reminders for Long-term Workers
For conciseness, we present here only the email reminder for long-term workers
in the Tucson-H experiment. A copy of the original instructions was attached.
The email reminders are similar across experiments. The reminders for the two
other experiments are available on demand.
Dear participant,
4 weeks ago, you were assigned to the role of Employee Choosing Later in
an experiment at the Economic Science Lab of the University of Arizona. You
had to send an email to this address with your choice of effort level 4 weeks
after the session.
This is the reminder that the date 4 weeks after is today, [date]. You have
now 5 days to send your choice of effort. These 5 days include today.
During the session, you were placed in a group of 3 participants consisting
of an employer, an employee choosing now, and an employee choosing later.
The employer had to choose a wage between 0 and 4 dollars, in any increment
of 10 cents, for each employee. The wage was the same for both employees.
The wages are deducted from the employer’s earnings.
The employer offered you a wage of $[wage] during the session and asked
for an effort level of [effort]. You now have to choose your effort level. Note
that the employer cannot force you to choose a specific effort level.
You can choose an effort level between 0 and 4, in any increment of 0.1.
Each unit of effort that you choose will cost you 25 cents, and pay the employer
2.50 dollars.
Payment Calculation (in dollars):
Employer: 11 − 2 × Wage + 2.5 × (Effort of Employee Choosing Now + Effort
of Employee Choosing Later)
Employee Choosing Now: 4 + Wage − 0.25 × Effort of Employee Choosing
Now
Employee Choosing Later: 4 + Wage − 0.25 × Effort of Employee Choosing
Later
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If anything is unclear, please contact me. I also attach a copy of the in-
structions for the experiment. The envelope with your payment will be sent by
mail on the day after the receipt of your email.
You must respect the deadline to be paid.
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Chapter 5
Unequal Chances: Ex Ante
Fairness and Individual Control
Abstract
Unequal financial outcomes often originate from unequal chances. Yet, com-
pared to outcomes, little is known about how individuals perceive unequal dis-
tributions of chances. We investigate empirically the role of different sources
of unequal chances in shaping inequality perceptions. Importantly, we do so
from an ex ante perspective—i.e., before the chances are realized—which has
rarely been explored. In an online survey, we asked uninvolved respondents to
evaluate ex ante the fairness of unequal allocations of chances. We varied the
source of inequality of chances, using a comprehensive range of factors which
resemble several real world situations. Respondents also evaluated how much
control individuals hold over the distribution of chances. Results show that
the source of inequality has considerable effects on the ex ante perception of
fairness and control. Unequal chances based on socioeconomic and biological
factors, such as gender, family income and ethnicity, are evaluated to be both
unfair and beyond one’s control. Allocations based on factors judged to be un-
der higher individual control, such as effort and knowledge, are perceived as
fairer. Luck is the exception, ranking as high in fairness as effort and knowl-
edge, but similarly low in individual control as ethnicity, family income, and
gender.
This short chapter is co-authored with Let́ıcia Micheli.
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I. Introduction
Unequal chances abound in the pursuit of financial rewards; erecting the land-
scape of the financial outcomes likely to be achieved by different groups of
individuals. The striking recent study of Chetty et al. (2018) reports that in the
United States “controlling for parental income, black boys have lower incomes
in adulthood than white boys in 99% of Census tracts.” Policies such as addi-
tional investments for low-income children, diversity quotas in firms, and Affir-
mative Action in university admissions strive to redress these uneven chances
before they translate into unequal outcomes. They attempt to “level the playing
field” as the saying goes. Such policies can be observed across the globe. Brazil
invests additional funds in the education of low-income children, through its
Bolsa Famı́lia cash-transfer program. Norway as well as other European coun-
tries require a gender quota on corporate boards. Universities in India, South
Africa, and the United States increase the admission chances of disadvantaged
groups through Affirmative Action. Nevertheless, our understanding of how in-
dividuals perceive the unequal chances that these policies address is minimal.
In fact, there is a noticeable empirical gap in the existing literature on redis-
tribution: we have limited knowledge about which types of unequal chances
are considered to be fair from the ex ante standpoint—i.e., before chances are
realized and incomes are known. We employ ourselves to bridge this gap.
Using a survey, we investigate the fairness perceptions of different proce-
dures used to distribute unequal chances, from the ex ante perspective of an
uninvolved spectator. We use a large set of procedures, which include factors
often serving as bases for unequal chances in society such as effort, knowledge,
luck, gender, ethnicity, and family income. Those factors are more comprehen-
sive than those that the literature on fairness has employed, enabling a more
fine-grained exploration of differences among a range of situations that can
generate unequal chances. Moreover, we examine the perception of individual
control over these procedures and the relationship between control and ex ante
fairness. This is important because work in distributive justice has emphasized
the divide between factors perceived as within and beyond one’s control in the
equity perception of different types of inequality. Lastly, we touch upon Affirma-
tive Action, which raises the odds for disadvantaged groups over advantaged
groups. We do this by testing whether it is fairer to provide higher chances
to groups that are generally disadvantaged than to groups that are generally
advantaged. Our hope is that understanding how individuals perceive unequal
chances originating from different factors can provide insights to policymakers
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in terms of which unequal chances are perceived as justifiable and which may
call for rectification.
The economic literature investigating inequality and redistribution decisions
draws a line between ex post and ex ante fairness. While ex post fairness con-
cerns the distribution of incomes between individuals once these incomes are
known (Harsanyi, 1955), ex ante fairness applies to the distribution of chances
that are to generate incomes (Diamond, 1967). The literature in psychology
and management (Cohen-Charash and Spector, 2001; Tyler, 2000; Leventhal
et al., 1980; Thibaut and Walker, 1975) also studies the procedure generat-
ing outcomes separately from the outcomes themselves and uncovers crucial
factors that influence individuals’ appraisal of procedures, such as respect, an
opportunity to be involved or voice their concerns, and the absence of biases.
The empirical literature on redistribution focuses mostly on ex post fairness,
once incomes are already known. Studies show that a substantial proportion
of individuals display concern for equality of incomes, exhibiting a willingness
to decrease their own income to improve the conditions of others through re-
distribution (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dawes
et al., 2007; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Forsythe et al., 1994). There is also
empirical evidence that individuals care about ex ante inequality, although the
topic is less studied. For instance, recent economic experiments have presented
their participants with unequal chances to win at a lottery, and an opportunity
to redistribute chances before the realization of that lottery. Many individuals
indeed show concern for equality when redistributing chances, even if it re-
duces their own chances of winning (Brock et al., 2013; Krawczyk and Le Lec,
2010). Chances also influence the redistributive decisions of uninvolved spec-
tators (Cappelen et al., 2013; Cettolin and Riedl, 2016). Moreover, there is
some evidence that individuals do consider the distribution of initial chances in
their redistribution decisions even after the realization of these chances (Bolton
et al., 2005; Grimalda et al., 2016). Finally, theoretical work on social prefer-
ences for obtaining a fair chance has been the focus of a number of papers in
the past twenty years (Bolton et al., 2005; Karni and Safra, 2002; Krawczyk,
2011; Saito, 2013; Trautmann, 2009).
Studies investigate the fairness perception and the distribution decisions of
incomes that have been generated through different procedures, but they do
so almost exclusively from an ex post perspective. For example, they examine
whether the patterns of fairness perceptions and income distribution decisions
differ if income inequality is caused by different factors, such as effort, knowl-
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edge, and luck (Cappelen et al., 2007; Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Schokkaert and
Devooght, 2003; Konow, 2000). Typically, a sizeable proportion of individuals
accept more inequality caused by effort and knowledge than luck. The promi-
nent explanation for this type of behavior is the view that individuals should be
held accountable for factors under their control, such as effort and knowledge,
but not for others which they cannot influence, such as luck. This is the position
taken by the liberal egalitarian fairness ideal (Roemer, 1998) and the account-
ability principle (Konow, 2000). Several earlier equality concepts in philosophy
also hold individuals responsible for their choices, the difference often being to
which extent one is responsible for certain factors and not for others, which
is notoriously difficult to determine (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Dworkin,
1981).
In contrast, how different factors behind the distribution of chances affect
the ex ante fairness perception of these chances has scarcely been explored by
empirical studies. We believe that this missing step is socially valuable because
many policies—such as the Affirmative Action described in the first paragraph—
intend not to correct incomes once unequal chances have been realized, but to
correct different types of unequal chances before they are realized. Further-
more, whether the positive relationship between perceived control and fairness
of inequality documented ex post is typical from an ex ante perspective has
not been researched much. Studying ex ante perceptions is essential because
our knowledge regarding ex post fairness views does not necessarily inform us
about ex ante fairness views. For instance, a society’s fairness evaluation of
a procedure based on luck may differ ex ante and ex post: providing equal
chances of obtaining either a high or low income to everyone might be judged
as fair at the outset, only to be considered unfair once unequal incomes have
been randomly allocated.
The only study that has empirically investigated the role of different factors
in ex ante fairness views compares how distributions of chances based on height
versus a combination of effort and knowledge impact individuals’ ex ante choice
of future redistribution (Krawczyk, 2010). The study finds that, ex ante, indi-
viduals are more prone to support future redistribution when height influence
chances than when effort and knowledge does, which provides some evidence
that liberal egalitarianism is present ex ante. We add to this research by inves-
tigating a wider range of factors underlying unequal distribution of chances,
which are mostly chosen to resemble real-world situations of inequality. More-
over, we study individuals’ fairness perceptions in combination with control
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perceptions, rather than redistribution decisions. We note that the previous
study also included questions regarding fairness perceptions of procedures, but
did not find significant differences between the reported fairness of the height
and the effort and knowledge procedures. However, as the author reports, its
use of a between-subject design might generate too much noise to distinguish
fairness differences between the procedures. Our within-subject design is likely
to alleviate this issue.
II. Methods
We recruited 82 undergraduate students from the online recruitment system
for economic experiments (ORSEE) (Greiner, 2015) of the Behavioral and Ex-
perimental Economics Laboratory (BEELab) at the School of Business and Eco-
nomics of Maastricht University (The Netherlands) to take part in an online
Qualtrics survey. We obtained informed consent from participants to take part
in the study. They completed the survey in April and May 2017 and received 5
EUR for their participation. They were 41% male and on average 21.5 years old.
The study was conducted following the peer-approved procedures established
by Maastricht University’s Behavioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(BEElab). Our study was approved by the Maastricht University’s Behavioral
and Experimental Economics Laboratory at a public ethics review and project
proposal meeting that is mandatory for all scholars who wish to use the BEElab
facilities. All methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guide-
lines and regulations of the BEELab and Maastricht University for studies with
human participants.
Participants considered a hypothetical scenario in which unequal chances to
win a prize of 10 EUR are allocated between two other individuals. Participants
could not win the prize themselves, and, for simplicity, we framed chances as
lottery tickets. Chances are always allocated in the following manner: one in-
dividual has a 90% chance, and the other has a 10% chance. Only one of the
two individuals wins the prize. Participants were asked questions concerning
different procedures determining who receives which chance. The scenario was
described to participants in the following manner:
Consider a situation in which lottery tickets are distributed between two per-
sons. Generally we ask you to assume that these two persons have a similar social,
economic and educational background. In some cases this will not be so and you
will be explicitly informed about it. Each ticket gives a 10% chance to win the
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lottery. There can be only one winner in the lottery, who receives 10 EUR as a
prize. The ticket allocation is as follows: one person gets 9 tickets and thus has
a 90% chance of winning the lottery prize, whereas the other person gets 1 ticket
and thus has a 10% chance of winning the lottery prize. The allocation of tickets
is based on various procedures.
We then presented 11 different procedures in random order. Although all
procedures presented led to the same consequences (i.e., one person receiving
a 10% chance to win a single lottery prize and the other receiving a 90% chance
of winning that same prize), these procedures differed with respect to the factor
that determines who receives which chances. The factor presented was one
of the following: benevolence, knowledge, effort, luck, student identification
number (ID), height, weight, nationality, gender, ethnicity (skin color), and
family (parental) income.
All procedures were presented once in our “Regular” Block, where the higher
chance was allocated to individuals who were benevolent, more knowledge-
able, exerted more effort, lucky, with a higher ID, tall, heavy, male, German,
light-skinned, or from a high-income family. We also presented participants
with the same procedures in our “Reverse” Block, this time allocating higher
chances to the opposite individuals (e.g., individuals who are non-benevolent,
dark-skinned, women or from a low-income family). We are more interested in
the “Regular” Block because the procedures in this block described cases that
generally occur more often in real life, such as advantaging men, light-skinned
individuals, or individuals from a high-income family. For our analysis, we are
only interested in a select group of these procedures to evaluate asymmetries
in fairness, which we explain below. The order of blocks was randomized.
Table 5.1 summarizes the criteria for receiving higher chances, in each pro-
cedure of each block. For benevolence, we presented the case of an individual
who decided to help a person in need and another individual who decided to
not help a person in need. In this specific case, higher chances are allocated
to the benevolent person in the “Regular” Block, while higher chances are al-
located to the non-benevolent person in the “Reverse” Block. For knowledge,
we used a general knowledge quiz, where the person with a higher number of
correct answers would receive higher chances in the “Regular” Block and lower
chances in the “Reverse” Block. For effort we employed a slider task (Gill and
Prowse, 2012), a common effort task in experimental economics, which is ex-
plained in the example below. Again, the person exerting more effort would re-
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ceive higher chances in the “Regular” Block and lower chances in the “Reverse”
Block. Then, for luck we adopted a 6-side die roll where one person would
roll a number equal or smaller than 3 and receive higher chances, whereas the
other would receive lower chances. In the ID procedure, we used greater and
smaller student ID numbers (which are generally allocated by order of enrol-
ment, although this might be unknown to students). For height we contrasted
taller and shorter individuals, while for weight we contrasted heavy and light
persons and for gender we employed women versus men. For nationality, we
made use of Germans versus non-Germans (German is the most common na-
tionality in the participants pool). For ethnicity, we contrasted light-skinned to
dark-skinned individuals. Finally, for family income we considered individuals
coming from higher or lower income families.
Participants first rated the fairness of all procedures for both the Regular
and Reverse Blocks. After that, participants were exposed a second time to
both blocks, again in random order, and rated the same procedures in terms of
how much individual control one has over chances received. Responses were
given on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Very Unfair to Very Fair and from
No Control to Full Control. The full instructions are provided in the Appendix.
The following two examples regarding effort and gender describe how the pro-
cedures were presented to participants. Both examples belong to the Regular
Block.
Effort Example: Chances are allocated based on the results of a task that depends
on effort. In the task, people see dots appearing randomly on horizontal bars on
their computer screen. Their task is to position as many dots as possible in the
middle of the horizontal bars. The person who places more dots in the correct
position in a given time receives a 90% chance to win, and the person who places
less dots in the correct position receives a 10% chance to win.
Gender Example: Chances are allocated based on gender. The two persons have
different genders. The man receives a 90% chance to win, and the woman receives
a 10% chance to win.
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Table 5.1: Criteria for receiving higher chances in the Regular and Reverse Blocks
Procedure Regular Block Reverse Block
Benevolence Choosing to help someone in need Choosing not to help someone in need
Knowledge Higher results in a knowledge quiz Lower results in a knowledge quiz
Effort Correctly position more dots in the task Correctly position less dots in the task
Luck Roll of 6-faced die gives 3 or less -
ID Higher student ID number Lower student ID number
Height Taller person Shorter person
Weight Heavier person Lighter person
Gender Male Female
Nationality German Non-German
Ethnicity Lighter skin color Darker skin color
Family Income Higher parental income Lower parental income
Note: We did not reverse Luck because this would simply mean changing the winning
numbers of the die roll, which should have no effect on its fairness and control ratings.
III. Hypotheses
We test whether there are differences in fairness among procedures, and whether
fairness is a correlate of the perception of control. Our first hypothesis is that
procedures will be perceived differently in terms of fairness and individual con-
trol based on the factors used to decide who would receive higher and lower
chances.
Our second hypothesis is that procedures with low individual control are
perceived as more unfair, in line with liberal egalitarianism.
Furthermore, we test for asymmetries in fairness ratings when chances favor
one group over the other for the following procedures: benevolence, knowl-
edge, effort, gender, ethnicity, and family income. We expect that asymmetries
in these cases will arise for two reasons. First, previous research shows that
individuals reward “merit” in the case of effort and knowledge, and this might
extend to benevolence. This can lead to individuals finding it fairer to allocate
higher chances to those who were benevolent, who provided more correct an-
swers in the knowledge quiz and who exerted more effort than to those with
opposite characteristics. Second, one might find it fairer to favor generally dis-
advantaged groups because this compensates existing inequality. Hence, our
third hypothesis is that participants rate procedures as fairer when females, in-
dividuals with dark skin and low parental income receive higher chances than
males and individuals with white skin and high parental income.
IV. Results
RESULT 1, EX ANTE FAIRNESS RATINGS: Regular-block procedures advantaging
individuals who are benevolent, knowledgeable, exert effort and are lucky, score
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high on fairness, whereas procedures advantaging individuals based on socioeco-
nomic or biological factors (e.g., gender, height, skin color or parental income)
score low on fairness.
Table 5.2 presents the mean fairness ratings of Regular-block procedures.
We use non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to analyze pairwise differ-
ences between procedures in their distribution of fairness ratings (N=82). Stars
in a cell indicate that the procedure in the column is fairer than the corre-
sponding row. P-values are corrected for multiple comparisons using the Holm-
Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979) and are indicated by the number of stars.
For completeness, Table 5.5 in the Appendix also shows fairness ratings of the
procedures in the Reverse Block.
This result indicates that not all chance inequalities are considered equally
fair from the ex ante viewpoint, which is in line with what other studies have
found for the ex post perspective. Indeed, despite the fact that all procedures
led to an unequal distribution of chances between individuals, some procedures
were considered fairer than others. Unlike for the ex post perspective, however,
procedures giving higher chances to those who exert effort or are knowledge-
able are not significantly fairer than the luck procedure, which simply randomly
allocates chances. Procedures based on socioeconomic and biological criteria
are the ones which really differ from luck, by being substantially less fair.
Overall, our first result suggests that individuals may be prone to accept, ex
ante, certain inequality of chances, e.g., when they come through effort, knowl-
edge, or even luck, while endorsing policies that rectify others, e.g., when they
rest on biological and socioeconomic factors. Next, we test whether individu-
als’ judgments of ex ante fairness differ depending on who is advantaged by the
unequal distribution of chances.
RESULT 2, ASYMMETRIES IN EX ANTE FAIRNESS RATINGS: It is fairer to advan-
tage individuals who are benevolent, dark-skinned, knowledgeable, and exert more
effort, compared to advantaging individuals with the opposite characteristics. It is
not fairer to advantage women over men.
In most cases, as hypothesized, results show that ex ante fairness ratings dif-
fer depending on who is favored with higher chances. The exception is gender,
for which, unlike what we hypothesized, we did not find significant asymme-
tries.
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Table 5.2: Mean Fairness and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons
Procedure Benev. Effort Luck Know. ID Height Weight Nat. Inc. Gender Ethn.
Benevolence
(Benev.)
5.38
(1.47)
Effort
5.04
(1.53)
Luck ∗
4.63
(1.77)
Knowledge
(Know.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗ 4.38
(1.88)
ID ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
2.17
(1.67)
Height ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
1.37
(.75)
Weight ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗
1.35
(.60)
Nationality
(Nat.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.33
(.85)
Family Income
(Inc.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.29
(.60)
Gender ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.21
(.46)
Ethnicity
(Ethn.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ 1.13
(.34)
Note: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Stars in a cell indicate that the
procedure in the column is fairer than the procedure in the corresponding row. Holm-
Bonferroni-corrected p-values: ∗ p<.05; ∗∗ p<.01; ∗∗∗ p<.001.
Table 5.3 reports the mean fairness for the procedures advantaging one
group (Regular Block) versus the other group (Reverse Block). Non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (N=82) are used to compare procedures in the Reg-
ular and Reverse Blocks. Stars in the table indicate whether the distributions
of the procedures are significantly different. The asymmetries that we identify
can occur for different reasons. First, asymmetries in fairness among proce-
dures that involve some sort of merit (benevolence, effort, knowledge) can
occur because individuals find it fair to distribute chances in a meritocratic
manner. Second, individuals may consider it fairer to give higher chances to
disadvantaged groups similar to what Affirmative Action policies often do.
We make two observations. First, finding no asymmetries in the case of
gender might be due to the specific setting that we study—a Dutch business
school with a large share of women among its student body, which for stu-
dents is likely not highly unequal in terms of gender. Second, although we
do find asymmetries in fairness, procedures that favor disadvantaged groups
are still generally considered unfair compared to procedures that advantage
those who are benevolent, exert effort, or are knowledgeable. This result re-
flects to some extent the mixed support affirmative action can receive. Even
though individuals recognize that giving more chances to the disadvantaged is
fairer, such procedures are still considered relatively unfair. Alternatively, the
low relative fairness of the affirmative action procedures that we use might be
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due to the somewhat egalitarian environment of the students. Another reason
for this result is that these procedures create a large amount of inequality by
distributing very unequal chances instead of slightly advantaging the generally-
disadvantaged group.
RESULT 3, CONTROL AND FAIRNESS: Individuals generally consider procedures
that one has control over to be fairer. Interestingly, luck stands out as the excep-
tion: it ranks high in fairness but low in control.
Table 5.4 details the mean control ratings of the Regular procedures. We
calculate the non-parametric Spearman correlation between fairness and con-
trol for each individual (N=79), for the 11 procedures contained in the Regular
Block. Note that we cannot calculate the correlation for 3 participants because
there are no variations in their fairness or control answers. For the 79 remain-
ing participants, the Spearman ρ is positive for 95% of them, at least of medium
strength (ρ ≥ .30) for 92%, and strong (ρ ≥ .60) for 63%. The ρ is significantly
greater than zero at the .05 significance level for 62% of participants, and at
the .10 level for 71%, while it is significantly smaller than zero at the .10 level
for none. For the interested reader, Table 5.6 in the Appendix also displays the
mean control ratings for the Reverse Block.
Our third result indicates that a substantial share of participants exhibit
a positive correlation between fairness and control when they make ex ante
judgments about unequal distributions of chances. This is in line with what
other studies have found for ex post judgments of unequal outcomes. That is,
the judgments of many individuals appear broadly consistent with the liberal-
egalitarian fairness ideal, whereby individuals find unequal chances based on
factors over which one has control to be fair. However, the fact that the proce-
dure randomly allocating high chances is as fair ex ante as the procedures ad-
vantaging those who exert effort or are knowledgeable—while at the same time
being judged to be under no control—is inconsistent with the liberal-egalitarian
fairness ideal.
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Table 5.3: Asymmetries and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons
Higher Chance to: Mean Fairness Difference
Benevolent 5.38 (1.47) ∗∗∗
Non-Benevolent 1.93 (1.44)
More Effort 5.04 (1.53) ∗∗∗
Less Effort 2.52 (1.65)
More Knowledgeable 4.38 (1.88) ∗∗∗
Less Knowledgeable 2.17 (1.39)
High Family Income 1.29 (.60) ∗∗∗
Low Family Income 2.74 (1.79)
Man 1.21 (.46)
Woman 1.32 (.83)
Ethnicity—Light Skin 1.13 (.34) ∗∗
Ethnicity—Dark Skin 1.44 (.98)
Note: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Stars in a cell indicate a signif-
icant difference in fairness depending on who is advantaged. Holm-Bonferroni-corrected
p-values: ∗ p<.05; ∗∗ p<.01; ∗∗∗ p<.001.
Table 5.4: Mean Control and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons
Procedure Benev. Effort Know. Weight Luck Inc. ID Gender Nat. Height Ethn.
Benevolence
(Benev.)
5.91
(1.51)
Effort ∗∗∗
5.22
(1.41)
Knowledge
(Know.)
∗∗∗ 4.98
(1.49)
Weight ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
2.95
(1.65)
Luck ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.55
(1.00)
Family Income
(Inc.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.50
(1.03)
ID ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.45
(.72)
Gender ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.28
(.76)
Nationality
(Nat.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.28
(.86)
Height ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.27
(.74)
Ethnicity
(Ethn.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.26
(.70)
Note: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Stars in a cell indicate that the
procedure in the column is under more control than the procedure in the corresponding
row. Holm-Bonferroni-corrected p-values: ∗ p<.05; ∗∗ p<.01; ∗∗∗. p<.001
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V. Discussion
This study addresses a gap in the existing literature on redistribution regarding
how individuals evaluate the ex ante fairness of distributions of chances based
on different factors. We exposed uninvolved participants to different proce-
dures used to distribute unequal chances to win a monetary prize between two
individuals. Before the chances were realized, participants were asked to rate
the fairness of each procedure as well as to rate how much individual control
each procedure allowed for.
Our results indicate that, as other studies have found for ex post inequal-
ity, the fairness of ex ante inequality depends on the causes that generate this
inequality. Procedures advantaging those who are benevolent, knowledgeable,
exert more effort or advantaging those who are simply lucky are rated similar
in terms of fairness by uninvolved spectators. The assessment of luck differs
from the ex post perspective, in which procedures that advantage individuals
based on luck are often considered to be less fair than meritocratic procedures
that advantage those who exert more effort or who are more knowledgeable
(Cappelen et al., 2007; Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Konow, 2000).
A clear demarcation line between the different procedures only appears
when we compare the fairness of the group of aforementioned procedures with
the fairness of the group of procedures that are based on biological and so-
cioeconomic factors. That is, the group of procedures based on gender, height,
weight, nationality, ethnicity or family income are substantially less fair than
the other procedures, which are based neither on biological nor socioeconomic
factors. The difference between the observed two groups of procedures is in
line with what we regularly witness in societies: unequal chances based on bio-
logical or socioeconomic characteristics are denounced as unfair and can elicit
strong reactions, such as social movements against racism and sexism demand-
ing equal chances for members of different groups. Generally, this result also
reinforces the need to differentiate inequality and fairness (Starmans et al.,
2017).
Moreover, the asymmetry observed in the fairness of certain procedures is
consistent with individuals supporting, on average, Affirmative Action for usu-
ally disadvantaged ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Even in our setting of
a simple lottery among university students, it is indeed fairer to favor certain
disadvantaged groups. We observe, however, that increasing the chances of cer-
tain ethnic and socioeconomic groups is still considered unfair in this context
relative to advantaging those who exert more effort or are more knowledge-
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able. We do not find that it is fairer to give higher chances to one gender over
the other, although we note that this might be the result of using students in
a relatively gender-balanced environment. Overall, asymmetries in perceived
fairness provide a potential source of expansion for current research.
Furthermore, procedures allocating chances in a fairer manner rate higher
in individual control. This is broadly consistent with the liberal-egalitarian fair-
ness ideal that a large share of individuals have been shown to hold in terms
of ex post fairness (Cappelen et al., 2007). Interestingly, unlike ex post, liberal
egalitarianism fails to hold ex ante in the case of luck, which is considered both
fair and outside of one’s control. On the one hand, the procedure randomly
allocating higher chances is considered as fair as the procedures advantaging
those who exert effort or are knowledgeable. One the other hand, whereas
procedures based on effort or knowledge are judged to be under individuals’
control, luck is obviously considered to be under no control, as are procedures
based on biological or socioeconomic factors. This reveals a sharp difference
between ex ante and ex post judgments.
How is it possible for the random allocation procedure to be fair from an ex
ante perspective, and to then suddenly become unfair ex post? Previous theo-
retical work suggests that individuals can be time-inconsistent when making ex
ante and ex post fairness judgements (Myerson, 1981; Trautmann and Wakker,
2010). For instance, they can first support policies that aim at ex ante chance
equality, but lead to unequal incomes, and, once these unequal incomes are
realized, they then support policies that aim at ex post income equality. This
problem can arise when, at the moment of making an ex ante choice, individ-
uals do not take into account possible ex post inequality. Our result on this
matter provides indirect support for time-inconsistency, by showing that a ran-
dom allocation procedure is ex ante fair, whereas other studies have found it to
be unfair ex post. A recent working paper also reports behavior consistent with
this phenomenon: individuals often make an ex ante fair choice before out-
comes are realized, only to then switch to an ex post fair choice once outcomes
are known (Andreoni et al., 2016).
In addition, we note that it can be puzzling that individuals evaluate chances
allocated based on luck as fairer than chances allocated based on other factors
that could be easily rationalized as coming from luck, such as height. We note
that luck being perceived as fair ex ante and unfair ex post may provide an
explanation for this phenomenon. That is, on the one hand, an allocation of
chances based on height may be seen through ex post lenses, as the luck that
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could determine height has already been realized. On the other hand, an allo-
cation of chances based on luck may be seen as still not realized—i.e., as part
of a compound lottery—and therefore be perceived through ex ante lenses. An-
other possibility is that the exception of luck might have arisen through social
conventions. That is, although die rolls cannot be controlled, they could be
perceived as fair because individuals often voluntarily opt to use them to settle
indivisible claims, whereas individuals rarely settle claims based on height.
Overall, our results contribute to the literature on distributive justice in the
following ways. First, we extend the investigation of how different factors caus-
ing inequality are perceived to the ex ante domain. By doing so, we indicate
similarities and differences regarding how fairness ideals are perceived in the
ex ante and ex post domains. Secondly, by exploring a range of factors that
often serve as the basis for unequal chances in society, we show which inequal-
ities in chances are perceived as fairer than others. Lastly, by comparing who is
favored by unequal chances (i.e., groups that are generally advantaged or dis-
advantaged in society), we point out asymmetries in fairness perceptions which
are consistent with the notion of Affirmative action.
Our findings carry two potential implications for policymakers. First, the
causes of unequal distributions of chances need to be carefully considered if
one wants to make chance-equalizing policies that correspond to the fairness
perceptions of individuals. Second, considered with the results of other stud-
ies, our study suggests that individuals exhibit time-inconsistency regarding the
fairness of different redistribution policies. That is, they may support policies
that grant equal chances, but create income inequalities, only to later switch
their support to policies that aim at equal incomes. A way to avoid this re-
versal is perhaps to conscientiously consider the ex post inequalities that equal
chances may generate, whenever there are public debates on equal-chance ver-
sus equal-income policies.
We note that we do not directly investigate how the fairness perceptions
that we observe translate into redistribution behavior. For some of our conclu-
sions, we assume that they translate into such decisions. We leave it for future
research to explore whether the many differences in fairness that we find actu-
ally transform into different redistribution decisions involving monetary stakes.
The starting point for such an investigation is the work of (Krawczyk, 2010),
discussed in the introduction, which finds that individuals redistribute more
when chances are assigned based on height than on a combination of effort
and knowledge. We note that this study explicitly interprets chances based
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on height as being the same as chances based on luck—and then concludes
that individuals redistribute differently if chances are based on luck or on ef-
fort/knowledge. Our results hint, however, that height might not be a correct
proxy for luck. This is because we find that chances based on height are judged
as much more unfair than chances based on luck, effort or knowledge, all of
which are judged to be similarly fair.
Finally, we realize that while in our study participants were clearly aware of
the reason behind inequality in chances, this is often not the case in real life.
Individuals’ misconceptions of the reasons why someone might have higher or
lower chances might considerably affect their fairness judgments, and conse-
quently their support for redistributive policies. It would be interesting to mea-
sure the contribution of these misconceptions to the opposition to and support
for public policies that aim to establish ex ante equality, such as Affirmative
Action.
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Appendix
5.A. Instructions Fairness
Consider a situation in which lottery tickets are distributed between two per-
sons. Generally we ask you to assume that these two persons have a similar
social, economic and educational background. In some cases this will not be so
and you will be explicitly informed about it. Each ticket gives a 10% chance to
win the lottery. There can be only one winner in the lottery, who receives 10
EUR as a prize. The ticket allocation is as follows: one person gets 9 tickets and
thus has a 90% chance of winning the lottery prize, whereas the other person
gets 1 ticket and thus has a 10% chance of winning the lottery prize. The allo-
cation of tickets is based on various procedures. We would like to know how
fair or unfair you consider each of the following procedures to be. Please also
note that you cannot win the lottery prize in question.
Questions Fairness—Regular Block
Note for the reader: the titles of each question—displayed in Italics—were not
shown to participants.
How fair/unfair would you consider the distribution of chances to win the
lottery prize based on the following procedure:
-Knowledge: Chances are allocated based on the results in a general knowl-
edge quiz. The person with the higher results receives a 90% chance to win,
and the person with the lower results receives a 10% chance to win.
-Effort: Chances are allocated based on the results of a task that depends
on effort. In the task, people see dots appearing randomly on horizontal bars
on their computer screen. Their task is to position as many dots as possible
in the middle of the horizontal bars. The person who places more dots in the
correct position in a given time receives a 90% chance to win, and the person
who places less dots in the correct position receives a 10% chance to win.
-Luck: Chances are allocated by throwing a 6-faced die. If the die number is
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smaller than or equal to 3, one person receives a 90% chance to win, and the
other person receives a 10% chance to win. If the die number is greater than 3,
the chances are reversed.
-Height: Chances are allocated based on height. The taller person receives a
90% chance to win, and the shorter person receives a 10% chance to win.
-Weight: Chances are allocated based on weight. The heavier person receives
a 90% chance to win, and the lighter person receives a 10% chance to win.
-Gender: Chances are allocated based on gender. The two persons have
different genders. The man receives a 90% chance to win, and the woman
receives a 10% chance to win.
-ID: Chances are allocated based on student ID number. The person with the
higher student ID number receives a 90% chance to win, and the person with
the lower student ID number receives a 10% chance to win.
-Nationality: Chances between students at the School of Business and Eco-
nomics of Maastricht University are allocated based on one’s country of origin.
The German student receives a 90% chance to win, whereas the non-German
student receives a 10% chance to win.
-Ethnicity: Chances are allocated based on one’s skin color. The two persons
have different skin colors. The person with the lighter skin color receives a 90%
chance to win, whereas the person with the darker skin color receives a 10%
chance to win.
-Benevolence: Chances are allocated based on one’s decision to help. The
two persons both had an opportunity to help someone in need and only one
decided to help. The person who helped receives a 90% chance to win, whereas
the person who did not help receives a 10% chance to win.
-Family Income: Chances are allocated based on one’s parental income. The
person whose parents have a higher income receives a 90% chance to win,
whereas the person whose parents have a lower income receives a 10% chance
to win.
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5.B. Instructions Individual Control
Consider the same situation in which lottery tickets are distributed between
two persons. Generally we ask you to assume that these two persons have a
similar social, economic and educational background. In some cases this will
not be so and you will be explicitly informed about it. The allocation of tickets
is based on various procedures. Now we would like to know how much control
you consider people have over the distribution of chances for each of the fol-
lowing procedures. Again, there are no right or wrong answers. We are solely
interested in your preferences and opinions. It is important for our research
that you answer all questions honestly.
Questions Individual Control—Regular Block
How much control do you think people have over the chances they receive to
win the lottery prize, when the distribution of chances is based on the following
procedure.
Note for the reader: Procedures were described in the same manner as in the
Fairness Instructions.
5.C. Additional Information Concerning the Reverse Block
Although we did not present Luck as a procedure in the Reverse Block, we
present fairness and control ratings for Luck (obtained in the Regular Block) in
the following tables for comparison purposes.
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Table 5.5: Mean Fairness and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons—Reverse Block
Procedure Luck Family Inc. Effort ID Know. Benev. Nat. Height Ethn. Weight Gender
Luck
4.63
(1.77)
Family Income
(Inc.)
∗∗∗ 2.74
(1.79)
Effort ∗∗∗
2.52
(1.65)
ID ∗∗∗
2.33
(1.66)
Knowledge
(Know.)
∗∗∗ 2.17
(1.39)
Benevolence
(Benev.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗ 1.93
(1.44)
Nationality
(Nat.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ +
1.66
(1.21)
Height ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
1.50
(.92)
Ethnicity
(Ethn.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ 1.44
(.98)
Weight ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.35
(.62)
Gender ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗
1.32
(.83)
Note: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Stars in a cell indicate that the
procedure in the column is fairer than the procedure in the corresponding row. Holm-
Bonferroni-corrected p-values: + p<.10 ∗ p<.05; ∗∗ p<.01; ∗∗∗ p<.001.
Table 5.6: Mean Control and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Comparisons—Reverse Block
Procedure Benev. Effort Know. Weight Luck ID Inc. Height Gender Ethn. Nat.
Benevolence
(Benev.)
5.61
(1.85)
Effort ∗∗∗
4.90
(1.70)
Knowledge
(Know.)
∗∗∗ 4.63
(1.70)
Weight ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
2.78
(1.66)
Luck ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.55
(1.00)
ID ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.46
(.88)
Family Income
(Inc.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.32
(.68)
Height ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗
1.29
(.76)
Gender ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ +
1.23
(.73)
Ethnicity
(Ethn.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ 1.23
(.65)
Nationality
(Nat.)
∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗∗ ∗∗ ∗ 1.20
(.74)
Note: Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Stars in a cell indicate that the
procedure in the column is is under more control than the procedure in the corresponding
row. Holm-Bonferroni-corrected p-values: + p<.10 ∗ p<.05; ∗∗ p<.01; ∗∗∗ p<.001.
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Valorization Addendum
The chapters contained in this thesis are indented to be useful for understand-
ing the behavior of individuals in the contexts of labor markets and public pol-
icy. Chapter 2 will serve firms, unions, courts, and policymakers aiming to
understand possible reactions of workers to unfair chances and, especially, to
gender discrimination. Chapter 3 proposes a new perspective to policymakers
concerned with the negative effect of ethnic diversity on support for redistribu-
tive policies. Chapter 4 provides food for thought for managers trying to elicit
long-term effort from workers. Finally, chapter 5 is of interest to policymak-
ers with a stake in understanding how individuals perceive different sources of
unequal chances in terms of fairness.
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